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INTROU'UCTION
The election victory of the ANC in April 1994 marked the decisive end of the National
Party's apartheid rule The institution of a democratic constitution and the ANC's formal
commitment to the Reconstruction and Development Programme have raised the hopes of the
majority of South Africans that the devastation inflicted on their lives by the National Party
regime would be eliminated. Yet the legacies of apartheid remain as stark today as at the time
(If iTelson Mandela's release in 1990. Millions of black people continue to suffer the socio-
economic consequences of apartheid: mass poverty. homelessness and racial segregation
remain all pervasive. Undoubtedly, reversing the massive racial social engineering imposed
on South Africans over more than four decades will not occur overnight. Even the National
I
It Party's participation in the Government of National Unity will not rid it of its responsibility
for the atrocities of the darkest period in the country's history.
The National Party's accession to power in 1948 represented an important turning point in the
development of capitalism in South Africa. For the next thirty years, until the commencement
of the so-called reform era in the late 1970s, successive Nationalist governments rigorously
pursued apartheid policies to enforce white political and economic supremacy and racial
separation. These ideas were by no means new, but the rule of the National Party, unlike that
of its predecessors, was characterised by a singular determination to implemezt segregationist
policies. The National Party's pursuance of its racial policies occurred not only with greater
co-ordination and planning but as its hold over the state became more secure, also with
increasing coercion, especially in the 1960s. Once in power the National Party begun
promulgating a litany of laws designed to fulfil its broad aims. The Group Areas Act,
1
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Population Registration Act, Suppression of Communism Act, among others, indicated the
determination of the National Party to impose complete racial segregation and simultaneously
strike a blow against the radical opposition movement.
The Group Areas Act (GAA) which was passed in 1950 became one of the cornerstones and
arguably the flagship of the government's segregationist policies. The implementation of the
GAA resulted in the forcible removal of hundreds of thousands of blacks from their homes
and their relocation into racially exclusive areas so that by the mid-1970s the government had
largely achieved its aim of effecting complete racial residential segregation, The devastation
inflicted on communities all over the country by these policies are well recorded. The
voluminous Surplus People's Project, published in 1983, estimated that no less than three and
a half million black people were subjected to forced removals.' The experiences of integrated
communities in urban and peri-urban areas such as the Western Areas in Johannesburg,
District Six in Cape Town and Cato Manor in Durban have long captured the imagination of
scholars and the general public, The removal of Sophiatown in particular has been the subject
of numerous scholarly works, autobiographies and fictional works.'
e
Yet, until recently only scant attention has been paid to the genesis and implementation of the
GAA. Few studies have focused on the integral part played by this Act in the dynamic and
contradictory process of the making of apartheid and particularly the racial restructuring of
the urban areas in the fifties and sixties. Furthermore, the implementation of the GAA in less
well known localities than the abovementioned has also been neglected. Consequently, our
understanding of the dynamics involved in the actual application of the law remains limited.
There is little clarity on why, for example, it often took up to twenty five years for the GAA
2
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finally to be implemented in numerous areas. This is significant considering that at the time
of its promulgation, the average urban area was already up to 90 percent segregated.' If the
creation of 'group areas' was so crucial for the Nationalists, why did it take so long to be
f
I implemented? Posing this question raises vario us other issues: What were the obstacles, ifany, to the immediate implementation of the GAA? The 195Gs were characterised by
numerous local and national struggles, but with a few notable exceptions little has been
written on the struggles against the infamous GAA. Indeed. it is necessary to ask why the
main political movements did not specifically mobilise a national campaign against the GAA,
as they did against the pass laws. How was the implementation of the GAA affected by the
changing political situation in the 1950s and 1960s? To what extent did the conflict over
policy in the government and the Afrikaner alliance influence the implementation of the Act?
I
~
Since the early seventies historians, especially in the radical tradition, have shed light on some
of these issues and have enhanced our understanding of the making of apartheid in general.
The writing .. of Legassick, Wolpe and O'Meara, among others, successfully challenged the
views espoused by liberal writers which emphasised that apartheid was dysfunctional to
capitalism. These early radical historians, writing primari1y from a marxist perspective, argued
instead that apartheid was an attempt by the white state to address the contradictions and
crises faced by a rapidly industrialising society after the Second World War.1iCoercion and
racial segregation were not anomalous features in countries experiencing a late development
of capitalism. They emphasised the role played by cheap labour and coercion to maximise
capital accumulation. These writers generally focused on the broad socio-economic and
political processes in the post World War Two period. Consequently their writings tended to
be very general in character. Although limited these contributions have had a significant
3
influence on subsequent writers.
Since the 1980s social historians have pointed to the shortcomings of the early revisionist
literature on apartheid. These writers, they argue, did not sufficiently take into account the
myriad of forces which impacted on the evolution of apartheid. In particular, they have
challenged the notion of apartheid as a preconceived master plan (emanating from the Sauer
report) simply imposed on blacks when the National Party came to power. The master plan
approach does not fully appreciate the role of real living forces in the shaping of apartheid
policies. Social historians stress the important influence oflocal popular struggles, which were
not necessarily organised under the auspices of the main national political movements, on the
milking of apartheid. Bonner, et al, argue that these struggles "both shaped the terrain
traversed by political movements and played a decisive role in the rise and fall of apartheid. 115
These historians also challenged the idea that the state was merely the instrument of a
particular section or fraction of capital (particularf Afrikaner capital). In their literature the
state is described as a contested terrain in which different class interests struggle for
hegemony. The primary characteristic of social historians' approach is their attempt to write
a "history from below", focusing on the role played by ordinary individuals in the making
of history. Over the last few years an increasing number of publications have highlighted the
role of apartheid bureaucrats and township dwellers in the making of apartheid and the
struggles against it. This challenge to "great man history" has had a profound influence on
our view of the making of apartheid, revealing a complex matrix of processes, shaped as
much by the individual as by broad socio-economic and political forces .
•
Deborah Posel's work, in particular, focuses: attention on how contending forces within the
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state (based essentially on different class interests)contributed to the changes in apartheid
policies." Her explanation of the changing views of the Native Affairs Department (later Bantu
Affairs Department) in the 1950s and 19605 rejects the notion that apartheid can be "seen as
I having been fundamentally pre-planned, continuous and cumulative."? Her analysis of thestruggles with in the Native Affairs Department highlights the roles of key individuals such
as Verwoerd and Eiselen in the formulation of apartheid policies. Much of Posel's argument
centres on the changing attitudes in the state to the key issue of black integration into the
mainstream or "white" economy. However, her work and that of others, does not explain how
the changes ill national policy affected the actual implementation of specific laws such as the
GAA. Thus her recognition of "two distinct phases in the development of Apartheid", remains
confined to an explanation of national policy and its validity is not tested at the level of
practical application, namely at regional and municipal levels.
Alan Mabin has recently made an important contribution in exploring the "roots of the Group
Areas Act and the processes by which its provisions were (incompletely) applied to the urban
landscape", revealing that the GAA had a "complex genesis"." His insightful work however
concentrates primarily on the period before and immediately after the National Party came to
power. Therefore, it does not deal with the different forces which impacted on the
implementation of the GAA in the 1950s and 1960s. Importantly, Mabin attempts to locate
the GAA within the context of regional and urban planning showing that "procedures
developed under the Act both derived from established planning practices, and enticed town
planners into the implementation of comprehensive racial segregation"," showing again that
; " there were important continuities with the pre-1948 era. Mabin also analyses the origins of
regional planning, especially of African townships, on the Witwatersrand. to The ideas of
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regional planning preceded the Nationalist. government, but during its rule this concept
became central in the racial restructuring of the urban areas. Mabin suggests that urhn
planners were "seduced" by the governments commitment to greater planning in the early
fifties. However, the support for regional planning did not necessarily translate into easy
implementation. For example, what problems did regional and local authorities confront when
implementing the regional schemes of the government? What was the attitude of black people
to these plans? Regional planning was not confined to creation of African townships but also
included plans for coloureds and. Indians. The Witwatersrand region was particularly the
subject in the early 1950s of numerous attempts to co-ordinate the planning of population
distribution. The impact of these plans on the different localities of the Witwatersrand remains
unexplored.
Geographers and town planners have contributed significantly to our understanding of the
making of the apartheid city. In his analysis of the implementation of the apartheid in Port
Elizabeth, A.J. Christopher argues that the National Party had a two-pronged programme: first
to effect the complete segregation of Africans, and then to segregate the rest of the
population. The removal of Africans received top priority. II An important component in the
making of the apartheid city was that the Central Business District and inner city areas were
I •
I
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zoned for whites, whereas blacks were relegated to the peripheries of the cities. Christopher
and Robinson 12 trace the development of the segregated city back to colonial times. They
suggest that many of the ideas used by twentieth century urban planner had their origins in
the colonial period. Interestingly, it is argued that the 'twin process' of removals and
• resettlement took 35 years to implement in Port Elizabeth. 13 However, Christopher does not
analyse the underlying reasons for this 10),'g delay.
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Van Tonder's analysis of the removal of the Western Areas attempts to relate the roles played
by central government and municipalities in the implementation of the GAA.14 His dissertation
focuses largely on the role played by the Johannesburg City Council in the Western Areas
f
I Removal Scheme from the mid 19405. Importantly. Van Tonder effectively dispels the liberalview that forced removals were invented by the National Party. He highlights the role played
by leading United Party members in initiating the V. estem Areas Removal Scheme. In
particular, UP member, Sarel Tighy, was pivotal in formulating these plans before the
National Party's electoral victory in 1948.tS Another important theme developed by Van
Tonder is the role plaved by other racial groups in lobbying for the removal of Africans from
the Western Areas. Working class whites particularly pressurised their local authorities to
implement the WARS. They were profoundly influenced by the rapid increase of the urban
African population and their involvement in numerous struggles against the state. For these
whites the danger of the "swart gevaar" was a reality too close to home. Equally significant
were the)representations made by coloured residents, at least those organised by the Newclare
Ratepayers' Association, urging the Council to remove Africans from the Western Areas.
However, insufficient attention is given in Van Tonder's work to the relationship between the
different racial groups within mixed localities and their responses to the GAA and removals.
Were all coloureds in favour of the removal of Africans? Did coloureds and Africans unite
against the removals? Pirie asserts that Indians and coloureds were the most affected the
GAA and Africans only indirectly." While this view will be challenged it nevertheless
indicates the necessity to understand hew the GAA affected the different racial groups and
how they responded to it. Cachalia, in her dissertation on the removal in Pageview, shows
• that the state deliberately followed a policy of dividing people along racial lines by first
removing Africans and then proceeding to remove roloureds and Indians."
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Van Tonder also discusses the weaknesses in the campaigns of the ANC and the Ratepayers'
Association against the Western Areas Removal Scheme. He concludes that "Theft indecision
and division undermined their strategies, limited their unity and ironically strengthened the,
)
resolve of the Verwoerd government to pursue its resettlement designs.?" The inability of
the resistance movement to prevent the removal of the Western Areas at a time when defiance
against the apartheid state reached unprecedented heights is significant. Van Tender does not
question whether the weaknesses fie iden.ifies were replicated in other localities. Lodge
suggests that the ANC's late response to the removal of Sophiatown was because of its
concentration on the Defiance Campaig» .. But removals occurred throughout the fifties, and
there is no indication that the ANC organised a specific struggle against them. Lodge
acknowledges that there were numerous shortcomings in the ANC's campaign against
removals but argues that the state's determination to remove the Western Areas, made it very
difficult to mount a successful resistance campaign." The question this raises is whether the
black urban working class was sufficiently united or strong enough to mount a successful
struggle against any racial law or apartheid as a whole. The existing literature on the GAA
and forced removals does not reveal the extent to which other integrated localities were faced
with similar circumstances. How did ordinary residents of these localities respond tc forced
removals? What were the main forms of opposition to the GAA? Were there united struggles
by African, coloured and Indian people against the imposition of racial segregation? These
issues remain largely untouched because of the lack of studies focusing on the specific
experiences of people in different localities .
• Glen Adler's" study of the implementation of the GAA in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage raises
an important factor which impacted on the consciousness of black people. The mixed location
8
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nin Port Elizabeth, Korsten, was very similar to those on the Witwatersrand, and also had a
long tradition of struggle. In fact Port Elizabeth was one of the national strongholds of the
ANC in the fifties and played a prominent role in the Defiance Campaign. Yet, the removal
of Africans from Korsten occurred very rapidly and almost without opposition. Adler suggests
that many people were attracted by the idea of moving out of the overcrowded and unhealthy
conditions in the old location to the: new townships where their living standards would be
improved, albeit only marginally. h will be argued here th<l.the establishment of townships
from the 1950s was viewed by many blacks, especially Africans, as a reform ~ an
improvement on the squalor of the mh,;ed locations - which in tum imoa eted on their
responsiveness to struggles against tho GAA.
Opposition to the GAA did not or .~j' emanate from the liberation movement and its allies but
also from some municipalities. In his analysis of the GAA in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage,
Glen Adler highlights the resistance by the Uitenhage municipality to its implementation."
He shows the differences in approach by the respective Town Councils, with the former'
complying and the latter resisting the central govern.nent's policies. His study of Uitenhage
reveals conflict between the Council and the government. The Council was sympathetic to the
interests of Indian and coloured traders, and responded favourably to their requests not to be
removed. Its reluctance to move these people retarded the central government's plans to effect
complete racial segregation in that town.
•
The works of Van Tender and Adler show the necessity for research on local areas. In this
way it is possible to discuss in detail the way in which specific apartheid laws were
implemented and the responses of local people to their implementation. The abovementioned
9
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Istudies show that one cannot talk of a uniform implementation of the GAA, even though the
final outcome of complete residential segregation was always the same. The processes
leading to this conclusion were influenced by numerous factors: the vicissitudes in. national
policy, the attitude of regional and local government structures, the interests of capital and
the struggles of local people.
l
A major gap in the literature of the post-1948 period is the absence of proper and detailed
analyses of the 1960s. Most studies focus on the genesis of apartheid policies and their
implementation in the 1950s. Even Lodge's work which covers the period from 1945 to the
late 1970s only deals with the mass struggles of the early 1960s; the rest of the decade is
dealt with as part of chapters on guerilla struggle and exile politics. The general assumption
is that the 19603 represented a period of unbridled success for the apartheid regime and defeat
for the mass movement. OUf understanding of the fifties has been enhanced by numerous
insightful studies, but little research has been conducted on the sixties. This is only partly due
to the problems of gaining access to primary material on this period. Detailed studies of the
experience of ordinary people in the "golden era" of apartheid rr ,1Ststill be undertaken. This
paper hopes to make some contribution to this effort.
•
This brief study will attempt further to sl-ed some light on the issues raised above. This will
be done by analysing the implementation of the GAA &I1dforced removals in one
municipality, namely, Springs, and in particular the mixed location, Payneville, It will be
argued that the GAA and forced removals formed essential components of the government's
social engineering schemes, especially in relation to its reshaping of the urban areas. Thus an
appreciation of the making of apartheid in the fifties and sixties is crucial. An important
'.
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theme which is developed here is the centrality of regional urban planning for the
Witwatersrand. The impact of regional schemes on the development of the East Rand in
particular is explored. The interaction between the different levels of government is discussed
and it is suggested that the relationship between the central government and local authorities
was characterised primarily by co-operation, The differences which occurred between the
different tiers of government was mainly over practical details rather than the political essence
of apartheid policies, although there were of course exceptions .. This was at least partly due
to the fact that the g, vernment expended considerable energy to ensure that its policies
succeeded in the Witwatersrand. Failure in the economic hub of the country would have been
disastrous for the regime. Thus the early 1950s witnessed near frenetic activity by different
government departments to ensure proper planning and co-ordination. T!,e plethora of
commissions, conferences and establishment of committees in this period was indicative of
the seriousness with which the government tackled this issue. This study also analyses the
struggles (especially the lack thereof) against the GAA and forced removals. Itwill be argued
that the struggles in Cato Manor and the Western Areas were exceptional and that absence
of such struggles in Payneville reflected more accurately the situation in other localities.
•
This is essentially a study in local history. Its main aim is give an account of the experiences
of ordinary black people in Payneville in the fifties and sixties. This allows one to reflect nor
only on the making of apartheid policies .but also on the responses of ordinary people to the
profound changes foisted on their lives by these policies. Here the focus will be on the
experiences of Payneville's residents to the GAA and forced removals. It will be shown how
this community was torn asunder by the removals. At the same time the Payneville
community will be desegregated tv }10W how different groups - coloureds and Africans,
11
lodgers and standholders, young and old * reacted differently to the disestablishmen, of their
locality.
I The main archival source of this research was the Municipality of Springs files. These recordsform the core of much of this study. During the course of research numerous records
pertaining to the implementation of the GAA and the establishment of KwaThema were
located among the East Rand Administration Board records which are to be found a
warehouse b Germiston. These records filled an important gap in the research, especially
from the mid sixties. However, on their own these archival records only show one side of the
story and do not reflect the experiences of ordinary people. The interviews conducted with
previous residents of Payneville and Bakerton were an important source of information about
the life of the old location. They provide invaluable insights about the relationships between
people and their responses to the policies of the government. I was fortunate enor-th to meet
and discuss with people from different social and political backgrounds which allowed for the
development of a more balanced view of the old location. This study of Payneville is to a
large extent their story and it is hoped that their varied experiences are accurately reflected
here,
<::
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f • Chapter outline
Chapter one provides a general overview of the first twenty five years of apartheid. It
discusses the genesis and evolution of apartheid and within in this context the development
and implementation of the GAA. The continuities and discontinuities between the 1950s and
• the 1960s will be analysed. It will be argued that by the early 1960s the plans to establish
group areas, especially black townships, were so advanced that the changes which occurred
12
in central government policy did not fundamentally affect the implementation of the GAA.
There will also be a general discussion about the lack of struggle in the 19608.
Chanter two traces the genesis and development of the Group Areas Act. It specifically
focuses on the obstacles faced by the Land Tenure Advisory Board in its implementation of
the Act. The lack of mass opposition to the Act and forced removals is analysed and it is
shown that the main problems faced by the Board were administrative. The roles of the South
African Indian Congress and the Councils of Durban ~U1dUitenhage are highlighted as
examples of opposition to the GAA. It is argued that the objections raised by these bodies
mainly retarded the progress of the Board. Their exposure of loopholes in the Act were
counteracted by amendments to eliminate the shortcomings in the Act.
Chapter three discusses the role of regional and local governments in the implementation of
the GAA. It traces the attetf,1prS to co-ordinate government policy in the Witwatersrand from
the late 1940s as a response te the problems of rapid African urbanisation. In particular. the
chapter analysis the reasons behind the establishment of the Mentz Commission in 1952 and
the effects of its recommendations on the removal of people from the so-called "black-spots"
such as Payneville and the establishment of new townships such as Kwa-Thema, Specific
reference will be made to the recommendations by the Mentz Commission for the East Rand .
• The establishment of the Subsidiary Planning Committee to co-ordinate regional planning for
the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area will also be discussed. Finally this chapter will
discuss the attempts to plan residential accommodation for coloureds on the East Rand .
•
Chapters four, five and six form the core of this study. They trace the actual implementation
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of the GAA and forced removals in Springs from the mid-1940s to the mid"1970s. Chapter
four outlines the history of Payneville, looking at the development of industry, population
growth and struggles of blacks in the location. It discusses the rapid urbanisation experienced
by Springs from the mid thirties and the social and political problems arising from it. By the
late forties Payneville was terribly overcrowded and became the centre of political agitation.
The pe.Iod 19.'52to 1958 was characterised by the rapid growth of the new African township,
KwaThema and the volunta-:- move to it by thousands of Payneville's residents. Chapter five
discusses this process and analy.iis file lack of struggle against the GAA and forced removal
in this location. The change" .. , ;i.. ~.'\nndl's policies, which were strongly influenced by the
regional schemes of the gov, aportant part of the background to this chapter.
The relationship between the .'.,~~::,;.... . "~ . f,.10UpS and their response to the GAA are
highlighted. So too are the contradictory r,;·,.~;(:'~~es~.:)'the removals from different sectors of
the community.
•
The final chapter focuses on the implementation of the GAA in the 1960s. Throughout the
1.960s and early 1970s the futu.e of Payneville remained uncertain with various representation
made to have it declared a coloured, Indian and white group area. The chapter also discusses
the growing conflict between standholders and the Council over the removal. This was
exacerbated by the growing awareness that living conditions in the new township, Kwa-
Thema, was not as good as it was initially thought to be. In spite of these there was no open
challenge to the removals in the 1960s and the reasons for this are explored. The changing
role of the Advisory boards is also traced. It is argued that the Payneville Board cannot
simply be categorised as "sell-outs". However, the post-Sharpeville period was also
14
characterised by the growing prominence of black middle class collaborators.
A study of the removals from Payneville is especially pertinent at this juncture because or the
campaign by previous location residents to reclaim their land. Since the April 1994 election
and the promise by the government that dispossessed people could reclaim their land,
hundreds of former Payneville residents have demanded that houses should be built for them
in the old location. Interestingly, the campaign has the support of Africans and coloureds, but
is viewed with suspicion by the Indian residents from Bakerton. Whether they succeed in their
campaign or not remains uncertain. However, the campaign has highlighted the anger of
people who were forcibly removed from tt 'iomes. Many of these people believe, naively
perhaps, that the wrongs of the past will only be eradicated when they can escape the
enforced racial segregation of the National Party and return to their old location where
Africans, coloureds, Indians lived together.
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CHAPTER ONE
The making of apartheid in the fifties and sixties
I From the vantage point of the new democratic South Africa, the years of National Party ruleappear like the dark ages. The first twenty five years of apartheid are often remembered for
the apparent unbridled success of racism and oppression. From the time of the National Party's
victory in 1948 numerous unjust and coercive laws were directed against the black people.
The white minority regime seems to have become stronger with every new racist law passed.
The 1960s especially are viewed as the golden era of apartheid: not only did the economy
experience unprecedented growth but the state dealt a crushing blow to the liberation
movements. These factors in tum strengthened the hand of the government, allowing it further
to entrench segregationist and separate development policies, By the early 1970s the state had
largely succeeded in implementing the main aims of the GAA, the bantustan system was
taking shape, hundreds of thousands of African people were convicted under the pass laws
and numerous draconian laws were passed which effectively paralysed the black opposition
movement whilst giving the security apparatus increasing powers. Not surprisingly the South
African state of the time has often been compared to the Third Reich. From the perspective
of ordinary black people the apartheid state must have appeared, insuperable .
• Yet, as will be shown here, the National Party's success in implementing its racial social
engineering was not a foregone conclusion at the time of its election victory in i948. In fact,
it was not until the 1960s that the National Party was in a position fully to dictate the pace'.
I
~
of events, and even then it did not escape internal rivalry and complications. From 1948 and
throughout the 1950s the government faced various obstacles to the implementation of
17
apartheid. The dilemmas faced by it resulted mainly from its inability to resolve the problem
faced by the ruling class, namely, effective control over the black urban population. This it
was only able to achieve after dealing a crushing blow to the liberation movements in the
early 1960s. The evolution of apartheid therefore cannot be viewed as a linear process, with
the National Party building on one success after the other. The process was far more dynamic
and was influenced by various forces within the Afrikaner alliance and by the opposition of
tens of thousands of black people. It took nearly seven years dter the promulgation of the
GAA in 1950 for the government to be in a position to start using it effectively. This delay
in the implementation of a cornerstone of apartheid policy is particularly pertinent and can
only be understood within the context of the dynamic process of the making of apartheid as
Q, whole.
Post-war industrialisation and urbanisation
Apartheid was not simply the product of racist Afrikaner ideology bent on realising white
supremacy at all costs. These ideas were in circulation for decades, and previous governments
also followed policies designed to achieve white supremacy and racial segregation. The
ideology of apartheid emerged out of the post World War Two situation when the country
-(r-' experienced a dramatic industrial transformation. It represented the specific response of a
section of the white popuiation, the Afrikaners (and in particular Afrikaner capital) to the
crisis brought about by the rapid industrialisation of the forties and the concomitant surge in
black urbanisation. These interest groups wanted a government which would act decisively
to defend white interest and the interest of capital in particular. At the end of the 1940s the
~;e
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National Party appeared to be the one party with the commitment and plan to implement such
policies.
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At the end of the 1930s the South African economy was still dominated by mining and
agriculture. The African population was also predominantly rural: two million stayed in the
Reserves, 2,2 million on white-owned farms and just under one and half million in urban
areas.' However, by 1952 the industrial and urban landscapes of the country had undergone
fundamental changes. The urban African population trebled between 1936 and 1960 and the
expansion in manufacture during the Second World War resulted in . at sector overtaking
mining as the biggest contributor to the gross national product(in 1943).2 Between 1936/7
and 194617 manufacturing output grew at an average of 5,1% per annum." Economic growth
in the early forties received an impetus from the wartime conditions. The disruption of the
world economy and the increased demand for goods by the embattled western countries forced
South Africa to adopt a more rigorous policy of import substitution." This period proved to
be the kickstart to the rapid industrialisation of the economy over the next two decades.
Manufacturing expanded the fastest from the 19405. In the early 1950s this sector recorded
significant growth, ego 7,2% in 1954, but declined from then to only 1,7% and experienced
a negative growth rate of 1,4% in 1959.5 This situation was, however, reversed in the 1960s
with output growing by 8,4% per annum from 1963 to 1968.6 In spite of a decline in ::,rowth
in the late 1940s and more seriously in the early 1960s the economy continued to grow at a
relatively fast rate. Although estimates vary, it is generally agreed that in the post-war period
up to the mid 1970s the economy grew at an average annual rate of between 5-7%.7 Until
recently, many writers accepted that the South African economy experienced the second
highest growth rate in the world during the 19605, eclipsed only by the phenomenal growth
of the Japanese economy." Notwithstanding recent critiques of the accuracy of economic
J
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growth figures, it remains undisputed that the post-war period witnessed the best economici
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~ performance in the country's history," To a large extent the country's economic growth in this
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penod was part of the post-war economic boom.
The expansion of industry increased the demand for labour, especially because the growth in
I manufacturing was primarily labour intensive, at least up to the 1960s.10 The economicexpansion during the war proved particularly favourable for African workers. A large number
of white workers (about 186 000) were mobilised for the army and had to be replaced. I I The
number of Africans in industry virtually trebled between 1934 and 1946, from about 85000
to over 250 000,12 Between 1940 and 1946 alene, approximately 134 000 Africans entered
industrial employment." The proportion of Africans to whites in industry increased from 41
percent in 1935 to 52 percent ill 194514, marking an important shift in the position of Africans
in the economy. The expansion of industry also opened the doors for Africans to occupy more
semi-skilled jobs. At the end of the 1930s up to 80% of African workers were employed in
unskilled jobs but by the end of the 1940s between 30-40% were employed in semi-skilled
jobs. IS Even though this was not a dramatic increase, and was partly undermined by the return
of whites from the war, it was nevertheless indicative of the increasing dependence of industry
on African labour. The demand for labour in manufacturing rose consistently in the post-war
period. Between 1951 and 1976 employment in manufacturing increased from 855 000 to 1,6
million.l" Out of a total of 750 000 workers in the manufacturing industry in 1959, nearly
I···
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400 000 were African and only 200 000 were white. 17
An important consequence of this industrialisation was the rapid increase in African
urbanisation. In the decade from 1936 to 1946 the number of urban blacks increased from
• about 1 141 642 to 1 794212. Probably more significantly the number of urban black women
i
~ almost doubled from 350 000 to 650 00018, indicating a greater tendency to more permanent
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settlement in the urban areas. Despite the National Party's attempts to curtail African
migration to the towns, the African urban population virtually doubled between 1946 and
1960, totalling nearly 3,5 million." Although the majority of Africans remained rural-based,
the mass migration of Africans to the towns fundamentally affected the social and political
landscapes of the country. As a result of the improved situation of blacks in industry,
demands for higher wages and better working conditions increased in the early 1940s. This
was shown by the increase in strikes during the war: in 1940 only 24 strikes were recorded
but by 1942 this figure more than doubled to 58, involving nearly 13000 black workers." The
strike wave of this period marked the end of the quiescence and confusion experienced by the
black opposition movement in the 1930s ~;ndgave impetus for the formation in 1941 of the
Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU). In 1940 black workers were organised in
about 20 unions with an estimated membership of 23 000, but by 1945 this had grown to 50
unions with about 80 000 members." The latter figure has been disputed and almost certainly
exaggerates the actual strength of the union movement at the time. Many unions belonging
to CNETU were small and not very well organised. Nevertheless, the growth in union
membership during this period reflected the growing strength and confidence of black
workers. The most important struggle of this period was undoubtedly the miners' strike of
1946. The African Mine Workers' Union, under the leadership of the communist J.B. Marks,
organised a strike of 70 000 workers to demand a wage increase of lOs. Although the strike
• was bloodily repressed by the state without any concessions being made to the workers, it
nevertheless represented the climax of the black workers' struggles during the war and left au
indelible imprint 011 the consciousness of white South Africa. The growing power and
militancy of the urban working class brought home the realisation among whites that black
demands for equality would not easily be pushed aside.
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The struggles by black workers was paralleled by the struggles of communities to improve
their daily lives. The rapid increase in the black urban population was not matched by a
programme of housing provision by the state. In 1947 the Department of I~Jltive Affairs
estimated that there was a national housing shortage of 154 000 family units and 106 900
single units [mainly for migrants).22 This dire lack of housing resulted in massive
overcrowding in existing locations and the mushrooming of squatter settlements on the
peripheries of urban areas. On the outskirts of Johannesburg alone the number of squatters
swelled t:.> about 90 000,23 Land invasions became commonplace from the mid-1940s as the
demand. for accommodation reached new heights. James Mpanza, leader of the Sofasonke
Party. led thousands of tenants in 1944 to occupy municipal owned land in OrlElIld024• Similar
movements occurred in Pimville, Dube and East Rand areas. The mid 1940s also witnessed
other struggles by urban Africans against high rents and bus fares."
The Smuts government's .esponse to these developments alternated between reformist rhetoric
1945 the government passed War Measures 145 and }425 respectively, aimed at curbing black
and outright suppression. In the early 1940s, when the war effort was it its peak and an Allied
victory appeared uncertain, the United Party showed a willingness to compromise with blacks.
However, the repressive face of the government was never hidden for too long. In 1942 and
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union activity. In 1943 the police were ordered to conduct mass pass raids on the
Witwatersrand, resulting in the arrest of 13 000 people in ten days." In spite of these harsh
actions the United Party could not stem the tide of black urbanisation or the increasing
propensity to struggle among the urban black masses. Itwas the Smuts government's failure
to deal with the "swart gevaar" that cost it the election. On the other hand, the National Party
promised the electorate that it would rigorously pursue policies to defend the interest of
whites and deal ruthlessly with the "swart gevaar". On this basis it won a narrow victory in
the 1948 election. Malan and his party argued that its apartheid policies, as set out in the
Sauer report, would be the salvation of the Afrikaner volk. However, they soon discovered
that their plan was riddled with shortcomings and could not simply be imposed on the
country.
The maldag of apartheid
The fundamental .csue facing the state and capital in the late 1940s, therefore, was how to
deal effectively with the massive growth in the black urban population and its tendencies
towards militant action. The ambivalence of the United Party was deemed unsatisfactory and
there was 1:* desire among whites for a clear and decisive plan of action. The essential
dilemma faced by the ruling class was how to maintain segregation and at the same time
secure an adequate supply of cheap black labour for industry. The views within in the state,
and in particular within Afrikanerdorn on this crucial issue were often divergent. Some
supported the need for a stabilised black urban workforce:
Can we develop our industries when we have the position that the native only works
for a few months and then returns to the reserves for a couple of years? No, the native
must be trained for hii work in industry, and to become an efficient industrial worker
he must be a permanent industrial worker. On that account he must live near his place
I
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of employment?'
On the other hand there were those who regarded this view as a danger to white hegemony:
23
....
Racial and class differences will make a homogeneous Native proletariat which will
eventually lose all contact with its former communal rural relations which has
previously given their lives a content and meaning. The detribalization of large
numbers of native congregated in amorphous masses in large industrial centres is a
matter which no government can view with equanimity. Unless handled with a great
foresight and skill these masses of detribalized natives can very easily develop into a
menace rather than a constructive factor in industry .. the whole problem calls for
visi i and statesmanlike guidance."
According to Posel the question of the economic integration of Africans in the so-called
"white economy" remained at the centre of conflict within the Afrikaner alliance, the state in
i
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general and between the state and capital from the late 1940s.29 Before the 1948 election the
United Party and National Party formulated their respective plans to deal with this issue in
the form of the Fagan and Sauer reports, respectively. The Fagan Commission, .ehough
adamant in its belief that the "races differ[ed] so radically from each other that there can be
no question of assimilation 1130, nevertheless supported the idea of controlled urbanisation of
blacks. The defeat of the United Party in the elections relegated the Fagan report and its
recommendations on African urbanisation to the dustbin of history. It was the National Party's
Sauer Report that became the guide to future government policy. Its commitment to white
o supremacy formed the basis of the support it won from various Afrikaner nationalist forces.
Itsuccessfully united different Afrikaner class forces - financiers, industrialists, agriculturalists
and workers - behind the common ideological discourse encapsulated in the notion (IfI. apartheid. Effective racial segregation, firm control over the African population, and white
hegemony were the common beliefs which galvanised these disparate class forces behind the
National Party in the 1948 election. Once in power the National Party proceeded with
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unprecedented fervour and meticulousness to implement its apartheid policies. But what
exactly were these apartheid policies to be? Posel has presented an effective critique of the
argument that the Sauer Report represented a coherent blueprint for apartheid policies." She
the ultimate removal of urbanised African communities from 'white' areas, on the
has revealed contradictory aims in this report on the crucial issue of the "economic
integration" of Africans. On the one hand the report advocated total segregation, arguing for
grounds that 'the urbanisation of Natives conflicts with the policy of apartheid' .32
On the other hand. the report also reflected the practical dilemma faced by white society over
the role played by Africans in the economy and thus stated more cautiously that
as far as it was practically possible [the implementation of apartheid would] be pursued
gradually, always taking into account the national needs and interests and with the
necessary care to avoid the disruption of the country's agriculture, industries and
general interests."
These contradictory statements reflected the division between the "purist" v1d "practical"
tendencies, which were based on class differences within the Afrikaner alliance. The former
(SABRA) which believed that apartheid meant total racial segregation. It did not advocate the
position was most effectively articulated by the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs
immediate extrication of Africans from the urban areas but for the "purists" this was the
ultimate aim of apartheid policies. For SABRA economic integration meant accepting
Africans as a permanent feature in "white South Africa", which would in turn lead to
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demands from them for trade union and political rights." The Afrlkaanse Handelsinstituut
(AHI) and the South African Agricultural Union, representing the interests of Afrikaner
capital, advocated a "practical" policy which viewed apartheid "as a means of expediting
whites' access to African labour in the urban and rural areas alike."35 They advocated strong
state intervention to control the influx of African to the urban areas and simultaneously to
ensure that industrialists and farmers would be guaranteed of a constant supply of cheap
African labour.
It would, therefore, be incorrect to assert that the National Party's apartheid policy, as
emanating from tho Sauer Report, constituted a blue print of homogeneous ideas. In fact there
was a continual contest between the "purist" and "practical II factions over the policies pursued
by the government. Posel's various articles on the process of policy making within the Native
Affairs Department (later the Bantu Affairs Department) reveals intense rivalry between the
different factions." This department was integral to the formulation of government policy in
regard to Africans and its leaders, men such as H.F. Verwoerd and W.M. Eiselen, were
prominent members of the government, The contest over "bantu policy" in this department
reflected the general struggle in the National Party and government, albeit in a sharper form.
The key question is which of these factions dominated state policy. From 1948 and
I ·
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throughout the 1950s the "practical" faction in the Afrikaner alliance predominated. The
alliance of urban and rural Afrikaner capital ensured that their immediate interests M the
supply of cheap African labour - would receive priority interest in the policy of the
government. During this period the government implemented policies designed to 'stabilise'
the urban black labour force and limit further influx to the needs of industry. The dominance
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of the "practical" faction did not go unchallenged as the "purist" faction was well represented
in the government, as well as at regional and local state structures.
Apartheid ill the 1950s
Throughout the 1950s the government's policies were premised on the recognition of the
permanence of African labour in the urban areas. It therefore aimed to maximise control over
the black urban population through various measures of influx control, residential segregation
and political repression. This is reflected in the legislation passed in the immediate post-I 948
period, ego The Group Areas Act(1950), The Suppression of Communism Act (1950), The
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1951) and The Native Resettlement Act (1953). The two
key aims of these policies were the extension and entrenchment of racial segregation and the
stabilisation of the urban black population. One of the most important pieces of legislation
of the time was the Native Laws Amendment Bill, Section 10(1) of which allowed Africans
who worked continuously in an urban area for ten years for a single employers or for fifteen
for several employers to be ..~ranted permanent residential status, irrespective of subsequent
unemployment Furthermore, wives and dependents of men who had residential rights were
also recognised as permanent urban residents." At this stage the government distinguished
between urbanised (detribalised) and rural (tribal)Africans. Permanent urban residential rights
only applied to the former. This concession of residential rights for "urban" Africans was
• accompanied by numerous restrictions and influx control to keep unwanted blacks out of the
towns .
• Thus, it simultaneously attempted to fulfil its ideological aims of racial separation and to meet
I
<, .he specific class interests of capital. The frenetic activity around urban planning in the early
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1950s, especially in the Witwatersrand, was indicative of the National Party's desire speedily
to set in place its apartheid urban policies. It is important, therefore, to view the various laws
pertaining to urban planning (influx control, residential segregation) as component parts in
the broader plan to effect urban apartheid and labour controls. The implementation of these
laws constituted the most significant attempt in racial social engineering to date. The attack
on integrated location, especially the removal of the Western Areas, showed the government's
determination to enforce complete residential segregation. The introduction of labour
preferences, egothe establishment of the Western Cape as a coloured labour preference zone
showed that the National Party was determined not to leave any part of society untouched by
its racial policies. The plan to assert greater control over the movement of African labour was
enhanced by the extension of pass controls to African women. However, in spite of the
plethora of racial legislation passed in the 1950s, this decade cannot be described as an
unqualified success for the National Party and apartheid.
By the time of the election in 1958, a decade after it came to power, it was clear that the
National Party had not succeeded in achieving its main aims. Its influx control policies had
not stopped the mass migration of Africans to the urban areas. Between 1946 and 1960 the
black urban population nearly doubled to almost 3,5 million. The percentage of Africans in
urban areas increased from 24% to 32% and they outnumbered whites in almost every major
urban centre." Twelve years of Apartheid rule failed to tum the tide of African urbanisation,
and whites effectiveiy became a minority in their "own" areas. There were still numerous
integrated locations in the main urban areas and probably most importantly> black political
opposition begun to reassert itself. This situation was brought about by a combination of
inter-related factors. As indicated above the National Party succeeded ill passing numerous
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apartheid laws but their passage did not lead to immediate or successful implementation.
There were various problems, ranging from administrative weaknesses to political opposition,
which hampered the successful functioning of apartheid in the 1950s.
The National Party's first problem was that it did not have a clear majority in parliament,
having won less than 50% of the votes in the 1948 election. Even though the party
strengthened its electoral position throughout the 1950s, it was not until the 1958 election that
it won an absolute majority of white votes. Furthermore, in a number of important
municipalities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town, the opposition United Party still had
a strong political presence. In the 1950s the National Party was unable to ride roughshod over
its opposition in parliament and regional authorities as it was able to do from the 1960s. It
was often forced to negotiate and even compromise with opposition parties. However, the
official white opposition proved to be fairly timid and in many cases acquiesced with the
National Party policies," By the time of the 1958 election two splinter parties had split off
from the United Party, and its more radical supporters linked up with the Congress of
Democrats, a member of the Congress Alliance. This effectively paralysed the white liberal
opposition and gave the National Party almost complete hegemony over white politics.
• opposition parties to retard their implementation (see chapter two for a more detailed
There were also loopholes in many of the laws passed which were effectively used by
discussion of this aspect in relation to the GAA). The South African Indian Congress in
particular used legal recourse to great effect, often succeeding in causing long delays in the
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final implementation of racial laws. But the success of these measure were ephemeral as the
National Party soon closed the loopholes exposed by opposition lawyers. Mass opposition also
played an important role in hampering government plans. This was especially the case with
influx control. The govzrnment's attempts to extend passes to African women was opposed
through non-compliance and mass mobilisation. Thousands of women were involved in local,
)
anti-pass protests, culminating in the march by 20 000 women to the Union Building in
Pretoria in 1956.40 The Defiance Campaign of 1952 and the anti-pass campaigns of the early
1960s further undermined the effectiveness of the pass system. These struggles made it
virtually impossible for the government immediately to enforce passes on women, and it was
only after the Sharpeville massacre that it was in a position effectively to use passes as a
control mechanism.
The picture that emerges of apartheid in the i950s is therefore a contradictory one. In spite
of its fervent pursuance of apartheid ideals, the National Party was unable in the first decade
of its rule to achieve all of its aims. But the National Party also used its increasing power
in the state to strike blows against the black political opposition, while at the same time fine"
tuning its apartheid policies. Segregation and repressive laws were amended throughout the
1950s to eliminate loopholes and make them more effective. Another feature of this period
was the operation of numerous commissions to investigate how best to implement National
Party policy. By the end of the 1950s therefore the National Party succeeded in putting into
i •
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place the essence of its apartheid legislation and bureaucracy. Yet, even as it was
strengthening its hold on white politics and the state, the National Party was acutely aware
of growing resistance from black people. This was reflected in what was probably its most
hysterical "swart gevaar" election campaign in 1958. The next few years proved to be an
I
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important test of the balance of power between the racist National Party government and the
black opposition movement led by the ANC.
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The 19608: apartheid's second phase
The period from 195.8to 1962 was critical in the development of apartheid. The National
Party's electoral victory in 1958, which gave it a clear parliamentary majority, marked a
decisive point in white politics. The weakness of the liberal opposition meant rendered it
incapable of challenging the growing power of the National Party, However, this success
came at a time when black resistance, led by the Congress movement, was rejuvenated and
entered one of its most militant periods. Underpinned by the struggles of black workers in the
factories in the late 1950s, the urban black working class engaged in numerous struggles
against apartheid laws. Unionised workers organised in the South African Congress of Trade
Uni<:m.sem.barked on the "£1 a day" campaign, to demand a minimum wage. In the townships
~&$ w~re mobilised against the pass laws and struggles for improvements in their living
OMditions. The late fifties were a watershed in the struggle against apartheid: ~he bus
boycotts, general strikes, wage struggles, and the anti-pass law movement were important
signs of the growing strength and confidence of the black working class.
Itmay be argued that the state and capital faced a serious crisis at the beginning of'the 1960s.
The state's response was to go onto the offensive. The Sharpeville massacre and the
subsequent banning of the ANC and PAC were major blows struck against the opposition
movement. The ANC and its allies reacted by organising general strikes, indicating some
recognition by it of the importance of the organised workers. But the sabotage campaigns by
Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo, the ANC and PAC military wings respectively, as well as by
the African Resistance Movement (ARM), were the main response from the liberation
movements. This was in tum followed by greater repression from the state. In the wake of
these events, there was a capital outflow ofR180 million in 1960.41 This blow to the economy
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•The 1960s: apartheid's seeund phase
The period from 1958 to 1962 was critical in the development of apartheid. The National
Party's electoral victory in 1958, which gave it a clear parliamentary majority, marked a
decisive point in white politics. The weakness of the liberal opposition meant rendered it
incapable of challenging the growing power of the National Part-y'.However, this success
came at a time when black resistance, led by the Congress movement, was rejuvenated and
entered one of its most militant periods. Underpinned by the struggles of black workers in the
factories in the late 1950s, the urban black working class engaged in numerous struggles
against apartheid laws. Unionised workers organised in the South African Congress of Trade
Unions embarked on the "£1 a day" campaign, to demand a minimum wage. In the townships
people were mobilised against the pass laws and struggles for improvements in their living
conditions. The late fifties were a watershed in the struggle against apartheid: the bus
boycotts, general strikes, wage struggles, and the anti-pass law movement were impcrtant
signs of the growing strength and confidence of the black working class.
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It may be argued that the state and capital faced a serious crisis at the beginning of the 1960s.
The state's response was to go onto the offensive. The Sharpeville massacre and the
subsequent banning of the ANC and PAC were major blows struck against the opposition
movement. The ANC and its allies reacted by organising general strikes, indicating some
recognition by it of the importance of the organised workers. But the sabotage campaigns by
Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo, the ANC and PAC military wings respectively, as well as by
the African Resistance Movement (ARM), were the main response from the liberation
movements. This was in turn followed by greater repression from the state. In the wake of
these events, there was a capital outflow ofR180 million in 1960.41 This blow to the economy
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followed a decline in economic growth in the late 1950s. At the beginning of the sixties
South African society faced an unprecedented political ana economic crisis. Once again the i
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struggles of the black urban and rural population threw white politics into turmoil, As at the
end of' the 19408 there were again serious reviews by the strategists of the state and capital
to find the best response to the new situation. Under these circumstances the divisions
between the l'practical"/verligtes and "purist"/verkramptes factions were once again thrown
,. to sharp relief.
In her discussion on state policy towards Africans in the 1960s, Posel shows that the
Afrikaner alliance and especially the Bantu Administration Department were racked by
controversy." Within the cabinet, senior ministers (Donges, Sauer, and Schoeman) asked
prime minister Verwoerd to eliminate pass books." Their sentiments were supported by
Afrikaner and English capital which called for more reforms. They were especially concerned
about entrenching the separation between urbanised and "tribalised'' Africans. By making
more concessions to the urbanised Africans they believed the government would be able to
create a compliant and "loyal middle-class type bantu" .44 These ideas even found resonance
within SABRA, albeit from a minority faction, and from a "dissident faction" in the Dutch
Reformed Church. The latter criticised the migrant labour system as anathema to fami1y life
and called for improvements in the lives of Africans. 45
However, this reformist faction encountered strong opposition within the National Party and
the state. Given ideological coherence by the increasingly influential Broederbond, the
verkramptes insisted that the policies pursued by the National Party in the 1950s were a
failure and called for more radical measures to secure white supremacy. The verkramptes
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consisted mainly of the' "purist" faction in the Afrikaner alliance, but nJW also included the
~AAU. Importantly, this alliance was given greater ideological and political cohesion by the
increasingly influential Broederbond. The verkramptes were extremely critical of the growing
dependence by whites on African labour, which they felt seriously undermined the essence
nf apartheid. These ideas penetrated virtually every part of the Afrikaner alliance, including
the previously "practical" SAAU. The spreading of these ideas was to a large extent a
consequence of the Broederbond's success in infiltrating various Afrikaner organisations and
state departments," The verkrampte faction was very influential within the BAD, and it is
within this department that the struggle between the different factions was most fiercely
contested throughout the 1960s. In the early 1960s the Broederbond and its allies in the BAD
set about reversing the National Party's policies in regard to Africans in urban areas. In 1960
they drafted the Bantu in European Areas Dill which called for the fixing of labour quotas.
They denounced section 10 'rights' "as an indefensible deviation from the principles of
separate development". 47 This idea was integrally linked to another reversal in BAD policy,
namely, the distinction between "urbanised" and "tribalised'' Africans. According to BAD all
Africans had to be regarded as the same and derided the notion of "detribalised" Africans.
Consequently they advocated "ethnic self-determination", which became the ideological
justification tor the development of the "homelands" policies. MC Botha, Minister of Bantu
Affairs, succinctly articulated the position of the "purist":
I
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The Bantu in the white urban areas cannot be dissected from their national relatives
in the homelands, not even if they were born here in the white areas. The Bantu in the
white area and those in the Bantu homelands are linked into one nation ... The national
consciousness of the Bantu is more deeply rooted than many people realise and are
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prepared to accept."
The opposition from business and many local authorities forced the BAD to withdraw its
1960 Bill49, but throughout the decade it attempted to undermine the "rights" of Africans in
the urban areas. In 1967 the government introduced the Physical Planning and Utilisation of
in industry outside the Bantu areas." and in 1970 the government enforced a labour quota on
Resources Bill which intended to "peg or reduce (the number) of Bantu workers employed
industry," The BAD was less successful in getting the government to eliminate section J 0
"rights", largely because of opposition from business. The resistance from urban busines ,":',
I
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successful in the 1960s partly because or the economic boom which increased the need for
labour. However. their opposition was only against those aspects of apartheid policy which
business felt would adversely affect their particular interest. For the rest, the 1960s
represented the highpoint of social engineering by the National Party, the political basis for
which WFJS created by the smashing of the liberation movements. The security clampdown of
the early 1960s included the detention of approximately 20 000 activists, charges of sabotage
against hu 'd-~ds and the promulgation of numerous security laws: the Defence Amendment
Act (19:.1); General Laws Amendment Act, which included the 12 day detention clause; the
Sabotage Act (1962); the 90-day detention law of 1963 and the general proliferation of the
security apparatus." The Rivonia trial of Mandela and other ANC leaders in 1964 represented
the final nail in the coffin for the libero :m movements in the 1960s. By that time the ANC
and PAC had established themselves' in exile and the internal movement was smashed into
acquiescence.
The defeat of the black opposition, the disintegration of the liberal parties and the economic
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boom of the 1960s tended to ease the tension between the verkramptes and verligtes as they
all basked in the glory of' their success. This was also the time when the National Party was
able to implement much of its racist agenda. Residential segregation and urban removals were,
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implemented with impunity. Tighter influx controls and more pass raids kept the African
urban population in a c- mstant state of uncertainty. Separate development and border
industries gained momentum in this period, so that by the early 1970s the bantustan policy
was reaching its apogee with the prospect f;Jf "independence" being granted. In contrast to the
1950s, the National Party was able to implement virtually any poi:icy it wished in the 1960s
without too "TIuchparliamentary or extra-parliamentary opposition.
There has been considerable debate over the continuities and discontinuities in the making
of apartheid during the 1950s and 1960s. Posel has criticised O'Meara and others for
presenting a "grand plan" view of apartheid Her contention that the "construction of
Apartheid has not been a wholly linear, systematic or monolithic project''" seems to be
supported by the available evidence. Yet, a primary characteristic of the post-1948 period was
pre.'.:sely the emergence of greater planning and co-ordination. The racial restructuring of the
urban areas begun in the fifties and the "homelands" system epitomised the Nationalist's social
engineering. But the eventual success of these plans should not blind us to the fact that their
implementation was not guaranteed. Moreover, these policies were contested within the
government and by outside opposition forces, which affected the way they were implemented.
Maylam has argued that the primary contradiction in segregation and urban control policies
arose out of the state's plans to secure an adequate supply of cneap African labour while
11_
,\
'~
simultaneously minimising their presence in the cities.53 He suggests that in the 1960s the
state was most successful in managing these contradictions." The basis for the state's success
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debilitating effect on the state, mainly because of the weakness of the black opposition. The
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in the 1960s was created by the defeat of the liberation movements =nd the economic boom.
The continued conflict between the veriigtes and verkramptes in the 1960s did not have a
,
I
favourable conditions of the 1960s created greater scope for the state simultaneously to pursue
policies which benefitted both capital and the rabid racists. Capital accepted most of the
apartheid laws passed in the 1960s as long as these laws did not interfere with thea access
to cheap labour. In fact, the quiescence of English and Afrikaner business is indicative of
their general satisfaction with the policies followed by the government. Verkramptes, on the
other hand. continued campaigning for tighter controls over the African urban population but
did not insist on the complete removal of Africans from the urban areas. The one thing on
which there was unanimity in the Afrikaner alliance was that the urban black population had
to be controlled. This meant curtailing and repressing any possible black opposition. The state
and capital understood the significant role played by the black opposition in challenging
apartheid.
Popular resistance against apartheid
An important question which this dissertation explores is the extent to 'which there were
struggles against the implementation of the GAA in the 1950s and 1960s. Pirie has argued
that civil unrest or mass struggles were not the most prominent response to the GAA. Rather
opposition took the form mainly of media protests, representations and public meetings." If
this assertion is true then the question it raises is why the struggle against one of the most
important apartheid laws was so muted. One may add a more general question: why did the
struggles in this period not prevent or defeat the implementation of apartheid? In order to
address these questions it is necessary briefly tJ assess the struggles of the 1950 and 1960s.
Here it is only possible to do this in a very schematic fashion and highlight some of the main
features of the period. Other writers have dealt in considerably more detail with this issue"
although as Bonner, et al, have noted the extant literature focuses mainly on leading
personalities and national campaigns. 57
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The 19505 are generally viewed as a watershed in the struggle of blacks against racism and
oppression. This is easilv understandable because the 1950s witnessed the transformation of
the ANC into a popular movement, creating the basis for its mass appeal from the early
19808. Moreover, the leaders of the struggle in the 1950s - Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Mhlaba,
Tambo ~ also became the popular icons of the struggling masses in the 19805. These leaders
played an important role in the transformation of the ANC from being an elitist movement
engaging primarily in the struggle of petitions and deputation, to a more radical movement
prepared to lead mass struggles. As leading figures in the Youth League, Mandala and his
comrades, took control of the.ANC in the late 1940s, marking a decisive turning point in the
history of the ANC, which then went on to adopt the radical Programme of Action in 1949.
At the beginning of the 1950s the new look and radicalised ANC prepared itself to battle the
National Party and its apartheid policies. The struggles waged by the Congress Alliance,
factory workers and the communities allover the country profoundly influenced the
development of apartheid. The struggles of the 1940s, impacted seriously on the
consciousness of capital, the state and the white population as a whole. Bringing the black
urban population under control thus became a key aim for these forces. It was precisely
against these measures of control '(hat most of the struggles of the 1950s were waged.
The first indication of a shift in the character of protest politics was the stayaways on May
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Day and June 26 to oppose the proscription of the Communist Party of South Africa.
According to Lodge these actions did not yet signify the transformation of the ANC from an
elitist to popular organisation," but they were an early sign of what lay ahead in the 1950s.
The Defiance Campaign of 1932 was the first real attempt by the ANC to lead the masses
against the government. In January of that year the ANC sent an ultimatum to the government
demanding the repeal of six 'unjust laws'; the GAA, the Suppression of Communism Act, the
Bantu Authorities Act, Stock Limitation Act, the Voters' Representation Act and the pass
laws.59 Thousands were in active defiance of apartheid laws throughout the country, with over
8000 volunteers arrested for their involvement. 60 Although none of the above laws were
repealed, the campaign was nevertheless significant for the ANC. At the end of 1952 it could
claim a membership of nearly 100000,61 which even if exaggerated represented a phenomenal
increese in support for the movement. The increase in membership was also a reflection of
the widespread support which then existed for the ANC allover the country. The campaign
also injected a new enthusiasm of defiance among ordinary people. Even though the activities
of ANC did not remain at the same pitch as during the Defiance Campaign, resistance by
ordinary people continued. Some of the most notable struggles in the 1950s were the school
boycotts in 1955. the bus boycott in Evaton and Alexandra in 1955·57, the £.A~Day campaign
of Sactu and the general struggle against the pass laws. Equally important was the resistance
against government laws by ordinary people in locations and squatter camps. As recent
• writers'" have indicated, women and youth were especially recalcitrant in the face of the
state's attempts to impose tight controls over them. The difficulty the government had in
extending pass laws to women, was indicative of the ability of ordinary people, with and
without the assistance of national organisations, to defy the laws of apartheid.
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In spite of the numerous shining examples of struggles waged against the apartheid
government, the reality remains that by the early 1960s apartheid laws not only remained
intact but were more or less successfully imposed on the black population. There is little
dispute that the use of force by the state in the post-Sharpeville period was crucial in
subduing the movement. Yet, this is an inadequate explanation for the quiescence of the
1960s. A critical analysis of the liberation movements in 1950s is required to understand why
black resistance failed to defeat the government's apartheid policies. Few writers have given
critical assessments of the struggles of this period." Much more detailed analyses are required
and here it will only be possible to pose more questions, some of which will be explored in
the further chapters.
In their recent work on the struggles of the working class in the 1950s Fine and Davis suggest
that there should be greater sensitivity to the inherent weakness of the black working class
in the 19508.154 They argue that the "roots of working class vulnerability lay in the economy,
deriving from the structural position of workers in production. In particular, the black
industrial labour force, as the most advanced sector of the working class as a whole, was still
relatively small, dispersed and de-skilled .... the bargaining power of black workers was no
stronger [in the 1950s] than it had been in the 1940s."65 Notwithstanding the important...
inroads made by blacks into industry since the early 19405, the formation of a strong working
class was still in its infancy. A further hindrance to the development of a collective class
consciousness was the dispersal of the workforce in small plants. In 1953/4, 65 per cent of
factories employed less than 9 workers and in 1959 the average of number of workers per
factory was approximately 43.66 '.'h', majority of black workers also remained employed in
unskilled positions, further weakening their bargaining position An additional impediment
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was the occurrence of a high labour tum over among African workers," which would have
made it very difficult to effect strong workplace organisations. Fine and Davis also warn
against exaggerating the strength of the industrial workforce in comparison with that in the
rest of the economy. The majority of African people were overwhelmingly rural and in 1960
only 400 000 Africans out of 11 million were employed in industry." Also many Africans
who left the rural areas went to work on the mines, which afte- tne defeat of the 194( l-'t;~l.·';
remained quiescent throughout this period.
A factor wbieh ~~ only recently begun to receive proper attention is the differentiation within
the urban l);lagees. Concepts such as 'nation' and 'masses' are convenient descriptions but give
a fal~e impression of homogeneity among black people during this period. One aspect that
is often glossed over is the fact that the majority of black urban dwellers in the 1950s were
recent immigrants from the rural areas. Bonner, relying partly on the earlier work by Philip
Mayer69, has questioned certain assumptions about the urbanisation of migrants. Describing
the urbanisation of Africans as a "complex and ambiguous process"," he suggests that urban
life for many first generation immigrants remained conditional, with many of them
consciously and deliberately maintaining ties with their rural homes. The impact of this on
the struggles in the 1950s still needs to be explored but it clearly raises questions about the
development of an urban or even working class consciousness among these immigrants.
Consequently, their involvement in struggles to improve living conditions in the urban areas
was not necessarily automatic.
One other factor influencing the character of the struggles in the 1950s, which has received
very little attention, is the impact of the state's 'reforms' on the consciousness of wide layers
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of the urban population. It may be strange to describe the racist policies of the National Party
in the fifties as 'reform's but the reality is that there were social improvements in the lives of
many people. What has made it difficult for these improvements to be accepted as reforms
is that they occurred in the guise of racial social engineering, and were thus scorned, even by
those who benefitted from the improvements. Nonetheless, the state's massive housing
programme of the 1950s, designed to assert greater control over the urban black population,
resulted in many people who lived in squatter camps or in overcrowded conditions in
locations acquiring houses for the first time in their lives. These houses were more than often
of a poor quality but represented an improvements on the squalid conditions experienced
especially by lodgers and illegal squatters in locations such Sophiatown, Payneville, etc. Many
of these people would have found it difficult to struggle against their removal from the old
locations to the new townships built in the 1950s. It is thus important to recognise that the
leadership of the liberation movement did not have access to a homogeneous urban mass
prepared to struggle for its class interests.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s the situation described above begun to change. The
creation of massive townships and the implementation of 'bantu education' tended to
homogenise the black urban population. This tended to undermine the division within the
African population and started developing a greater sense of unity. As in the eighties the
existence of massive townships gave its occupants a better appreciation of their collective
power. Influx control and section 10 'rights' militated against high labour turnovers, resulting
in the development of a more stable workforce, which in tum made it easier to organise
workers into unions. As more workers became dependent on wage labour, demands for better
remuneration begun to emerge. These changes created the basis for the renewed upsurge in
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struggle in the late 1950s. The severe repression unleashed by the state after Sharpeville
struck a serious blow to the black opposition. But the defeat of the movement which ensued
cannot adequately be explained by the state's repression. At least some of the reasons for this
must be accounted for by weaknesses of the leadership.
Here it is only possible to cite one or two salient examples of how the political approach of
the leadership adversely affected the struggle aga' It apartheid. In 1957 the South African
Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu) launched it campaign for a national minimum wage or the
£1 a day campaign. In the same year Sactu organised a successful stayaway in support of
their demand with impressive support in Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg. According to
Lodge the successful mobilisation of organiced workers "generated a revived faith among
political leaders in the potency of working-class forr, 'j of struggle"." Yet, in the next period.
the ANC leadership tended to undermine the potential power of the organised working class.
Its decision to make the 1958 white elections the focus of the General. Strike that year
undermined Sactu's intention to step up the campaign for a national minimum wage. Unlike
with the 1957 strike Sactu was not centrally involved in the 1958 strike and consequently it
was less successful. Trade union leader, Dan Tloome, criticised the basis on which the ANC
leadership attempted to mobilise the people," although he also believed that Africans were
not yet class conscious." The official position of the South African Communist Party, based
on its analysis of Internal Colonialism, was that the class struggle had to be subordinated to
the national democratic struggle." The centrality of working class control of the liberation
movement was contested in the liberation movements throughout the fifties. The post-
Sharpeville crisis, however, forced the leadership of the movement to act decisively, The
course of action which they embarked on in response to the state violence had a profound
42
--------------------------------~ ~ .n .. ~ ...... ~ __~~ __.. .. ~~~
16 s.
impact on the struggle of the working class.
After the banning of the ANC and PAC, Sactu was the largest national organisation in the
country allowed to operate legally. With the support it gained from the late 1950's the trade
union movement was in a good position to become the main vehicle for protest against the
apartheid regime. The strengthening of the position of black workers in industry in the 1960s
could have placed Sactu in a much better bargaining position than in the 1950s. However, the
tum to sabotage and guerilla struggles by the ANC and PAC denuded the trade union
movement of some of their most capable activists. For many activists there appeared to be
no alternative to the proposed tum to guerilla warfare. The successful insurgency wars fought
by Che Guevara and Castro appeared to be the ideal examples of what should be done against
the warfare by the white regime against blacks in South Africa. The shift to recognising that
a violent struggle would be necessary to topple the apartheid government was in itself
profoundly important and inspired many to join the leadership of the liberation movement in
their quest to inflict a military defeat on the white regime. Yet, as Baruch Hirson (an activist
in the sabotage campaign of ARM) recently admitted,
... We were not blindly following the Cuban/Vietnamese/Algerian experience, There was
no obvious alternative strategy in sight. If, however, we had probed deeper, we might
have seen that there was a basic rupture between what we were saying and the class
analysis upon which we had always prided ourselves ...The new course we were
adopting would take us away from the workers who were essential for the building of
a socialist society. 75
•
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This is not the place for a lengthy discussion on the tum to armed struggle. Suffice it to say
the argument that there was no alternative to this course of action is flawed. Fine and Davis
argue that from the late 1950s the ANC leadership was "out of step with the tempo of the
class struggle"?" and arguably abandoned the class struggle at a time when the working class
was showing a willingness to act as a class in the struggle against the state. The denudation
of activists did not only adversely affect the trade union movement Communities were also
deprived of many of their most capable leaders who went into exile. However, in matters like
this it is necessary to have a sense of balance. Under the severely repressive conditions of the
sixties there could be no guarantee that a mass struggle against the government would succeed
or even be sustained. Thousands were arrested and some were brutally murdered by security
forces. The impact of these measures on the popular consciousness cannot be underestimated
and took many years before ordinary people overcame their fears. It is ironic therefore that
at the time the black working class was gaining in strength, the movement was smashed by
the government and was unable effectively to mobilise that power against the state. However,
in less than ten years the urban working class begun to reverse the setbacks of the 1960s with
the docks strikes in Durban in 1969 and again in 1973. The late 1960s also witnessed the
early stirring of discontent among black students with the emergence of the black
consciousness movement.
This chapter has attempted to outline some of the most important features of the dynamic and
complex processes in the making of apartheid from 1948 to the end of the 1960s. It is clear
that numerous forces impacted on this process and contributed to the specific routes followed
by policy makers, This study hopes to make a useful contribution in shedding more light on
the GAA and forced removals. In so doing it is intended to test some of the general
---'------.-----,--------------. S}
arguments raised about the genesis and evolution of apartheid.
NOTES
1. Hirson, B: Yours for the Union, Witwatersrand University Press, Johanne: f;J. 1989, p.2
2. Lodge, T: Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1983,
p.11
3. Nattrass, N: "Economic Aspects of the Construction of Apartheid", in Bonner, P, et al
(eds): Apartheid's Gene~i.s.. Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1993, p.43
4. ibid
5. Innes, D: Anglo, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1984, p.173
6. ibid, p.188
7. Beinart, W: Twentieth Century South Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1994,
p.165.
8. Since the late 1960s various writers, marxist and liberal, have repeated this point. See for
example, Legassick, M: "Legislation, Ideology and Economy"; O'Meara, D, Volkskapita1i§lme;
Nattrass, J, The South African Economy. Recently, however, Terence Moll has questioned this
assumption, arguing that in fact the growth was not only less spectacular but was also less
than countries at a similar economic development. See Moll, T: "Did the South African
Economy Fail?", Journal of Southern African Studies, voLl7, 2, 1991
9. Moll does not dispute this. His main criticism is about the precise rate of growth and
particularly questions the idea that the South African economy was the second fastest growing
in the ] 960s.
10. Innes, D: Anglo, pp.I69-170
11. Beinart, W: Twentieth Century, p.l25
12. Fine, R and Davis, D: Beyond Apartheid, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1991, p.13
13. Innes, D: Anglo, p. 227
14. Fine. R and Davis, D: Beyond Apartheid, p.14
• 15. Bonner, P: "African Urbanisation on the Rand between the 1930s and 1960s", Inaugurallecture, University of the Witwatersrand, 1993, pp. 7-8
16. Beinart, W: Twentieth Century, p.165
45
19. ibid, p.IJ6
46
17. Fin~, R and Davis, D: Beyond Apartheid, p.155
18. ibio, p.14
20. Hirson, B: Yours for the Union, p.87
21. Stein, M: "Black Trade Unionism During the Second World War - The Witwatersrand
Strikes of December 1942", p.94
22. Morris, P: A HistolY of Black Housing in South Ah~.®, South African Institute of Race
Relations, 1981, p. 36
23. Lodge, T: Black Politic~ p.1S
24. Morris, P: Black Housing, pp. 36-37
25. Hirson, B: Yours for the Union, Chapters 11 and 12
26. Morris, P: Black Housing, p.36
27. House of Assembly Debates, 1947. Quote taken from Legassick, M: "Legislation,
ideology, and Economy in P<:lst-1948South Africa", Journal of Southern Africa Stydies. vol.l,
1, 1974, p.l3.
28. ibid, from the Board of Trade Industry, Report No. 282
29. See for example Posel, D: "The Meaning of Apartheid before 1948", Journal of Southern
African Studies, vol 14. no.1, 1987
30. ibid,
31. ibid
32. ibid, p.136
33. ibid
•
34. ibid, p.l27
35. ibid, p.l30
36. See for example Posel, D: "The Construction of Apartheid, 1948 ·1961"; "The State and
Policy-Making in Apartheid's Second Phase", paper presented to the African Studies Institute,
University of the Witwatersrand, 1990
37. Posel, D: "The Construction of Apartheid", p.11
38. Fine and Davis, Beyond Apartheid, p.156
39. See for example D. van Tonder's explanation of the role of United Party councillors in
Western Areas Removal Scheme.
40. Lodge, T: Black Politics, p.144
41. Innes, D: Anglo, p.173
42. Posel, D: "The Constr-iction of Apartheid"
43. ibid, p4
44. ibid, pp. 4-5
45. ibid
46. ibid, pp. 9-10
47. ibid
48. ibid, p.lO
49. ibid, p.ll
50. ibid, pp.15-16
51. Bloch, G: "Sounds in the Silence: Painting a Picture of the 1960s", Africa Perspective,
25, 1984
52. Posel, U: "The Construction of Apartheid", p.l
53. Maylam, P: "The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in South Africa", African Affairs,
89, 1990, p.74
54. ibid, p.57
55. Pirie, G: "Race Zoning in South Africa: Board, C iurt, Parliament, Public", Political
Geography Quarterly, vol 3, 3, 1984
/:;:::
I.
1
j
1,
1\
56. For example: Lodge, T:Black Politics; Fine, R and Davis, D: Jleyond Apartheid
57. Bonner, P, et aI, ~.partheid's Genesis, pp. 16 -20
58. Lodge, T: Black Politi~ pp. 34 - 35
59. ibid, p.42
60. ibid, p.46• 6' ibid, p.61
47
76. Fine and Davis: Beyond Apartheid. p.251
48
62. For example Glaser, C: "When are they going to fight? Tsotsis, Youth Politics and the
PAC" in Bonner, P, et al: Aparthejd's ($ne§is
63. The works of Lodge IIDdFine and Davis are some of the notable exceptions
64. Fine. R and Davis, D: ~ong Apartheid, Ravan Press, 1991
65. ibid, pp. 153 - 154
66. ibid, p.154
67. Bonner, P: "African Urbanisation", p.8
68. Fine and Davis, BeYQndApru;theid. p.155
69. Philip Mayer's Tribesmen and Townsmen is a fascinating study of the process of
urbanisation in the East London.
70. Bonner, P: "African Urbanisation", p.2
71. Lodae, T: ~k.£.Q.Ji1ics, p.194
72. ibid, p.196
13. Lambert, R: "Trade Unionism, Race, Class and Nationalism in the 1950s Resistance
Movement", in Bonner, P' et al (eds): Apartheid's Qen~~, p. 282
74. ibid, 281
75. Hirson, B: Rev.QlutiQns in mx.,Life, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1995,
p. 301
I·I
l~
~
I
i'[
I
CHAPTER TWO
The Group Areas Act in the fifties: from inertia to consolidation
The previous chapter ",r~ued that the National Party came to power without a clearly worked
out plan about precisely how it was going to implement its apartheid polices. The main aim
of this chapter is to show how this affected the implementation of the Group Areas Act. From
the time of the Act's pro.nulgation nearly seven years elapsed before it started functioning
effectively. However, as Posel acknowledges, the lack of a blueprint did not mean that the
government operated on an ad hoc basis. I This applied to apartheid in general and the GAA
specifically. Two of the key aims of apartheid policy were to impose stricter control over the
urban-based black population and to enforce complete and compulsory racial separation all
over the country. The GAA, which according to prime minist- , Nlalan "was apartheid'", must
be viewed as integral to these aims. The Act was not merely the fulfilment of the racial
ideology of the Afrikaner alliance. The National Party's fervent commitment to racial
segregation and white supremacy is unquestioned, but it was particularly determined to
preserve the hegemony of (white)capital over the mass of black labourers. Historically, a
critical aspect of racial balkanisation in South Africa was to effect maximum possible control
by the ruling group over the oppressed people. The establishment of reserves and segregated
locations were designed to achieve this aim. The GAA represented a continuation of these
• policies, but with mora far-reaching consequences.
The creation of 'group areas' and the removal schemes were integral to the dramatic'. reshaping of the country's cities in the 1950s. The rapid industrialisation cf the economy
necessitated changes to the organisation and structure of urban areas. However, the National
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Party was determined to infuse this reorganisation with racial segregation. It not only aimed
to set racial segregation on a new footing but also to reverse existing practices of residential
racial integration. The forcible removal of people from integrated locations became an
(
\,
important corollary of the GAA. Therefore legislation which was directed specifically at urban
Africans should be viewed in conjunction with the GAA. The disestablishment of integrated
locations became a crucial target for the National Party. Not only were they contradictions
to the essence of racial separation, but were invariably the centres of black opposition.
However, the removal of "black spots", as these integrated location became known, did not
resolve the problems for the government, Removals was one thing, but deciding where to
m« "'0 people of different 'races' was more complicated. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the
establishment of numerous segregated townships all over the country, as tens of thousands of
people were moved from old locations and squatter camps, and herded into these new racially
exclusive townships .. The siting of these townships was in itself problematical as the interests
of various groups had to be accommodated. For example, industrialists wanted townships
situated in close proximity to industrial areas and white 1 generally wanted them as far away
from their residential areas as possible.
The implementation of the GAA depended crucially on the involvement and co-operation of
regional and local government structures. Most local authorities complied with the
• government's plans. However, even the limited opposition from some Councils caused
considerable delays in the implementation of 'group areas', One area of tension between the
central government and municipalities was over who should bear the cost of the racial zoning'. of the towns. Oppositi. 1 from other groups, such as the South African Indian Congress,
used the legal loophoies in the legislation to hinder the government's work. The main effect
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of this type of opposition was to cause deleys in the final implementation of the GAA. The
primary shortcoming of the opposition was that there was not a nationally co-ordinated mass
campaign directed specifically again... the GAA.
Support for racial segregation was a central unifying force for the Afrikaner alliance. Working
class and middle class whites wanted blacks tucked away in locations far from their own
areas. Capital on the other hand wanted the state to 'stabilise' and control the black workforce.
But these were not the only interested parties in favour of 'group areas'. UP members in
various municipaiities often actively participated in the creation of 'group areas'. Probably
more sipiticant. however, was the support the government gained from some coloureds and
Indians in cmain localities, especially for the removal of Africans. Although this kind of
suppcrt did not come from mass based organisation, it nevertheless strengthened the hand of
the gov(;fnmant while weakening ~b~,ability of blacks to unite against the GAA.
The GAA did not apply to Africans and other legislation such as the Native (Urban Areas)
Act catered for their settlement into separate location. However, as mentioned above it would
be a mistake to view these Acts in isolation from one another. They were crucial components
of the government's social engineering and in "articular of the racial re-zoning of the cities.
Africans were of course affected by the GAA as thousands were forcibly removed from
• integrated locations which were declared 'group areas' for whites, coloureds or Indians.
The Genesis of the Group Areas Act
The promulgation of the GAA in 1950 indicated the government's determination to fulfil its
promise to the white electorate that it would enforce compulsory racial separation. However,
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the ideas of 'group areas' and racial segregation were by no means novel. For centuries
already white rulers attempted to enforce some form of racial segregation on the majority
black population. After their military subjugation in the nineteenth century African people
were placed in reserves considerably smaller than the territories they had previously
occupied. The formation of Union in 1910 opened a new chapter in the relationship between
white rulers and the subjugated black pcpulation. The 1913 Land Act took segregation a step
further by making it illegal for Africans to acquire land outside the reserves. This division
of the whole country into white (over 90% of the territory) and black owned land, was
replicated at a local level. The 1920 Housing Act, for example, established a Central Housing
Board of the Department of Health, which could only approve housing for specific 'groups'.'
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More significant for the urban areas was the passage by the Smuts government of the Native
(Urban Areas) Act of 19~'3,which empowered local authorities to set aside land for black
occupation. It was based on the main tenets of the Stallard Commission of 1922 which
regarded Africans as "temporary sojourners" in towns arguing that lithe native should only be
allowed into the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is
willing to enter and minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart there>lorm when
he ceases so to minister.!" This Act attempted to establish better control over the African
population, especially in the aftermath of the post-World War One strike wave in urban areas .
It was a crucial piece of legislation because it set the framework for future legislation on
residential segregation. However, the application of the Act by municipalities was not
obligatory and some towns only adopted it later, ego Port Elizabeth in 1935.5 This was
indicative (If the tardiness with which many local authorities pursued these policies. As a
result black residents generally ignored the law and lived in integrated locations.
•
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•Racial segregation was not strictly enforced by governments before the apartheid era. The
urban black population was not very big and their struggle for political rights was muted
during the 1930s. The government's policy towards urban planning was characterised by
I neglect of the;ne- 1 ... black people, which was reflected in the virtual absence of housingprovision for blacks. In 1Q39the official housing 1--acklogestimate in Johannesburg alone was
9000 units." Following the rapid urbl~;,:'3ationof blacks in the succeeding decade the number
of black families needing housing in Johannesburg alone rocketed to 50 000,' making the
existing 7000 housing units built a year nationally utterly inadequate. Although the situation
in Johannesburg was probably the worse, it reflected a crisis faced by most urban centres in
the 1940s.
From the early forties the United Party tentatively moved towards a resolution of the crisis,
which revealed its explosive potential in the squatters movement and struggles in locations.
The United Party's spproach to th-eurban crisis in the late 1940s laid the groundwork for the
National Party's 'group areas' schemes." In the late 1930s the Smuts government had already
raised it~ concerns over the 'irregular' urbanisation, especially of Indians and coloureds. The
Thornton report of 1940 expressed shock at the "occupation ofland and buildings irrespective
of race with the result that Europeans were found to be occupying premises and living cheek
by jowl with non-Europeans"." The implication of the report was clearly that blacks should
be segregated from whites. In the early 1940s the UP did not give much attention to urban
planning matters, partly because of its pre-occupation with the war effort. Its policy towards
black urban dwellers was ambiguous and consequently was characterised by inaction. By the
end of the war, however, the government became more concerned abou; its lack of control
over black urbanisation. It not only acted decisively against black opposition (the crushing of
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the miners' strike) but also moved to deal more deliberately with the urban crisis.
The first step taken by the United Party was the introduction of appropriate government
bodies to deal with urban planning and housing provision in particular. An important
consequence of this was the shift to greater centralised planning of the urban areas." In 1944
the Housing Act was amended to allow for the establishment of the National Housing and
Pl&nnin,a Commission in place of the Central Housing Board. In addition a National Houreg
Cowail, eoosisting of Provincial executives and municipal associations, was set up to advise
the Minister.lt The Social and Economic Planning Council established by Smuts emphasised
th~ae.a for greater co-ordination and planning.P These measures did not immediately lead
tQ the :f0rmulation of a coherent national plan for urban racial zoning but they were the first
_tative steps towards addressing the crisis faced in urban areas, The most striking example
0f United Party policy to urban racial planning was its role in the Western Areas .val
Scheme.
)
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Van Tender has brilliantly outlined the pivotal role of the United Party in initiating the
Western Areas Removal Scheme." The latter was a key component in the Johannesburg City
Council's (JCC) post-war plans to deal with the 'urban crisis'. The western areas of
Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare were particularly problematical for the JCC not only
because of their racial integration but because they were generally beyond the control of' the
authorities and were in many respects the centre of black opposition in Johannesburg, From
the point of view of the JCC it was crucial that these 'black spots' be removed. Instrumental
in the removal plans of the western ereas was prominent United Party member, Sarel Tighy,
who according to Van Tonder wanted to deal with 'problem' of Sonhjatr;'i'.~n as fh' back as
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1939.)4Tighy's constituency consisted largely of white working class and lower middle class
residents. The proximity of the black western areas was a constant source of concern to these
whites who continuously pressured the JCC and government to remove these areas. In 1944
the JCC presented a ten year programme for the removal of the western areas but its
\; implementation was delayed because of a severe shortage of funds." Nevertheless, in spite
of suosequent protestations by the United Party against the National Party's Western Areas
Removal. Scheme. the plan originated with them. Thus Van Tonder concludes that the there
was "a large measure of continuity" between the policies of the two parties and there were
some elements in the United Party who were "as dedicated to the ideals of urban and spatial
(racial) segregation as were the Nationalists"."
From the early 1940s Indian people became a prime target cfthe United Party's urban racial
zoning. For a long time whites, especially smail businessmen, voiced their concern about the
competition from Indian traders. In 1940 Smuts appointed the first 'Penetration' Commission
to investigate the 'penetration' of Indian traders in predominantly white areas since 1927.17A
second commission was appointed in 1943 to investigate the acquisition by Indians of land
in Durban. As a consequence of these commissions the government passed the Trading and
Occupation Land (Transvaal and Natal) Restriction Act of 1943 which forbade changes in
ownership between Indians and whites without ministerial permission." The passage of the
• Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act in 1946 was a watershed in the
development of residential segregation." It allowed for the identification of land for Indian
occupation outside which they could not acquire or occupy property. These provisions were
• important precursors to the GAA. In a profoundly significant move the government also
established the Land Tenure Advisory Board (LTAB), with an inspectorate, to oversee the
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Isegregation of Indians." For Mabin these moves by the United party indicated a shift from
"ad hoc racial planning" to greater co-ordination and planning, which was also reflected in
its establishment of the Natural Resources Development Council in 1947, without whose
permission no development of townships could occur in 'controlled areas'." In spite of these
shifts in the United Party's policy its attitude to urban planning and control over the urban
black population was generally characterised by indecision. It was left to the National Party
not only to continue where the United Party had left off but to pursue the racial zoning of
urban areas with much greater determination and commitment.
.~
The election platform of the Nationalists emphasised that on its assumption of power, it would
immediately proceed to enforce compulsory segregation. However, other than its ideological
commitment, the party did not have a clearly defined proposal about how precisely it would
implement its aims. The Sauer report, Mabin notes, did not even have a plan for compulsory
segregation." Yet it was crucial for the National Party to show that, unlike its predecessor,
it would rapidly bring the urban black population under control. Malan thus established two
committees under the chairmanship of D.S. van der Merwe, chairman of the Land Tenure
Advisory Board, to investigate the future of 'Asiatic land laws'. These committees, and Van
der Merwe in particular, played a crucial role in the drafting of the Group Areas Bill." In a
number of important respects, therefore, the National Party based. itself on the steps taken by
the Ui,ited Party in the last years of its rule: the principles of the Asiatic Land Act strongly
informed the GAA and the National Party used the Land Tenure Advisory Board to oversee
the implementation of 'group areas'. However, the haste with which the government
promulgated the GAA proved costly in the next period when it was confronted with numerous
shortcomings in the Act.
•
•
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The first seven years of the GAA
In March 1950 the minister of the interior, T.E Donges, presented the Group Areas Bill to the
House of Assembly and by September of that year the GAA became operative. Its primary
I aim , as the name suggests. was to establish 'group areas' for the different 'races', Unlike theAsiatic Land Acts of the 1940s, the GAA was to apply to all people classified as white.
coloured and Indian, throughout the country - segregation would be compulsory and
comprehensive. Importantly. also, the Act allowed tor the reversal of existing integration to
ensure that all residential areas would become 'racially-exclusive'. As a first step. the Act
provided for the "preservation of any particular area from further penetration by one group
or the other" and "for the control of the acquisition of immovable property and the occupation
of land and premises" ,24 These provisions were clearly designed to freeze existing residential
patterns pending proclamation of a 'group area'.
The GAA instituted procedures to be followed before the proclamation of 'group areas', The
first was the establishment of' controlled areas. Within such an area property could not be
exchanged between different 'groups' without ministerial permission. In such an area it was
compulsory that the occupant of any property had to be of the same 'racial group' as the
owner." The declaration of a controlled area was the main precursor to the proclamation of
a 'group area'. However, the state recognised that initially it would be impossible to impose
• the strict specifications of controlled area because of all the anomalies that would exist. It
therefore allowed tor exceptions to this rule. Specified areas could be declared. the main aim
of which was to freeze the status quo regarding ownership and occupation. This basically
• permitted the continuation of integrated areas until such time that complete segregation could
be enforced. It also mean! that there could be no exchange of properties between different
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•example, if a house was declared a defined area any extension to it could only be occupied
tradal groups" but allowed exemption from the harsher provisions applicable in controlled
areas. The Act also established defined areas which could apply to parts of a property. For
by the 'group' for which it was declared. Occupation by anyone else required ministerial
permission.
The Act also stipulated that there would be three types of 'group areas': fur occupation only,
for ownership only and for occupation and ownership." In practice this meant that blacks
could be placed in a group area with only occupation rights. But it also meant that whites
could own properties in areas not for their occupation. In general white 'group areas' were
always declared for ownership and occupation to avoid the possibility of blacks owning
properties in such areas. Once an area was proclaimed for a certain 'group' all those from
other 'groups' became 'disqualified persons' and normally had to vacate, the place within a
year." The LTAB which was created by the United Party now became the main body
overseeing the implementation of the Act. Finally the GAA established an inspectorate whose
responsibility it was to ensure that the provisions of the Art were not violated. The GAA thus
seemed to be all encompassing and well thought out. But it was quite weak on ideas for
practical application and in the first few years of its existence there was very little progress
in the proclamations of 'group areas' .
In 1956, Muriel Horrell, a key figure in the South African Institute of Race Relations,
commented in her book on the GAA that,
•
The Group Areas Act has probably caused more uncertainty, anxiety, hardship and
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resentment than any other recent measures. Its effects have been particularly pernicious
because so few Actual decisions have been promulgated, and the Sword of Damocles
has been left in uneasy suspension for some six years, now, over the heads of'many
thousands of Non-White people, and in some C8Ses, of Whites tOO.28
By 1970 over 111 580 families had been 'disqualified' in term of the GAA29 and by 1987 over
1300 group areas had been proclaimed." The implementation of this Act had dire
consequences for tens of thousands, many of whom were forcibly removed from their homes
and herded into segregated areas. Yet, six years after the promulgation of the Act only five
'group areas' had been proclaimed." Why did it take so long for the government to get this
crucial piece of legislation functioning effectively? Meshtrie argues that the government
I'never intended proclamations to be made at a rapid pace - the Act ensured that a course of
time would lapse before a group area could be declared as the lengthy preliminary procedures
were followed. !t32 However, it is unlikely that the government would have planned or
anticipated the kinds of delays with which the Act was confronted in the first few years after
its promolgation. Certainly, the ideologues of apartheid and their supporters would not have
planned for the creation of 'group areas' to take over two decades. The opposition
encountered by the LTAB came from various quarters, some of them unexpected.
Meshtrie has recently outlined some of the key administrative difficulties confronted by the
Act." One of the first problems faced by the LTAB was the initial uncertainty which existed
over the number of 'racial groups' to be identified, Without clarity on this issue, the LTAB
'. could not proceed with the creation of'group areas'. The Population Registration Act of 1950which identified three main. groups, namely, white, coloured and 'native' proved inadequate
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and provision was made for further racial subdivisions. Coloureds, for example were sub...
divided into Indians, Chinese, coloured and 'malay'." Subsequently, Africans were divided
C:' 1
1
1
;
into numerons groups. The identification and proclamation of various 'groups' was both tragic
and farcical. In 1951 Indians and Chinese were recognised as separate groups in ail provinces
except the Orange Free St".te. 'Malays' were also declared a separate group in a number of
Cape Town municipalities only, Such persons would, however, become coloured when
enOOag a m:uni0ipality which did not have any 'Malays'!"
A ~ prabtem which occupied the time of the LTAB was the issuing of permits. For
• I
examl"l~once erejined and specified areas were declared permission had to be obtained from
the LTAB if coloureds wanted to live in an Indian 'group area' and vice versa. Initially there
was uncertainty about precisely what length of time 'occupancy' referred . '\ As a result
owners (mainly Indian and Chinese) of public entertai.sment venues often allowed other
'groups' onto their premises. To prevent this the government amended the GAA so that
permission had to be obtained even when people wanted to go to cinemas. As a result the
LTAB had to deal with a new range of permits. In 1951-52 it processed 581 permits but this
escalated to 1875 the following year and in 1953-59 no less than 3395 p~pl1its were
processed." The issuing of trading licences and determination certificates also took up a
considerable amount of the LTAB's time. As the main implementing arm of the GAA, the
LTAB was therefore often busy with matters other than investigating the establishment of
'group areas'. The government attempted to lighten the burden of the board by increasing its
I
I
bureaucracy in the late 1950s.37
Oth.;: than these administrative problems inherent to the functioning of the GAA there ',V ire
also numerous other obstacles encountered by the LTAB, some of which arose out of
opposition to the GAA. One organisation which had some measure of success in delaying the
implementation of the Act was the South African Indian Congress and its provincial arms in
Natal and the Transvaal. For example, lawyers of the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC),
intervened in the LTAB's enquiry meeting in Lydenburg in 1953 to great effect. They insisted
that members of the board. whom they claimed were not impartial, should recuse themselves
from the hearings. Although the board refused to accede to this, it was forced to test the
matter in court, causing a delay of nearly nine months. This action was repeated in other
Transvaal towns." When the LTAB refused the SAlC the right to make representations at its
hearings it was taken to court where a ruling was made in favour of the SAIC. This forced
the government to amend the GAA in 1955 giving the LTAB powers to decide who could
appear at its hearings. The essence of this a.mendment was that only state structures and
persons who proposed 'group areas' could appear before the board, thereby preventing
opponents of the Act from making representations. The intervention of the SAIC on this
matter eventually strengthened the hand of the government because it exposed a number of
loopholes in the original Act which the government then proceeded to change. Nevertheless,
the S i\IC succeeded in its narrow aim of causing considerable hindrance to the government.
•
Opposition to the GAA also came from some municipalities, such as Cape Town, Durban and
Uitenhage. The latter municipality was controlled by United Party members who were
sympathetic to coloureds and Indians businessmen and property owners. When lobbied by the
Uitenhage Indian Congress in 1953 the Council reversed its decision to co-operate with the
LTAB in identifying cases of 'possible penetration' in specified areas." The Council basically
decided that it would not take the initiative in implementing the GAA because it was likely
•
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to cause e xmomic hardships for Indian, coloured and Chinese businessmen. One Councillor
"objected to the very principle of the Act and..did not think the Council should take the
lead ...[a]s responsibility for the Act and its administration rested solely with the Government
and it should be left to them to apply it."" The Council's position of non-compliance, and of
leaving the matter in the hands of the LTAB, resulted in a six year delay in the
implementation of the GAA.
Council was strongly in favour of the implementation of ~he GAA. In fact it was known to
In Durban the opposition from the City Council surfaced only in 1957. Prior to this the
be one of the most fervent supporters of the Act amI put forward a strong pro-white plan for
the re-organisation of the city. In the 1950s Durban's population consisted of an almost equal
implications of the Act changed after the passage of the GADA in 1957, in which the
number of Africans, Indians and whites. The Council and white residents clearly wanted to
make Durban as white as possible and initially proposed to remove half of the city's black
population amending this in 1956 to three quarters. 'II. However, their attitude to some of the
government indicated that the city and ratepayers would have to bear the cost of implementing
the GAA. The Council strongly objected to this." Furthermore, they realised that the
proclamation of 'group areas' would result in a decline of property values which would lead
!! •
I
I
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to the city's physical deterioration and impede development." The removal of Indian
businessmen would also reduce revenue income. thereby adding to the economic decline of
the city. Consequently, in 1958 the Council requested a delay in the proclamation of 'group
areas' in Durban." The government refused and instituted the plans previously agreed with
• the Council. The immediate implication of this was the 'disqualification' of 81 000 Africans,
75 000 Indians, 8 500 coloureds and 1 000 whites, all of whom would have to be removed
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from their existing residential areas." But the Council's opposition prevented the immediate
implementation of this plan. The government eventually got its way ~but only after a four year
delay and only after it applied considerable pressure on tho Council.
The primary consequence of opposition from local authorities was to cause delays in the final
implementation of the GAA in those localities. However, most municipalities co-cperated with
the central government and the LTAB. When there was any resistance from authorities t:1e
board used its powers to withhold funds for housing, which in the 1950s caused municipalities
much concern considering the dire shortage of housing. When town planners for example
refused to co-operate with the board Of' delayed presenting plans for 'group areas', they more
often than not found it difficult to raise fund from the National Housing Office.46 The LTAB
eventually succeeded in 'seducing' most town planners, either through coercion or other
means, making them active participants in the formulation of racial zoning plans for their
respective towns. For many town planners interested in slum clearance and squatter removals
the GAA seemed to present a much clearer plan of action than the policies of any previous
government. 47
The government therefore gradually overcame the various obstacles placed in its path. The
GAA was probably one of the most amended pieces of legislations in the early 1950s as the
government sought to close the numerous loopholes exposed by opposition groupings. In 1957
the government was compelled to pass the Group Areas Amendment Act which incorporated
all the amendments made to the original Act. In addition in 1955 the Group Areas
Development Act (GADA) was promulgated." The latter Act, which was partly a response
to the complaints from the Durban City Council over the effects of the GAA on property
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values, established the Group Areas Development Board (GAB). which replaced the LTAB.
According to Meshtrie the passage of the GADA accelerated the proclamation of 'group areas',
albeit not with immediate effect." The Acts of 1955 and 1957 were crucial in overcoming
"he legal and administrative problems faced by the central government. The effective
functioning of the GAB was further enhanced by an expansion in its bureaucracy. From he
late 1950s therefore the proclamation of 'group areas' increased rapidly: in the first six years
only five areas had been proclaimed, in the next year this increased to 32 and by 1959 the
figure jumped to 170.50 All that remained to prevent the implementation and proper
functioning of the GAA was mass resistance by the black population.
•
The failure of popular resistance
Pirie has argued that civil unrest or mass struggles were not the most prominent response to
the GAA. Rather, he asserts, opposition took the f'''''',n mainly of media protests,
representations and public meetings." It appears that even though the 1950s were
characterised by the emergence of a mass popular movement, there were no spectacular
struggle against the GAA or forced removals, in spite of the widespread hatred of them. Some
of the reasons for the lack of effective mass resistance against 'group areas' may be found in
the attempts to oppose the GAA and forced removals in Durban and Johannesburg.
Undoubtedly, the most important struggle between the state and the mass movement over
forced removal occurred in the western areas of Johannesburg. The removal of these 'black
spots' and the creation of 'group areas' were crucial components of the government's re-
organisation of the cities. Its determination to use all means necessary to get rid of
Sophia-town and its adjacent location was a key factor in the removal schemes. On the day
before the removal of Sophiatown was to commence the police banned all meetings In
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quashed.f This show of force proved the National Party's determination to succeed with its
Johannesburg. At least two thousand a.rned police were used to ensure that any resistance was
plans. However, the opposition to the removal also faced many problems, making it difficult
to mount an effective fight against the government's schemes. Various groups were involved
in the opposition to the Western Areas Removal Scheme, eg Trevor Huddleston's Western
Areas Protest Committee, the South African Institute of Race Relations, Xuma's Ratepayer's
Association and the Congress Movement. The inability of these organisations successfully to
organise a united fight agains' +"13 Western Areas Removal Scheme not only undermined the
opposition but strengthened the hand of the government."
The ANC only begun giving attention to the Western Areas Removal Scheme after the
simultaneously tackle the main apartheid laws such as the GAA, Native Resettlement Act and
Defiance Campaign" and even then found it difficult to focus on a single campaign. In 1954
the ANC decided rather than focus on the Western Areas Removal Scheme alene it should
Bantu Education. H This lack of a clear focus was one of the key shortcomings of the ANC's
struggles in the 1950s. Therefore no specific struggle was organised against the GAA and
forced removals. Opposition to the GAA was more often than not left to organisations such
as the SAIC, which only had a limited effect. What emerges from the struggle against the
,':""
Western Areas Removal Scheme is that the ANC did not have a clearly worked out strategy
• to counter the plans of the government. This was in part due to the enormity of the task
facing the ANC on a national basis. The National Party had gone onto the offensive from
1948 with a barrage of legislation, which the ANC was organisationally and politically ill-
• prepared to tackle. Its major intervention at the time, the Defiance Campaign, only had a
limited effect. In fact the movement experienced a decline after this campaign partly because
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mobilise against the apartheid state.
the ANC did not have a prepared plan about how to capitalise 011 this and how effectively to
However. as a broad popular movement the ANC was confronted by numerous problems
arising from the heterogeneous constituency it tried to serve. One problem faced by the
movement was the division which existed between homeowners and tenants. The latter often
accused homeowners of exploiting them, which in many cases was undoubtedly true. Dr
Xuma's Ratepayers Association contributed to this problem b)' specifically organising the
some ANC leaders were also accused of being partial to the property owners. Another
property owners and thereby exacerbating the tension between the different groups. However,
division which strengthened the hand of the government was the support the removal gained
and NIe were political allies they could not overcome the deep-seated divisions which existed
from a section of the coloured community, in particular those represented by the Newclare
Ratepayers' Association, which called on the government to remove Africans from the western
areas. This problem of racial division also reared its head in Durban. There the Natal Indian
Congress successfully mobilised thousands of Indians against the GAA. Although the ANC
between Durban's African and Indian population. These divisions clearly weakened the
opposition and strengthened the hand of the government.
:;::~
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The 1950s were also characterised by the most concerted effort by the state to provide
housing for Africans. This was partly a response to the massive shortages in housing and the
resultant emergence of squatter camps on the periphery of urban areas. However, the
• government was also committed to 'stabilising' the African workforce to cater for the needs
\
.~
of industry. Up to 1952 the central government and local authorities paid scant attention to
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the provision of housing for blacks. In 1948 only 3821 sub-economic houses were built
nationally for Africans by municipalities." However. between 1952 and 1960 housing
provision for blacks escalated. For example, in the financial year 1955156 an unprecedented
number of 19 000 houses were built in the PWV area. 57 At the height of the housing
construction in 1957/58 over 11 000 were built in Johannesburg alone." Most urban areas
experienced similar developments, which laid the basis for African townships of today. For
the tens of thousands of squatters and lodgers, the idea of having a house, however
rudimentary that house might be, was a step forward. Lodgers in the overcrowded inner city
locations Were more than often the victims of unscrupulous landlords, for whom rent was an
important source of income. It was not surprising therefore that these people were not
enthusiastic opponents of their removal to racially segregated townships.
The struggle against the GAA and forced removals were therefore muted and generally
unsuccessful. The government was determined to ensure that this important aspect of its
apartheid policy succeed and that the black opposition movement would be unable
successfully to mobilise a campaign to counter its plans. However, the first few years of the
GAA were not easy for the government. It faced numerous obstacles but overcame these
through coercion and legislative changes. By 1957 the National Party consolidated all the
changes to the GAA into a single Act, signalling the strengthening of its legal position. From
that point the proclamation of 'group areas' and force removcls entered their most important
phase. Even though more amendments were made to the GAA in the 1960s, these were
generally only fine-tuning by the government. The basis for this development had been laid
• in the 1950s. The silencing of the black opposition in the 1960s allowed the government to,
.1
~
proceed with a key component of its social engineering with virtual impunity.
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CHAPTER THREE
Regional planning - the new panacea
This chapter discusses the implementantion of the GAA, forced removals and resettlement at
a regional level, It is contended here that these policies are best understood within the
context of the dramatic re-organisation of the cities which was initiated in the 1950s and
carried on through the 1960s and 1970s. Regional planning ';'dcamp rn important component
vi the state's attempts to achieve greater co-ordination and control over urban planning
Changes to urban areas in the post-war period were necessiu.tec by the rapid industrialisation
and urbanisation occurring at the time. People from across the political spectrum invariably
described the urban situation as 'chaotic', explosive' and 'intolerable'. From the perspective of
urban blacks the dire Jack of housing was a constant source of resentment and anger, which
were difficult to contain and underpinned the squatter invasions in the mid to late forties. For
capital, urban disorganisation and black militancy were not conducive to industrial growth and
capital accumulation. Significant sections of the white population feared that the rapid influx
of Africans into the urban areas would jeopardise their privileged position. The message to
the state was clear: it was urgent that the urban areas be brought under control, not least
because failure to do so raised the danger of more struggles by the black population .
• As explained in the previous chapter, the United Party government prevaricated in tackling
the urban crisis and it was left to the National Party to restructure the cities. The various
efforts by the government to reshape, plan and co-ordinate the development of the urban areas
• in the 1950s represented one of the most significant attempts at social engineering by the
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apartheid regime. In fact the early 1950s was characterised by near frenetic attempts by the
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central government to formulate a clear urban policy. It was out of these attempts that the
basic premises of the 'apartheid city' were derived. A key dynamic in these processes was the
increasing concentration of power in the hands of the central government. The formulation
of plans was taken away from urban planners and left to government officials who operated
within clearly set out objectives and frameworks. Nevertheless, many urban planners
supported the government's urban policies because they appeared to be serious attempts to
deal with the urban crisis. Thus the National Party did not encounter serous opposition from
provincial and local authorities.
The 1950s witnessed the beginning of the demise of integrated urban locations ?J1dtho
emergence of the modem African township, which both in its srructure and siting epitomised
the apartheid notions of social engineering and 'grand planning'. The human tragedies resulting
from forced removals and resettlements were also integral to this process. But the racial
reshaping of urban areas was not merely a product of apartheid ideology. Itwas also intended
to meet the needs of capital. Manufacturing capital, especially, required a stable labour force.
The creation of new townships and the unprecedented provision of housing to Africans were
the main means by which this aim was achieved. Having African families settle in urban areas
was crucial to ensure permanent urbanisation. It is for this reason that the government insisted
that only married people could occupy these new houses, which often forced men and women
• into marriages of convenience .
The post-war urban crisis was most acute in the \~hLwatersrandregion. Itwas here, therefore,
that the government concentrated its efforts to resolve the urban crisis. The Witwatersrand
became the focal point of the government's regional plans because according to them this
__ ._J
region urgently required planning and restructuring, Success in the economic centre of the
country was crucial and the National Party was determined to 'ensure that the siting and
development of new African townships, industry and white residential areas would occur with
maximum efficiency and control.
An important feature of the government's modus operandi at the time was its greater reliance
I
1)0 internal ana closed committees to formulate plans for the development of the regions.
These committees often did not have statutory powers and were accountable only to important
departments and influential ministers. Central in these schemes was the Native Affairs
Departm -nt and especially its minister, H.P. Verwoerd, who preferred dealing with matters
outside the public eye, Thus the nexus of power in matters dealing with national urban
planning appears to have shifted to a smaller group of politicians centred around the likes of
Verwoerd, W.M. Eiselen and T. Donges at national level. Key members from their
departments such as Mentz, Moolman, Barker and Nel became the influential figures in the
regional planning schemes of the Witwatersrand. Between them they had a hand 111. most of
the committees set up to develop policy on urban restructuring, and more often than not
controlled those committees. These individuals shared a common political vision for South
Africa's urban areas which they were keen to impose on local authorities.
• The GAA and Native Urban Acts were principal components of the foundation on which
urban areas were to be reshaped. But they did not provide solutions to the important question
of where townships for blacks should be sited. Thus the principles of racial segregation had
• to be combined with other aspects of urban planning such as the location of industrial areas
and transport networks.
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This chapter will concentrate on efforts at regional planning in the 1950s. The essential plans
for the. restructuring of the urban areas, primarily the Witwatersrand, were completed in the
1950s. In the msin developments in the 1960s and 19705built on those foundations. Regional
planning reached its apogee in the 1950s but had its origins in the 1940s. Mabin has recently
dealt fairly extensively with the origins of regional planning. A summary of some of the
important issues raised by him will be presented here in so far they impact on the discussion
pertaining to planning on the Witwatersrand and the East Rand.
•
The early days of regional planning
The previous chapter argued that from the mid-1940s the United Party made tentative attempts
to address the urban crisis. In the process it set in place important mechanisms for the racial
rezoning of the urban areas and initiated the process of 'slum-clearance', a euphemism for
removing integrated locations such as the Western Areas. Towards the end of its term of
office the United Party also shifted towards a policy of greater centralisation and planning.
But the party lacked vision and unity, and the plans which emerged from its ranks were either
not implemented or pursued without any really vigour. This was especially the case in the
way it dealt with the housing crisis and the lack of land for the development of African
townships. In the mid 1940s the United Party government managed to build no more than
7000 houses per year for urban Africans.' Yet, the resolution of the housing crisis was central
to tackling the urban crisis.According to W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, "Only
by the provision of adequate shelter in properly planned townships can full centrol over urban
natives be regained."'.
As industrial development proceeded apace in the forties manufacturing capital required a
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more skilled and stable workforce. A serious problem facing capital in the 1930s and 1940s
was the high labour turnover among Africans. In the period 1936 to B44 no less than 50%
of jobs for African workers lasted less than a year and only 10% for more than two years.
This high labour turnover resulted in the entire African workforce of Johannesburg replacing
itself every 20 months.' Also, the government was keen to bring the numerous locations and
informal settlements that existed under control. They represented a major political problem
for the government. The termination of the war also signalled the end of the United party's
excuses for inaction. White voters and capital insisted the government act to bring the urban
areas under control. In this situation elements within the government pushed for regional
schemes as the basis for tackling the urban crisis. From the mid forties important steps were
taken to set in place various mechanisms designed to facilitate co-ordination and planning for
urban areas. However, the United Party appears neither to have had the capacity nor the
political will to use these mechanism to effect urban transformation.
•
Attempts at regional planning were not new. In 1932 a conference of Witwatersrand
municipalities agreed that regional planning would be advantageous and in 1934 the province
even appointed a 'regional planner'." But not much was done in practice and only towards the
end the end of the war did the regional planning concept once again gain currency. The
Housing Act of 1944 allowed for the formation of a regional planning commission, but this
idea this was not pursued by the NHPC. However, the Social and Economic Planning Council
(SEPC) which was constituted at the end of the war recommended the establishment of a
national ministry to oversee ~U1dimplement urban and regional planning.' At this stage,
therefore, there were elements within the United Party government who considered regional
planning of African townships and industry as crucial. Unfortunately for the proponents of
•
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regional planning, these ideas did not receive unanimous support and little was dono to carry
forward the SEPC's proposals. Nevertheless, the government remained underpersistent pressure
to deal WIth urban problems. In 1947 the National Resources Development Council was
established to co-ordinate the regional planning of townships in the OFS goldfields. However,
similar planning by the Council was not undertaken anywhere else in the country. In Natal
and the Cape, Councils independently moved towards more regional planning." Although
regional planning was gaining acceptance among more urban planners and local authorities,
there was very little co-ordination of efforts to implement such plans on a national basis.
•
By the end of the war the housing crisis among Africans had reached an extreme crisis and
was coupled with outbursts of militant action in numerous locations. From the point of view
of the state and capital this the Witwatersrand could least afford to have a large and
uncontrollable African population with a propensity for mass struggles. Consequently, the
need for African housing presented a much :~reater challenge to the municipalities in this
region. Individual municipalities, such as Sl,;i'lngs,attempted to resolve the problem on their
own by making plans for the establishment of new African location, but found that the
acquisition of land for tha. purpose rather difficult.1 In March 1947 a meeting of local
authorities from Pretoria, the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging proposed the establishment of
a Witwatersrand Regional Committee to consider the question of housing for Africans in the
whole region. In May of that year the idea was formally accepted with the formation of the
Witwatersrand Advisory Council for non-European Housing." The main question discussed
by this Council was the possibility of having 'jointly·sponsored native towns to serve the
whole Reef.' For example, it considered the idea of ajoint African township for the East Rand
towns of Brakpan, Springs, Benoni and Boksburg." These plans were not implemented during
•
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the United Party's rule but they indicated the general trend of thought among regional and
urban planners. To a certain degree the basis of their support for the National Party's schemes
was laid in the pre-1948 era.
The c::, "Ct- ;. rd changes in United Party policy occurred too slowly and made little real impact
on the urban areas. But the indecision of the central government was not the only obstacle
faced by advocates of regional planning. Local authorities were often also slow in responding
to the crisis faced hy their respective areas For ~x,\mple, many municipalities were reluctant
to take responsibility for the establishment of new l'Ownlj' I'S and provision of housing for
blacks. to They complained about the heavy f:, :~!'\datburden such development would place
on their shoulders, Under the Housing Act ;'H - r' < h""dsole power to initiate public
housing schemes." Non-compliance from them :'0\,__ .: delay tackling the worsening
conditions in which an increasing number of b~,;;3~p~:'lPttt i~;'" ,....live, By the end of their
term of office very little had been achieved in the way of .uecldil1t Oil the establishment of
new locations or in addressing the dire shortage of housing for Africans and blacks in general.
These issues were to be vigorously pursued by the new government, although it took a few
years before it could formulate clear plans.
The 1''' sntz Commission and regional planning for Afl'jeans
• In the early 1950s the Department of Native Affairs, under H.F. Verwoerd's leadership,
attempted to bring the development and planning of African locations under its control and
to impose its plans on loc...1. authorities. The first indication of the direction in which
• Verwoerd was heading was the appointment of the Net Commission to investigate the siting
of African locations in Pretoria. Initially Verwoerd felt compelled to hold 'semi-public'
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meetings to consult other interested bodies on regional planning. But, he increasingly shifted
to a greater reliance on the work of committees such as those of Net and Mentz.12Regional
and local planners were generally not involved in these committees, unless they shared
Verwoerd's vision. Plans were formulated by these committees and imposed on local
authorities. This shin reflected the impatience of government leaders like Verwoerd with the
slow progress in tackling the urban crisis. By the early fifties the government begun shifting
attention more seriously to the urban areas:
The time has come to review the whole position with the aim of replanning the
townships of the Witwatersrand, as flit as it is possible .... The bigger centres on the
Wnwatersrend are all strongly industrialised and mainly r... ~ sndent on Native labour.
It is necessary in virtually all of these centres to acquire more land for location
purposes ... in view of the fact that land requirement for Natives will be much greater
than that for Asians or Coloureds, this Department is particularly interested in regional
planning of any sort ...
T.E. Danges, Minister of the Interior, September, 1950. 13
Squatter chaos, overcrowding cf existing N..tive plots, illegal lodging in white yards,
the removal of those who refuse to work and thus don't belong in the city, can only be
combatted once large enough legal townships for Natives are established close to the
towns ... The most complicated problem of this character in the Union, exists in the area
from the north in Pretoria to the Vaal River, and ill the east from Springs till far in the
west to Krugersdorp and Randfontein ...
Press release ofH.F. Verwoerd announcing the formation of the Mentz Commission in
1952.14
progress in dealing with the urban crisis. The government's problem was that it did not have
By the early fifties National Party leaders were clearly becoming impatient with the lack of
a plan to impose on local authorities. Four years after coming to power and two years after
the promulgation of the GAA there was little evidence of progress on key aspects of its
election platform, viz, control of the black urban population and the imposition of compulsory
segregation. Furthermore; the rate of black urbanisation continued unabated from the time of
the Nationalist's election victory. Equally serious from the perspective of the white population,
was the increase in black political opposition in the early fifties. The 1950 stayaways and the
Defiance Campaign did not augur well for the new government. Thus, partly in anticipation
of the election in 1953, the government stepped up a gear and made concerted efforts in 1952-
3 to formulate plans for the development and restructuring of the Witwatersrand. A numl.er
of committees and commissions were established at tL ..time to investigate matters relating
to the siting of African locations, industry and the future of coloureds and Indians in the
region. These were the years in which the policies of social engineering finally took shape
1952 Verwoerd appointed the Mentz Committee to investigate the IIquestion of township, iN
and the various committees established played a critical role in the reshaping of the cities. In
Natives in the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging region"."
The decision to establish this committee came after a meeting held in Pretoria at the end {)(
• 195116 with 'interested parties' to discuss the planning of African locations, At this conference
various proposals were presented without any consensus being reached about how to proceed .
.
The Mentz Committee was ostensibly created to "thoroughly investigate the different
proposals in an attempt to make recommendations which would have the unanimous, or at
least the majority support of the participants"." The terms of reference of the committee was
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recommendations of this 'fact-finding body' became the main guidelines for government policy
not specified and Verwoerd presented it as a fact-finding body." Yet, as will be shown, the
in the planning and development of African locations on the Witwatersrand, and in particular
on the East Rand
The composition of the committee was an indication that Verwoerd had much more in mind
for it than the gathering of information. The chairman, F.E Mentz, was a member of the
Native Affairs Commission, J.H. Moolman was a leading figure in the Natural Resources
Development Council, M. C. Barker was prominent in the Land tenure Advisory Board and
C.A. Heald came from the Native Affairs Department. These men were therefore all key
figures in matters relating to 'native affairs' and were instrumental in the formulation and
appliceicn of government policy on the Witwatersrand. The committee was formally
appointed in August 1952 and by the end of that year it had completed its investigation. It
presented its report to the minister in 1953. The Witwatersrand was divided into five sub-
regions: Johannesburg and environs; West Rand; Far West Rand.Vereeniging and
Vanderbijpark and the East Rand. The Committee convened hearings in each of these sub-
regions to discuss with local authorities, businesses and interested individuals." Of course it
did not consult with black people. In its report the committee made various recommendations
for the! respective areas. Here we will concentrate on its proposals for the East Rand .
Although it necessarily had to consult local authorities, the Mentz Committee operated within
•
a framework developed by the Department of Native Affairs. The basic principles applied to'. the siting and planning of African townships were presented in the Senate in May 1952. They
were:
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1. The site should be at an adequate distance from t~e European town;
2. It should preferably adjoin the location of a neighbouring town, so as to decrease
rather than increase the number of Native areas;
3. It should preferably be separated from the European area by an industrial buffer
where industries exist or are being planned;
4. It should have provision for an adequate hinterland for expansion stretching away
from the European area;
5. It should be within easy distance of the town or city for transport purposes, by rail
rather than by road;
6. It should have a road of its own connecting the location site with the city,
preferably nmning through the industrial areas;
7. It should possess open buffer zones around the proclaimed location areas, the
breadth of which should depend on whether the location borders upon a densely or
sparsely occupied European area; and
8. It should be at a considerable distance from main, and more particularly national
loads, the use of which as local transport routes for the location should be totally
discouraged."
According to Mabin these principles were enunciated by Verwoerd in a speech to the senate
• on 'native policy'." It is unclear what discussions preceded their formulation. However, many
of these ideas were already in use. For example. the siting of townships such as Orlando, were
guided by these principles before Verwoerd's speech. Nevertheless, his announcement in
• parliament elevated these ideas to government policy. So, while the committee entertained
representations from different bodies, it rarely recommended anything which did not comply
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with these principles. In fact it would not countenance any proposal that contradicted the
abovementioned guidelines. Moreover, Verwoerd's Department insisted on close adherence
to them. Recalcitrant municipalities found that the central government made it difficult for
them to gain access to housing funds, In this sense, therefore, they were bullied into accepting
the political framework set out by Verwoerd.
There was, however, very little opposition from East Rand municipalities and employee
representatives, which all seemed to agree with the abovementioned principles. The Boksburg
Council, for example, concurred that industrial areas should serve as the main buffer between
African locations and white residential areas. In the case of the East Rand this meant white
areas would generally be located in the north and African locations in the south, with the
industrial areas and the main railway line separating the twO.22 Part of the rationale behind
this was that it obviated the need for Africans to travel through 'white areas' to their places
of employment. In addition the industrial areas and railway line were regarded as useful buffer
zones, an absolutely essential aspect of town planning. The municipalities were particularly
sensitive about the proximity of locations to their white residential areas. Thus the Farmers
Association of Roodekop strongly objected to the idea of expanding Natalspruit too close to
their areas. Heidelberg, on the other hand, objected to this expansion because it would bring
...~
the location too close to the national road." Having mostly agreed with the government's
• principles on the siting of locations and the concept of regional planning the municipalities
busied themselves with securing the best siting of the locations for their particular areas.
'. After considering the proposals of the various municipalities the committee "concluded thatthere are presently three areas which lend themselves to natural planning of Native
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locatiocs"." 'Natural planning' of course meant that the locations could be developed in
accordance with the principles set out by the government. The recommendation of the
commission created the basis for the development of the two main township complexes of the
East Rand - Katerus (Kathlehong, Tokoza and Vosloorus) and KwaTsaDuza (Kwa'Ihema,
Tsakane and Duduza)." The identification of sites for the establishment of joint locations
represented an unequivocal success for the ideas of regional planning of African locations
advocated by the Native Affairs Department. The concept was to be replicated in other urban
>
areas. The creation of these large townships, of which Soweto is of course the prime example,
more than anything else signifies to millions of ordinary people the essence of apartheid
planning.
Another crucial notion underpinning the recommendations by the commission was the
preference of the government for bigger townships in place of small locations which were
scattered all over the Witwatersrand." From the perspective of the government these locations
epitomised uncontrolled urbanisation of Africans. The early 19505 represented the key
transition phase from the old location to the modem day townships. Having identified where
the new townships would be located the committee then had to deal with the existing
locations. For them and the government the answer was clear - they had to be removed. The
.......
committee did not hesitate to recommend the relocation of the residents of those location to
• the new townships. It is for this reason that the Mentz Committee became popularly known
as the 'black spots' commission. The Mentz Report was published in December 1953,27but
was only formally adopted by the government two years later. In August 1955 the Native
'. Affairs Department announced the recommendations of the commission: The Paynevillelocation in Springs and the Brakpan and Dunnotar locations were to be moved to the
and availability Of possible provision of the necessary transport services, so that the
KwaThema and Vlakfontein (Kwal'salruza) areas. The old locations of Germiston, Alberton,
Boksburg and Eisburg were to be relocated to the Natalspruit (Katorus) area." The
government declared itself happy with the Mentz Committee and proudly announced that
Every area has been planned with a view to the creation of the necessary buffer zones
Natives living there will be able to get to work with the least inconvenience ... The
Mentz Commission has thus completed the planning of the whole Reef area from
Heidelberg to Vereeniging, and found solutions to both the short and the long-term
problems. The local authorities can !lOW go ahead on this basis with no uncertainty
about the future. 29
Scheme. The government's success with the latter and the lack of effective resistance must
The reasons why it took more than two years for the recommendation of the commission
formally to be adopted by Verwoerd are not known to me. It is likely, however, that the
government would probably have waited for the work of other committees to be completed
so that the plan for African locations could be integrated into the broader plans for the
restructuring of the Reef (see below). Furthermore, the plan to remove 'black spots' allover
the Reef was probably held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Western Areas Removal
have convinced the Native Affairs Department that it would be able to proceed with its plans
• without too much hindrance. It does also seem that liberal individuals in some municipalities
on the East Rand were opposed to the 'directives' from the Department of Native Affairs.
Jack Ellis, a Councillor in Springs, was indignant about the interference by central'. government in matters which he regarded as municipal affairs:
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KwaThema and Vlakfontein (Kwa'Iaalruza) areas. The old locations of Germiston, Alberton,
Boksburg and Eisburg were to be relocated to the Natalspruit (Katorus) area. 28 The
government declared itself happy with the Mentz Committee ?n!,' nroudly announced that
Every area has been planned with a view to the creation of the necessary buffer zones
and availability or possible provision of the necessary transport services, so that the
Natives living there will be able to get to work with the least inconvenience ... The
Mentz Commission has thus completed the planning of the whole Reef area from
Heidelberg to Vereeniging, and found solutions to both the short and the long-term
problems. The local authorities can now go ahead on this basis with no uncertainty
about the furure.29
The reasons why it took more than two years for the recommendation of the commission
formally to be adopted by Verwoerd are not known to me. It is likely, however, that the
government would probably have waited for the work of other committees to be completed
so that the plan for African locations c.suld be integrated into the broader plans for the
restructuring of the Reef (see below). Furthermore, the plan to remove 'black spots' allover
the R~I~fwas probably held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Western Areas Removal
Scheme. The government's success with the latter and the lack of effective resistance must
have convinced the Native Affairs Department that it would be abte to proceed with its plans
without too much hindrsz.cc. It does also seem that liberal individuals in some municipalities
on the East Rand were opposed to the 'directives' from the Department of Native Affairs.
Jack Ellis, a Councillor in Springs, was indignant about the interference by central
• government in matters which he regarded as municipal affairs:
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We as Municipalities know the best place for our locations, but in the future somebody
from Pretoria, who knows nothing about our conditions, will tell us where to put our
locations whether it is convenient for us or not... The whole thing is like a vicious
circle, ... You cannot establish an area for 1'1 future location unless you have the funds
for Native Housing on hand. Industrial expansion will mean an influx of native labour,
an influx of native labour means new locations and new locations provide the labour
for industrial expansion. Stop the establishment of new locations and you stop
evccyUling.30
•
This tirade did not move beyond rhetoric, which characte .ised the nature of the opposition to
the government's plans. Most local authorities accepted the underlying principles propounded
by the government in relation to urban planning and the development of African locations in
particular, which made any opposition from individuals very difficult. The basic plan which
evolved in relation to the development of African locations may have had its origins in the
government, or specifically in the Native Affairs Department, but it quickly gained currency
among other planners on the Witwatersrand. A.J. Cutten, a liberal town planner, concurred
with the essence of the government's thinking. In a memorandum dealing with township
development he agreed that tithe entire economic structure of European life in South Africa
is so dependent upon Native labour, it is Important that such labour be housed in townships
located conveniently close to the labourer's place of work".31 Locations, he argued, could only
be established in the south or north because the main urban develop .•lent on the Reef occurred
along an East - West line." The United Party opposed the recommendations of the Mentz
Committee and established its own Tucker Committee to formulate alternative plans." In
March 1954 this committee announced its recommendations which coincided largely with
those in the Fagan Commission." It called for the recognition of Africans as permanent
'.
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residents in the urban areas, but also agreed that influx control was necessary. The Tur~.er
Report specifically rejected the Mentz Committee's proposal to remove Africans from various
integrated locations." However, by 1954 the United Party was wracked by internal division,
especially ov . the W estern Areas Removal Scheme and it failed to mobilise any kind of
opposition to Mentz."
The Mentz Committee concentrated on formulating plans for the development of new African
locations. From the perspectives of the state anc, capital the restructuring of the urban areas
.msisted of two prongs. Firstly, African people had to be removed from integrated locations
and resettled in suitably situated townships. This was the most important task and received
priority 3*.Wntionfrom the state. Secondly, other blacks - coloureds and Indians ~ also had to
be located in segregated townships. These two aims had to be realised within the context of
regional planning. Therefore, while the Mentz Committee functioned the government also
initiated more invesrigations to address other aspects of urban planning, such as the siting of
industrial townships and the division of the whole Reef into group areas. It is to the most
pertinent of these schemes that we now tum.
•
Subsidiary planning committee: regional planning of group areas
The idea of centralised location for coloureds was first raised in November 1951 at a
conference convened by lD. du Plessis, Commissioner of Coloured Affairs, to discuss
position of coloureds in ti .....Witwatersrand. The conference was attended by municipalities
from all over the Witwatersrand, as well as by senior politicians, including prime minister
Malan, P. Sauer (acting minster ofInternal Affairs) and W.W.M. Eiselen (Secretary for Native
Affairs).37 In his address I.D. du Plessis explained that the need for the conference arose from
•
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meetings he held with municipalities on the Reef and deputations he had received from
among others, the Transvaalse Kle t:rlingvolkbond. The "coloured man" he argued, "found
himself in a very special position that had already been described as 'a brown island in a
I
black sea',"3SIt was revealed in the conference that coloureds constituted only 1,5% of the
total population in the Transvaal and just on 3% in the Witwatersrand/" Alluding to the
existence of numerous integrated locations the conference noted that
This problem this problem required immediate attention in view of the fact that it was
the Government's policy that the coloured community in the Transvaal alos (sic) be
enabled to develope (sic) as an independent group."
Reflecting the general trend to adopt a regional approach in matters dealing with the black
housing the conference resolved "that the principle of centralised ... residential areas be
adopted for the East, Central and West Rand Areas, respectively, and that all aspects and
implications of this motion be investigated in consultation with local and other authorities
with a view of drafting concrete proposals.v" These ideas were essentially adopted by the
committee created to co-ordinate regional planning of 'group areas' for the Witwatersrand. '
On December 2, 1952, the acting Minister of Bconomic Affairs, J.F. Naude announced the
• establishment of the Subsidiary Planning Committee (SPC) under the chairmanship of Dr J.H.
Moolman, also member ofthe Mentz Commission." In his motivation to the press Naude
suggested that the idea of a more permanent planning committee for the Witwatersrand area
originated with Verwoerd at the time of the establishment of the Mentz Commission." At•
least five ministries and the Administrator of the Transvaal were consulted on the formation
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of the 8PC. Although it was declared to be merely an advisory body> the 8PC was also
expected to "provide a lead in the planning of the region on a much wider basis.v" The SPC
was to function under the auspices of the Natural Resources and Development Council
(NRDC}, created by the United Party in 1947. The committee would, however, also consists
of senior members from the Departments of Mining, Native Affairs, Transport and Internal
Affairs."
At its first meeting held in January 1953, the chairman of the NRDC, P.J. du Toit explained
to ,'j.elegatesthe essential purpose of the new committee;
In the past the one department or local authority seldom knew what its neighbours
were planning and each one was just carrying on its own.... this Committee will
provide an opportunity for automatic consultation with the result that various aspects
of development will no longer clash with one another.46
•
The directive from the government was unambiguous ~ad hoc planning and development of
the Witwatersrand had to come to an end. Henceforth, planning and co-ordination would
characterise the state's attitude to urban planning, especially where this involved black people.
It was envisaged that the 8PC would play a key role in co-ordinating the planning of the
Witwatersrand. The future development and planning of industry, mining, transport and
residential areas would be co-ordinated by this body. The committee, one delegate proposed,
"should aim at the preparation of a master plan within which private enterprise can operate ...
Development can follow the pattern outlined by the Committee,":" It was agreed that IICO"
ordination can only be achieved through voluntary co-operation II but ill the event that•
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'voluntary co-operation' was not forthcoming the government threatened to proclaim an area
a controlled area, which would make consultation with the SPC compulsory" The
recommendadons of the Mentz Committee would be accepted by the SPC and any future
racial planning for the region would occur in consultation with the committee. At a conference
held in Johannesburg to inform other role players of the establishment of the SPC Du Toit
promised that the committee would urgently give attention to the big problem of residential
racial integration."
The SPC agreed that various ad hoc committees would be established to investigate the
different aspects of urban and regional planning for the Witwatersrand. Two of the most
important of these committees were the Minerals and Mining committee, and the Group Areas
committee. The latter would be headed by M.C. Barker, another member of the Mentz
Commission. Other members of the ad hoc committee came from the Departments of Native
Affairs, Coloured Affairs and National Housing. This committee played a crucial role in the
division of the region into 'group areas' for coloureds, Indians and whites. Here we will only
be concerned with the proposals it made in relation to the East Rand and th: Springs areas
in particular. It seems from the report of this committee that there as minimal consultation
with local authorities. There are no records of public hearings or investigations as occurred
with the Mentz Commission. Bv this time the government had dispensed with the formalities
• of public hearings and left urban planning in the hands of its committee-men .
In its report the Subsidiary Planning Committee explained its basic 'principles and work
'. methods', which not surprisingly coincided largely with those set out by the Native AffairsDepartment. The committee aimed, in accordance with the GAA, to devise a system of
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"planning thl:'!~would allow each group the opportunity to develop on their own and at the
same time to ensure the most convenient transport to workplaces without the need for one
group to move through the area of another group to reach their workplaces". so By the
beginning of 1955 the committee had completed its investigations and put forward very
detailed plans for the region. Its report on the East Rand included maps with clear
demarcations of 'group areas' for the region as well as for the individual towns. The proposals
presented by this committee, as with the Mentz Committee, were profoundly to influence the
future planning and development of the East Rand. A basic tenet of these committees was the
understanding that the various towns would be dominated by the white population. Black
people would be located in townships where they could develop 011 their own. As far as
coloureds and Indians on the East Rand were concerned the committee argued that,
... the present number of non-whites, excluding natives. in the different municipalities
is so small and the fact that separate schemes for such small groups in these towns
would be uneconomical, the committee attempted as far as possible to combine the
racial groups of two or more municipalities into a single region."
This report therefore replicated the Mentz Commission's regional planning of African
townships to coloureds and Indians on the East Rand. In its report on Springs the committee• suggested that the coloured population from Germiston, Springs, Boksburg and Brakpan be
moved to one township. It was proposed that this regional township be located south of
Boksburg, not too far from where Reigerpark is situated.52 This area was regarded as suitable'. because of its proximity to the industrial areas which would serve as an adequate buffer
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between coloureds, Africans and whites. S3 The committee also suggested that the 510 'malays'
of the East Rand be located in a single area, within the proposed coloured township. 54 It was
calculated that the 'malay' population would probably grow to about 4000 in 60-70 years and
that enough land had to be made available for future expansion of their residential area." The
planning of residential areas for Indians and Chinese were similarly conducted, with proposals
for the creation of townships on the far east rand and in the GermistonlBoksburg area." The
Mentz and Subsidiary Planning Committees were crucial components in the government's
schemes to restructure the Witwatersrand. Their recommendations, which fused racial
segregation with urban planning In an industrialising country, guided state policy for the next
two decades.
•
It took much longer for agreement to be reached on the establishment of regional townships
for coloureds and Indians, and this was the source of much debate and conflict between the
municipalities. In April 1952 the Springs Council responded to Du Plessis' conference,
advising him "that the Council intends to establish its own township for Coloureds and that
it does not subscribe to the principle of centralised residential areas for Coloureds.?" The
central government's intervention in these matters was less severe than in the planning of
African locations. Thus by the mid 1970s a dual situation arose of joint locations between
some municipalities (Actonville for Indians) and others having their townships, egoBakerton
in Springs. In fact the proclamation of 'group areas' was often delayed because of the lack of
agreement between different bodies on the siting of these townships. Furthermore, the precise
recommendations of the committee were not always adopted, but it nevertheless formed the
basic guidelines for the development of 'group areas' on the East Rand .•
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The initiatives by the government to institute and co-ordinate greater regional planning were
net the only ones attempted on the Witwatersrand. There were also independent plans by
municipalities on the Reef to co-ordinate their work in relation to blacks, In 1952 the Institute
of Administrators of Non-European Affairs was formed as a liaison body for managers of
African locations. In the same year a conference of Reef municipalities proposed the
formation of a regional body - the Witwatersrand Regional Planning Council - "whose
function would be to plan on a regional basis the provision of Native housing on the
Witwatersrand with due regard to the present and future industrial and other development of
the areas. ,,58 These initiatives were indicative of the successful conversion of most town
planners to the idea of regional planning by the mid fifties. The early initiatives of the central
government ensured that the important decisions on the planning of regional development and
co-ordination for blacks would rest with it and would occur within the political framework
set out by the National Party. These principles came closest to representing a blue print for
urban development, and too a large extent they determined the racial restructuring of the cities
in fifties and sixties.
•
Thus by the mid fifties the reshaping of the urban areas begun in earnest. The provision of
houses to African urban dwellers accelerated. In Johannesburg for example, three times as
many houses were built between 1950 and 1960 than in the whole period from the city's
founding in 1886 to 1950.59 The mass provision of housing in the urban areas indicated the
government's recognition of the permanency of Africans in the cities. However, the siting of
these locations was also designed to keep Africans separate so that they did not become too
integrated in the city. They were generally located close to industrial areas so that the main
purpose allowing Africans in the cities was not lost, viz, to provide labour to industry. The
•
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mushrooming of large African townships was central to the reshaping of the cities. This
process was carried on through the 1960s, although the provision of housing declined until
it came to a virtual standstill in the early l 970s.
The commission established by the government preempted the sittings of the LTAB/GAB on
the East Rand and although local authorities were integrally involved in the planning of 'group
areas' they found themselves functioning within the parameters already laid down by the
central government. In fact, the tendency to centralise matters dealing with blacks was
continued over the next period as local authorities were denuded of their power in these
matters. The establishment of the Native Resettlement Board in 1954. to undermine the
influence of the JCC in the Western Areas Removal Scheme. was the precursor to the
establishment of the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards in the early 1970s. Similarly
departments of Indian and coloured affairs were also established. The regional planning
schemes which emerged from numerous committees set up by central government in the early
1950s were therefore absolutely crucial in the National Party's social engineering plans. It is
within the context of the evolution of these plans that the following chapters will discuss
forced removals, resettlements and the making of 'group areas' in Springs.
\
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CHAPTER FOUR
The post-war crisis in Sprlngs
•
From its inception the develo; .nent of Springs was typical for an East Rand town. After the
initial discovery of gold deposits in Johannesburg, prospectors followed the Reef to the east
and 1.' t. Mining camps were established wherever gold was discovered, and these formed
the basis of many of the existing towns in the Witwatersrand. From the thirties, and especially
in the forties East Rand town such as Springs, Germiston and Brakpan were transformed as
they experienced relatively rapid economic development, The burgeoning secondary industry
in this area also had crucial social and political consequences. Deteriorating living conditions
radicalised the black population, who engaged in numerous struggles during this period. The
Communist Party of South Africa played a prominent role in these struggles on the East Rand
and its members were often in the forefront of many of the campaigns waged by communities
during this period. In tum, government created structures such as the location Advisory
Boards were also radicalised and reflected the interests of the community more than in any
other time in their history. Throughout the forties a'lj into the early fifties the housing crisis
in the East Rand locations deteriorated, making living conditions a nightmare for the majority
of blacks. From about 1952 the central government begun intervening more directly in the
urban crisis, representing an important turning point in the development of the East Rand. In
order to understand fully the actions of the government and local authorities in the fifties it
is necessary to come to terms with the conditions in the forties which gave rise to the later
developments. This chapter looks at some of the key features of Springs in the fornes and
early fifties and sketches the background to some of the themes dealt with in the following
two chapters
I
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Springs: from mining camp to industrial town
The founding and initial growth of Springs, like other Reef to'\\'115:,was integrally linked to
the fortunes of the mining industry. Springs started as a mining camp and was initially
almost entirely dependent on the coal mining ii.dustry. For a time it appeared that the mining
camp would not last long as the prospects of coal mining dwindled. However, the discovery
of gold assured the permanency of the settlemen .. ;11d its development into a town. The 1930s
and 1940s were boom decades for gold mining in the i, jon and some Springs mines were
among the most profitable in the world. In the 1940s mines in the municipal area produced
approximately 25% of the country's gold and in the late 1940s the Daggafontein mine was
the largest single -roducer in the world. I The mining industry laid the basis for industrial
development, alvt:h on a small scale initially. From the late 1930s the council also intervened
more directly in stimulating the development of secondary industry. Its efforts were
particularly successful in the late 1940s,2 with investment from national and foreign
companies transforming the town's industry from its parochial focus on mining to being
rapidly integrated into the national industrial economy.
The economic development of Springs, especially of secondary industry, resulted in a steady
growth of the town's population. In J 930 the total population of Springs was 34 455 but
nearly doubled in the next five years to 60 000 as a consequence of the gold boom.' By 1940
the population stood at 102 800. Then the overall growth rate slowed slightly so that by 1950
the figure was 114 100.4 Whites constituted about thirty percent and Africans close to seventy
percent of the total population. The Indian and coloured population remained very small
having a combined total of no more than 2000 in 1950.5
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When blacks first moved to Springs in search of work on the mines they had to take
responsibility for their own accommodation. Originally there was no planning of black
housing, resulting in the development of a shanty settlement on the outskirts of the town.
However, the existence of such an 'uncontrolled' area became increasingly problematic for the
Council in the early 1920s. Besides the overcrowding and unhealthy conditions under which
blacks had to live, the area became a hotbed for various 'illegal' activities. Foremost among
these was the illicit brewing of beer, an activity in which 'a large percentage' of the locations
residents were involved in." This proved to be of particular concern to the mine management
who complained to the Council that mine workers flocked to the location over weekends and
returned to work on Mondays in "a hopeless state of intoxication, some of them incapable for
their work, others insolent and aggressive in their manner, the latter class being the cause of
many assaults and disturbances in the compounds."? For the authorities the primary problem
with illicit beer brewing, was that it represented the inability of the state to control the lives
subsequent activities of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Unions (ICU) on the East
of urban blacks. The struggles by workers in the post World War One period and the
• allowing local authorities better control over their black workers. These factors led the
Rand, albeit without much success, made local authorities more anxious to assert greater
control over blacks, In the early 1920s the government passed various pieces of legislation
to achieve this aim. It attempted to impose stricter pass controls and passed the Native (Urban
Areas) Act and in 1923,8The Act encouraged the establishment of locations as mechanism
Council to establish a formal location 1Y2miles north of the town. In 1924 the old shanty
town had been cleared and the black population moved to the new location, Payneville .
•
Payneville: home to a "strange nation"?
From the time of its establishment Payneville was an integrated black location, with a
majority African population but also including Indians, coloureds and a very small group of
Chinese. The location was divided intc two sections, a small Asiatic Bazaar and the main
African section, The Asiatic Bazaar (later renamed Bakerton after the Baker, the Non-
European Affairs manager) consisted of Indian and Chinese people and was the main
commercial section of the location. There were numerous small trading stores there which
catered mainly for the people in the location and miners in the compounds. The African and
coloured section of the location was surrounded by a fence designed to enforce strict control
over any movement in and out of the location. Municipal police, especially blackjacks as the
black police were known, guarded the few €' -trance points to the location checking permits
and passes. However, people frequently cut holes in the fence making access freer for
residents and hostel dwellers. The location consisted of a men's hostel. municipal houses and
privately owned houses, The owner built houses added variety to housing in the location as
people used all sorts of material • from baked clay to bricks and cement to construct their
houses. The municipal houses were built in rounds at the centre of which were communal
toilets, taps and washbasins. Municipal houses did not have any of these amenities and the
facilities had to be shared by the residents. Not surprisingly therefore, the rounds were the
centre of activity in the location. This was where children played all day and where women
• congregated daily. making these areas the communication nodal points of the location. In the
centre of the location a few rounds were allocated for the occupation of the one thousand
coloured people of the location. This area was known as Cape Stands by the residents because
• it was believed that ali coloureds carne from Cape Town."
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Payneville was initially a single integrated location but the physical separation between the
Asiatic Bazaar and the location made integration between the inhabitants of the two areas
difficult. Over time the two sections were transformed into separate entities. Payneville was
the centre of entertainment with its shebeens, live entertainment and the only place where
blacks could watch films. There were 110 such facilities in Bakerton and it was inevitable
therefore that some interaction would occur between the people from the two sections.
However, the religious and cultural differences remained pronounced and maintained a certain
social distance between them. For one there was virtually no religious interaction. Indians
were primarily Hindu and Muslim. whereas coloureds and Africans were mainly Christian. I I
Furthermore, Bakerton was governed by the Asiatic Bazaar Regulations which controlled
occupation and trading practices there. There was little integration in the workplaces because
those Indians who were not employed in shops generally sought employment outside Springs.
In 1951 the Council set up an Advisory Committee for the area but it had even less powers
than the location Advisory Boards and dealt with matters such as cleaning roads and
petitioning the Council for places to keep animals." These factors tended to reinforce the
idea of separateness between the two areas, so that in the minds of most people there were
in fact two locations. The main connection between Payneville and Bakerton was at a
commercial level. Kenny Madalane, leader of the campaign to reclaim Payneville, remembers
."\, the relationship between the residents:
• 1 was right there ill Cape Stands where the coloureds were .. We had a very good
relationship with coloured families. W~ married one another, it was just mixed
marriages. When you take it with the Indian community, we used to go and shop there .
• they used to come and visit. they used too come and sell bananas, samoosas and other
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school in round four he was fluent in Afrikaans and Zulu, and most of his social activity
things. They went house to house and there was nothing wrong. I don't remember
having a problem with the Indians and Chinese, who also came into the township with
what we called Faliee. Then the police would come and chase them away. We
enjoyed seeing that."
The main integration thus occurred within Payneville between coloureds and Africans. The
so-called Cape Stands sections, separated from the rest of the location by Central avenue, was
originally intended to be exclusively for coloured occupancy. This was impossible to enforce
as coloureds and Africans, especially those living as lodgers, generally chose to live wherever
they wanted. Jimmy "5000" Jacobs' background was similar to at least some and probably
many coloured youths in the 1950s. He was born of coloured mother and Zulu father, and was
generally unaware of his official identity as a coloured." Although he attended a coloured
occurred within an integrated environment. He recalls being harassed for a pass on numerous
occasions and only his ability to speak Afrikaans fluently convinced policemen that he was
coloured. IS For Jimmy Jacobs "There was no such thing as colour in Payneville. It was just
when you went to school you went to a coloured school. There was no such thing as he is
a coloured or he is a black. Except for the ones who wanted to be whiter than whiter.v" The
integration between Africans and coloureds was strengthened by their shared religious beliefs
and inter-marriage. In the post-apartheid era many of the interviewees now remember
Payneville as an ideal location in which race played no role in the lives of people. In fact the
'j~.'! ",;1
\ '"
campaign to reclaim Payneville is strongly infused with the idea of resurrecting the 'racial
harmony' of the location in the pre-apartheid days.
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It would be a mistake, however. to ignore the undercurrents of racial tension, which were
enhanced by forced racial segregation. The existence of separate schools and evert churches
maintained a certain separateness. Coloureds were not subjected to the same racial controls,
such as pass laws, as Africans and there is little indication that they participated in large
numbers in any of the struggles conducted by Africans. }. memorandum from the Springs
branch of the Transvaal Coloured Peoples' Association to the ,11.1111,,1 in 1950 gives some
indication of the consciousness of a layer of coloured peop!-. TIe essence t.,.,
memorandum was an appeal to the Council to establish a coloured location. In its motivation
the association argued that,
For all the years we have lived among natives in circumstances which are foreign to our
customs and habits. Under these circumstances the younger generation degenerates very
quickly.
When we arrived here we were promised that our residence here was temporary, but in
spite of repeated applications for the removal of the coloureds, nothing positive has been
done for us ill this direction; on the contrary all privileges have been denied us,
We are concerned to learn that the Asiatic, a foreigner. has been exempted from all
these circumstances wherein we, the coloured population, suffer. We are very much
concerned to lean that after all these years of living with and faithfulness to the
1
0'
European authority we are compared with the native.l7
The memorandum concluded by appealing to the Council to provide "Facilities for the
furtherance of the coloured on economic and industrial grounds" and made clear that its aim
was to ensure the "furtherance of coloured interests in general as a separate race with its own-I
U tradition and national pride.i'" The memorandum was signed by 105 people, indicating
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support for segregation among some coloureds of the location. The memorandum came in the
wake of the passage of the GAA, giving these people hope of having their own location. An
underlying concern of some coloureds, especially the petty bourgeois, was that they were not
permitted to be involved in any form of economic activity because Payneville was a 'native
location'. This undermined the growth of a coloured petty bourgeoisie. Furthermore, coloureds
did not have any political representation in the city. The Payneville Advisory Board was
exclusively for Africans and its members generally were only concerned with their own
advancement and that of the African petty bourgeoisie. On the one hand, therefore, there
were those coloureds, like Jimmy Jacobs, who saw themselves as part of the black population
and were not interested in defining themselves as a separate 'race' from Africans. On the other
hand, there were those for whom the apartheid policies of the National Party presented an
opportunity to advance their specific class interests. For poor coloured people the idea of a
separate location also held the promise of improving their lot. For some the fact that they
lived in an African location was the reason for their misery. From the mid fifties the demand
for a separate coloured location would become stronger.
Housing crisis in l"llyneville
When the location was established it was designed to accommodate 8000 people. In 1933 the
location's population stood at 5441 but by 1939 the number almost doubled to 10 000.19 By
• 1952 the population had more than trebled to 33 000
2°, four times more than was originally
catered for. Of the total population c 110ureds (or Eurafricans" as they were called by the
Council until 1950) numbered just under 800 and the number of Indians in the Asiatic Bazaar
I
j
totalled nearly 1000.22 The majority of African lived on the mines. For example. in 1952 the
African mine population was 53 321, of which only 1560 were women." In addition almost
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8000 blacks were estimated to live on white owned properties in town." This rapid population
increase, especially of Africans, was a result of the growth in the manufacturing industry and
the gold mining boom of the 1940s, and ref.ected the general trc.-d on the whole Reef. A
survey conducted on behalf of the Council by the National Building Research Institute in
1953 revealed that about 40% of Payneville's population resided there for less than. 10 years."
This confirms the high rate of urbanisation from the late 1930s and is probably itself an
underestimate because it appears that backyard lodgers were excluded from the survey.
The dramatic increase in Payneville's population resulted in a concomitant decline in living
standards. Overcrowding became endemic mainly because the Council did not build any
houses between 1939 and 1951,26 reflecting the general inertia in housing provision for blacks
in the whole country. This resulted in the mushrooming of shanties on the existing stands. A
survey of' olack Council employees conducted by the town engineer revealed that the average
number of people living in a room was 6.1, but there were examples of up to ten people
occupying a single room." Banzi Bangani, renown jazz trumpeter (for the African Inkspots)
of the fifties and sixties recalls the conditions on his father's stand:
My father had a stand in Payneville, which he bought from a previous owner. The main
stand had four rooms and at the back we had three rooms. So you could say we had
a seven roomed house. In the main stand we had nine people and at the back there was.i
a man with his wife and also a single man ill one room. There were about 16 to 18
people on our stand. There was not very much space left 011 the stand. Maybe just
enough to hang up the washing. In each round there were six toilets. So you had more
• than 120 people for those toilets."
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From the above it may be surmised that in all likelihood the number of people living in
backyards was nearly the same as those living in the houses. The figure of 1000 lodgers
indicated by the Council in 195029 was thus clearly an underestimate. In 1953 the town. clerk
estimated the number of lodgers to be 8000.::;0This figure is far more realistic and was
calculated after the establishment of the emergency camp and the removal of some people
(mainly lodgers) to KwaThema. By the early 1950s Payneville resembled other inner city
locations such as the Western Areas townships or the Brakpan location. The overcrowding
and lack of adequate sanitation gave rise to extremely unhealthy living conditions. From the
late 1940s the medical officer constantly complained of the dangers of outbreaks of poverty
diseases such as of tuberculosis and diphtheria. In 1950 there was an outbreak of diphtheria 31
and over 800 people reported at the clinic with tuberculosis." A further indication of the
poverty in the location was the high rate of infant mortality. In J 952/53 the infant mortality
rate among Africans and coloureds was 383.77 and 166.66 per thousand live births o
respectively, compared to only 41.01 for whites."
Council employees earned between £1.06.00 and £1.08.06 a week, with only a handful of
The majority of African adult males were employed either in industry or by the Council. Most
settled in the urban areas. Thus the survey of the National Building Research Institute showed
office workers earning slightly more than £2.34Although most adult males were employed the
pittance which they earned had to feed an increasing number of mouths as more families
that 47% of families in the location could not afford to pay rents without resorting to informal
means of generating income." In this regard women involved in illicit beer brewing played
a crucial role in supplementing incomes. However. the Council attempted to undermined the
home beer brewing industry with the construction of a municipal beerhall and constant raids
on beer brewers.
The abovementioned survey further reveals that Payneville residents were most dissatisfied
with the housing conditions, Less than twenty percent indicated any degree of satisfaction
with housing." On the other hand residents were generally satisfied with education (58%) and
transport(~O%).37In the case of the former there were numerous church sponsored schools
which helped to alleviate the education crisis. Transport was generally not a problem because
of the close proximity of the location to the town ceu.re. Payneville was also directly linked
to the rest of the Reef by the easily accessible railway line. The deteriorating living conditions
of the black population in Payneville created ideal conditions for the mobilisation of residents
against the authorities.
Popular resistance against control in Payneville
From the start Payneville posed numerous problems for the authorities. Like other locations
on the Reef the state found it extremely difficult to assert any real control over the activities
of the population. Not surprisingly, therefore, these locations became hotbeds of opposition -
by formal political organisations and also by numerous forms of independent and 'anti-social'
activity. Gang activity was regarded as a normal part of location life and was particularly
attractive to the youth, for whom there appeared to be no future. It was estimated that there
were about 800 unemployed juveniles in the location in 1951.38 On the one hand, this was
because many employees refused to employ youth whom they regarded as unreliable and not
strong enough to undertake hard manual work. On the other hand, many urban youth loathed
the discipline imposed by industry and chose not to be employed. Their rebellion against the
regimentation of factory work was enhanced by the fact that crime held the possibility of a
•
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better income than the low wages of manual work. Furthermore, educational facilities in the
location was inadequate and was mostly the responsibility of various churches. The Roman
Catholic, Anglican, Methodist and Seven Day Adventist churches all organised their own
schools, whereas the state generally neglected the education of black children. In spite ef
these efforts the schools in the location could only accommodate one third of tJ.- .r -uth of
school going age." Even in Bakerton there was only a primary school and childretl had to
travel to other East Rand towns to attend high school." In the early 1950s the Council
considered building more schools" but these plans were put on hold when the future of the
location became uncertain. It was only with the establishment of Kwa'Ihcrna and after the
passage of the Bantu Education Act that the state built proper schools for African children.
These factors created ideal conditions for the growth of gangs among the youth who were
attracted by their anti-social and anti-establishment cultures. They revolted not only against
the oppression and exploitation of the system imposed on them by white authorities but also
against parental authority.? As in other locations, Payneville gangs acquired elaborate names
such as the "Ringo Stars" and "Mashalashala". Each gang held sway in a particular part of
the location where they had a monopoly over their main money making activities such as
pickpocketing, robbery and dealing in stolen goods. Jimmy Jacobs, who was not a gang
member, nevertheless found their way of life very attractive:
•
I left school when 1was very young. I tried a few jobs but just couldn't come right.
Maybe I did not Iike working then. Then I got arrested for handling a stolen starter.
We went to court and I got acquitted because I was able to defend myself very
articulately". The magistrate told my uncle to put me into school but this did not
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work. .. I tried to make a living by pickpocketing here and there, doing whatever I
could put my hands on. Then in 1955 I decided to go straight. I come from a very
Christian home. M; grandfather was a dean in the church and my mother was very
holy. I could not smoke in the house. She would not even allow you to come into the
yard with liquor. But you always go against the grain. I wanted to taste the things they
were forbidding me to dO.43
After a few failed attempts at going straight Jimmy Jacobs got lucky and won a £5000 lottery
in the sweepstakes in 1960 and earned himself the name 1I5000".Jimmy's luck lifted him out
of the morass of poverty and employing a bit of entrepreneurship (and more luck) he made
a reasonable success of his life as a taxi operator, undertaker, driving school instructor, soccer
club owner and boxing promoter." Most other petty criminals and gangsters were not as
lucky. They were pursued by the authorities and often had to live in the forest between the
location and the Welgedacht mine." Gang fights were common in the location and these
sometimes took on a racial character as coloured and African gangs fought each other. Miners
often complained that they were waylaid by coloured gangsters on their way to the location
over weekends, but these 'racial' incidents did not seems too serious as there were never
reports of serious racial conflict. In any event inter-gang rivalry and fighting rarely spilled
over into the community. Fights between location. gangs did not compare irllits ferocity with
the gangs fight on the mines and hostels. Here the Russians and Hlubis, which were different
factions among Basuto workers, were frequently involved in bloody feuds. These fights
generally occurred in the hostel, especially the Nuffield compound," but on occasion they
would also fight in the location. In the early 1950s the Payneville Advisory Board became
so concerned with crime in the location that it proposed the establishment of a Civil
•
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Protection Unit.47 Crime remained a big problem in the location throughout the fifties and
sixties, occupying much of the Advisory Board's time .
Illicit beer brewing was a key component in the people's resistance to municipal control over
their lives. Women were (if course central to this resistance as they were the main brewers.
They were probably the most marginalised section of the black population in the urban areas.
Industrialisation did not hold many employment benefits for women and formal
unemployment was thus much higher among women. Domestic work was the main sector in
which women were employed, 48 but wages were notoriously low and there was little guarantee
of long term employment. In a situation of low incomes deriving from male employment and
an the increasing cost of living many women entered into illicit beer brewing to supplement
incomes. However, this activity also represented a crucial form of resistance by women
against control by the white authorities and male domination. For decades the Springs Council
attempted to stamp out beer brewing through new laws and daily raids on brewers. But the
women successfully resisted everything thrown at them and it was therefore almost natural
that they would play a key role in the general opposition to the white authorities. Dinah
Maile, Communist Party and Advisory Board member, is remembered by most former
Payneville residents as the main political organiser of the people. She was at the centre of
most of the resistance organised in the location from the 1940s.
•
The most important struggle initiated by Dinah Maile 'vas against the municipal beerhall
which was established in the location in 1937.49 These beerhalls were created by the Councils
• specifically to undermine the illicit brewing by women. Furthermore, considerable profits
could l-e derived from beer sales. Profits from beer sales in the location were indeed very
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good: surplus revenue from 'kaffir beer' sales in £42 026, £38 143 and £55 387 in 1948/49.
1949150 and 1951/52 respectively. This of course also represented a loss in real disposable
income for women brewers and aggravated poverty among the people. The beerhall thus
became the focal point of conflict between women and the local authorities. In 1945 matters
came to a head when women called on location men not to frequent the municipal beerhall.
On the 8 July the Communist Party called a public meeting where Dinah Maile's support "for
domestic brewing of Kaffir beer" was "loudly applauded"." The t'vllowing day a man who
had bought beer at municipal hall was stoned, resulting in the rest of three women. That night
500 hundred women, led by Dinah, demanded the release of those arrested. For the next two
weeks there were regular protest meetings and marches through the location." On July 22,
attempt by the police forcefully to disperse the protesters sparked a riot which went on the
o
two thousand women demonstrated in front of the beerhall to prevent men from entering. TM
whole day and soon spread to the whole location." The violent response of the police
transformed the anti-beerhall protest into an open conflict against the local authorities. A Rand
Daily Mail reporter captured the extent of the revolt:
~
I
I offices and residences of officials were smashed, After the crowd had been dispersed
f
L
I
I ~ The windows of the beer hall, the municipal police station, the native administrative
•
many of them went to the lower end of the township and smashed portion of the iron
I;
I
fence surroum' ing it.53
At the end of the day 1:\' least four people were killed by the police and eleven hos~'i.alised.
Twenty policemen were injured and reinforcements were called in from all over the East Rand'.
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to quell the riot." The demand for the closure of the heerhall did not succeed but the struggle
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of the women shook the authorities to the core. Illicit brewing continued as women were
determined not lose this source of income or give into the control of the authorities.
Subsequent protests against the beerhsll mainly took the form of the demand that it operate
on a non-profit making basis. In 1949 residents protested against the decision of the
government to use profits from the sale of beer to build houses. The Residents' Protest
Committee objected to this 'indirect method of taxation' and requested that people be allowed
to brew beer at home." The Payneville Advisory Board also recommended that the price of
beer be reduced from 2/- to 1/- per gallon.56 However, the joint pleas in the early 1950s by
the Advisory Board and the ANC to reduce the price of beer made went unheeded.
An important feature of protest politics in Payneville at the time (at least until 1950) was the
leading rote played by Communist Party activists, such as Dinah Maile. As in other localities"
the party focused its attention on bringing the Advisory Board under its political sway, in
order to use it as a vehicle for protest. E.J. Baker, the Non-European Affairs manager noted
in 1945 that the Communist Party had four members on the Board and basically controlled
that body. In fact the recalcitrance of the municipality in the face of the protest by the women
was strongly influenced by the role of the communists in those struggles. According to Baker,
"The Communist section undoubtedly fe't that it would be a tremendors feather in their cap
•
if during the term of office of their 4 members on the Advisory Board, the administration
could be compelled to accede to the demand for domestic brewing. lisa Under these
circumstances the authorities feared that any oncession by them would have boosted the
standing of the Communist Party. It would rather risk a riot than make such a concession to
the communists. Nevertheless, the Party's standing in the community was enhanced by its role
J in community struggles and at the time it was the main political organisation in the location.
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At this stage the Advisory Board reflected the general interests of the location residents far
more than in later years. In 1952 a prominent board member, Absolom Khumalo, was arrested
for urging residents to support the stayaway call in 1950.59 In spite of this he was returned
seems to have been the place where POPU'o.lt pressure was asserted on representatives.
to the board with the highest number of votes. The monthly public meetings held by the board
Undoubtedly, however, the role of the Communist Party was crucial in radicalising the board
and making it far more sensitive to the needs of the people of the location. As in the case of
the Brakpan location, the forties represented the most radical period in the history of
Payneville. After the banning of the Communist Party and the radicalisation of the ANC,
many previous party activists shifted their activities to the ANC. Dinah Maile, Khumalo and
viewed as the popular representative of the people.
Legodi, all Advisory Board members, became prominent ANC leaders in the location. Under
these circumstances support for the ANC grew rapidly in the early 1950s as it came to be
o
Tentative steps towards reform
By the end of the 1940s the housing problem in Payneville reached a crisis point. The lack
of any development in housing and amenities resulted in unbearable pressure on the limited
resources of the location. In the late forties there were also increasing and frequent reports
•
of squatting on farm lands adjacent to the town." The rapid increase in the town's black
iO
popuration was viewed as a crisis by the municipality and the white population. The local
employees were particularly concerned about the uncertainties experienced by the African
workforce:
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Inter-related with ;h,e industrial and mining development is the urgent problem of
housing for both Europeans and Non-Enroneans ... We have got to catch up on a
cumulative position of shortage, build ~t: a basis 3f unavoidably inflated costs, due
principally to the increase in labour costs and provide housing at a rental within the
means of the average owner. As businessmen employing large numbers of natives, this
suitable accommodation."
position is of vital importance to us in that the natives cannot be expected to seek
employment and consequent spending power in a town where they cannot obtain
From the mid forties business in Springs pressurised the Council to address the severe housing
crisis in the location. They were especially concerned that Springs would become unattractive
to potential labourers if housing could not be provided, which would in tum adversely affect
possible investment in the town. Moreover, the increasing militancy displayed by the
accommodation in the backyards of whites, increasing the latter's fear of being engulfed by
o
location's residents in the 1940s raised the spectre of the 'black peril' among whites, The close
proximity of Payneville to the town centre and white residential areas became a cause for
much concern. The overcrowding in the location resulted in hundreds of blacks seeking
a black tide. Under the circumstances, tensions ran high between whites and blacks. This
situation was exacerbated by reports of gang fights between blacks and whites. In 1945 a few
•
killings are not known to me, as they were mere'. , reported in shrill terms as murders of
k
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whites were killed by black gangs resulting in an outcry. (The exact circumstances of these
whites by blacks). The white population panicked and convened a "black peril" public
meeting." Both capital and the white population of Springs wanted the Council to take
responsibility for bringing the black population under control. As a result of these pressures
• the Council seriously turned its attention to resolving the housing crisis in the location. In the
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late forties the Council built the Nuffield Hostel to accommodate single male workers. many
of whom were living in white areas. However.early in 1950 the Council complained that
workers were reluctant to move into the hostel, partly because of the stricter control over their
lives which would exist in there.
As early as 1939 the Council had recognised the "dire necessity of having to provide
additional accommodation for natives in the area". But it took a decade before the various
interested parties could agree on a suitable site for a new lccatlon/" Before this the Council
identified at least four areas but the opposition from mining companies prevented development
from starting. The refusal by mining companies to countenance the use of some of their land
for black locations was to re-emerge as an obstacle in the late fifties and early sixties. Only
in 1948 could the Council, the mining houses, land owners and central government agree on
a site, the farms Vlakfontien and Rietfontein which were 4 to 5 kilometres south of the
town." However. it took another three years before the Minster of Native Affairs formally
agreed to the establishment of Kwa'Ihema."
Yet the housing crisis in Payneville cried out for a immediate resolution. The resident ...·found
the overcrowding intolerable and demanded action from the authorities, In March 1950 a
public meeting was held in Payneville to discuss the housing shortage. Fifty people decided
to march into town to demand houses. By the time they reached the police station on the;edge
of the town the number of marchers had swelled to about one thousand. The residents of
Payneville were determined to end the overcrowding in their location ..66 In the context of
• increasing militancy by blacks the Council moved rapidly to implement a recommendation
by the Native Commissioner (in February 1950) that an "emergency camp" be built adjacent
115
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to the main location." By May the Council had secured a loan of £96 850 to build 1700
rooms in the emergency camp, which they estimated would accommodate between 700 and
800 families." By 1951 hundreds of people moved to "temporary housing scheme", known
as Jabavu by the re .•". The scheme was intended to alleviate the overcrowding in
Payneville and accommodate some of the squatters (._}the farms."
•
The emergency measures of the Council only brought minimal relief to the residents of
Payneville. The dire shortage of houses, which epitomised the situation of blacks in urban
areas, remained a serious crisis and all parties demanded a solution. The continuously
deteriorating living conditions suffered by blacks laid the basis for the growing opposition
from all sectors in the location. The struggles in Payneville in the forties were unprecedented
and remained unmatched in the next period. For capital and the white population this situation
was untenable and their pressure on the municipality eventually led to some efforts by the
authorities to deal with the housing crisis. But the wheels of the bureaucracy turned slowly.
especially because it was accompanied by indecision at the highest level of government. This
was a crucial period in the history of Springs and of the black population in particular. It
witnessed the transformation of the tOWI1into an important iadustrial cent: e. In this situation
black people began playing a more prominent role in the life of the town. The housing crisis
in particular thrust itself onto the centre stage of politics in the town. demanding immediate
resolution. Yet. this period is characterised by the lack of solutions and stop-gap measures in
addressing this dire problem. However. in so far as agreement was reached to establish
KwaThema this period at least laid the basis for the transformation of the town in the next
period.•
117
NOTE8
1. Gilfoyle, D: "An Urban Crisis: The town council industry and the black working class in
Springs", Honours Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1983, p.5
2. ibid, p.15
3. ibid, p.6
4. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/25, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
Annual report of the medical officer for the year ended 30th June, 1950
5. ibid
6. Bonner, P: "Divisions and Unity in the struggle: African political organisation on the
Witwatersrand in the 1920's and early 1930's", p. 13
7. Quoted in ibid, p.15
8. ibid, p.lS
9. This is the description given to the location by Moses Magudulela, see Interview with
Moses Magudulela, Springs 9 June 1995
10. Interview with Jimmy "5000" Jacobs, 20 June 1995 in Geluksdal
11. Interview with Abou Khan, present mayor of Springs, 29 June 1995, Springs
12. Interview with G. Khan, 23 June 1995, Bakerton
13. Interview with Kenny Madalane, 12 June 1995, Springs
14. Interview with Jimmy "5tOOO'" Jacobs
15. ibid
16. ibid
o 17. CAD, MSP 113/5/1/25, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,Translated memorandum received from the Springs branch of the Transvaal Coloured People's
Association, Octcber, 1950
18. ibid
19. Gilfoyle, D: An Urban Crisis, p.21• 20. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/39, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee of
4/7/57. This appears to be a revised figure. In 1952 the medical officer reported that the total
population for Payneville was 18 243. However, the records do not h ."~!';';,h, t' " reasons for
this massive discrepancy. The figure of33 000 is probably more accurate because in 1954 the
figure stood at 24000, after the removal of a few thousand people to KwaThema.
21. CAD, MSP i/3/SI1I2S, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
Annual report of the Non-European Affairs manager, July 1950
22. CAD, MSP 113/5/1/28, Mtnutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
Preliminary report of the medical officer of health for the year ended 30th June, 1952
23. ibid
24. ibid
25. Germiston, East Rand Administration Board records, HS/57/14, Final report of the socio-
economic survey at Payneville location, Springs, undertaken to collect necessary data for the
design of the new native township of Kwa'Ihema by the National Building Research Institute,
July 1953
26. Gilfoyle, D: "An Urban Crisis", p.21
27. ibid
28. Interview with Banzi Bangani, 01 July 1995, Kwa'Ihema
29. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/25, Minutes of the Public Health and NOll-European Committee,
Annual report of the manager of Non-European Affairs, July 1950
30. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/31, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
Report of the Town Clerk
31. Springs and Brakpan Advertiser, 2 March 1950
3'2. ibid, 27 December 1950
33. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/31, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
Preliminary report of the medical officer of health for the:year ended 30th June, 1953
34. Gilfoyle, D: IIAn Urban Crisis", p.25
• 35. Germiston, East Rand Administration Board records, HS/57.114,Final report of the socio-economic survey at Payneville location, Springs, undertaken to collect necessary data for the
design of the new native township of Kwa'Ihema by the National Building Research Institute,
July 1953
36. ibid, 1'.23'. 37. ibid
38. Gilfoyle, D: !IAnUrban Crisis", p.29
118
II'
40. Interview with Mr G. Khan
39. ibid
41. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/25, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs
Committee, July 1950
42. Glaser, C: "Tsotsis, Youth Politics and the PAC", in Bonner, P, et al (eds): AI2f!rtheid's
genesis, p.300
43. Interview with Jimmy "5000" Jacobs
44. ibid
45. Interview with Mrs Zenzile Tshabalala, whose son was a gang member and was
arrested on numerous occasions. 14 June 1995, KwaThema.
46. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/27, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
47. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/28, Minutes, Report of Payneville Advisory Board meeting held in
December 1951
48. Bonner, P, et al (eds): Apartheid's Genesis, Introduction, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, p.15
49. Gilfoyle, D: "An Urban Crisis", p. 27
50. CAD, NTS 7676, 110/332, Report of the Springs police District Commandant
51. ibid
52. CAD, NTS 7676, 110/332, Report of the Non-European Affairs manage on the
disturbances at Payneville - Sunday 22nd July, 1945
53. CAD, NTS 7676, 110/332, Rand Daily Mail, 23/07/1945
54. ibid
o
55. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1128, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
'Protest ajainst the proposal to use profits from the sale of Kaffir beer for housing funds'
56. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1128, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
'Memorandum of the Payneville Native Advisory Board and the African National Congress
(Springs branch) to the Iron, the Minister of Native Affairs as a plea for the reduction of the
retail price of kaffir beer in Springs'
" 57 See for example Sapire, H. "African Urbanisation and Struggles Against MunicipalControl in Brakpan, 1920-1958", Ph.D. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987 and
Baines. G: "The Contradiction of Community Politics: The African Petty Bourgeoisie and the
New Brighton Advisory Board", Journal of African History, 35, 1994
119
69. ibid
120
58. CAD, NTS 7676, 110/332, Report of the Non-European Affairs manager
59. CAD, MSP 113/5/1/25,Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
60. ibid. Annual report of the Non-Europeau Affairs Department, July 1950
61. Statement from the Springs Chamber of Commerce quoted in Gilfoyle, D: "An Urban
Crisis", p.43
62. ibid, pA2
63. Mabin, A: "Conflict, Continuity and Change: locating "Properly planned native townships'!
in the forties and fifties", University of the Witwatersrand, p. 318
64. ibid
65. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/28, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
66. Springs and BrakpM Advertiser, 31 March 1950
67. CAD. MSP 113/5/1/25, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee,
Annual report of the manager of the Non-European Affairs Department, July 1950
68. ibid
•
•
1930s placed a big question mark over the future of these locations. By the end of World War
CHAPTER FIVE
The making of an apartheid town
From the time of its founding Payneville, like other integrated Reef locations, represented an
anomaly in a country characterised by racial segregation. These locations were generally
overcrowded and poverty stricken, but they were also places where race often became a
relatively insignificant factor in the lives of its inhabitants. Today it is not uncommon for
former residents of Payneville to describe it as a place where a "strange nation was born and
bred ... and lived together quite nicely". I As long as these 'black spots' remained isolated they
were tolerated by the regime. But the massive urbanisation of black people from the late
Two the integrated locations had become terribly overcrowded and centres of struggle by
black people. The urban demographic revolution of forties presented the ruling class with its
most serious crisis to date.The National Party's solution to the problem was stricter and
compulsory racial segregation. In this schemes integrated locations were regarded as an
absolute aberration and had to be eliminated. This is the fate that faced Payneville and other
'black spots' in the fifties. These locations represented everything the National Party was
against: racial integration, lack of control by authorities and increasing working class
militancy. Their continued existence was not only anomalous to enforced racial segregation
• but also posed a threat to the control by the state and capital over the black working class.
Their removal thus became an essential component of the National Party's social engineering
plans .
•
\
'- The 1950s was a period of intense restructuring of the urban areas. One of the first aims in
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'no were permitted to remain in the urban areas. The establishment of the new townships was
ihis process was to resolve the 'native problem'. This meant placing effective curbs on the
influx of African people into the tOWJl~and to impose stricter control over the lives of those
v'ewed as a crucial part in this plans. The Springs municipality thus expended much of its
f
I
energy in establishing KwaThema and removing Africans from Payneville and the white areas.
It did so as part of the broader regional plan conceived by the government through the Mentz
Committee in 1952/3. An integral part .Jf this scheme was the provision of houses to the
thousands of people living in overcrowded conditions in Payneville. By the end of the fifties
the municipality felt that it had brought crisis faced by it in the late forties under control.
This period also witnessed the GAA machinery getting fully into gear. By the mid fifties the
Springs municipality was deeply involved in developing plans to divide the town into 'group
areas'. These plans did not affect the white population as they were generally allowed to
remain in the areas which they already occupied. But the 'group areas' plans had a profound
influence on the future of Payneville. The Council's intention to declare the location a 'group
area' immediately jeopardised the character of the location. It placed a question mark over the
future of those people who would become 'disqualified' in the event of a 'group areas'
disestablishment of Payneville as an African location and the removal of all Africans to the
proclamation. The essential aspects of the urban replanning in Springs were the following; the
• new township, KwaThema; the imposition of tighter influx control over the African population
so that t~eir numbers in the municipality was as close as possible to the labour needs of
industry; ,:nd the creation of 'group areas', especially for Indians and coloureds. This chapter'. focuses on the first part of this process, as it unfolded in the fifties ..
\~
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•The initial response of the Council to 'group areas' plans was ambiguous. On the one hand,
some Council members took their cue from the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs
(SABRA). For example, they found the input of V.G. Hiemstra, a strong supporter of the
GAA, at a conference of SABRA on the Act, IIa very useful analysis for future reference, as
it sets out the main essentials of the Group Areas Act in an unusually clear and
understandable form. ,,5 On the other hand, the liberal Councillors (who generally took their
cue from the: South African Institute of Race Relations and the Joint Councils) were
influential and convinced the Council to object to the impact of the GAA on black people:
I
Making of 'group areas' in Springs
On the 31 March 1951 the GAA came into operation in the Transvaal and Natal and the two
provinces were simultaneously declared specified areas? The aim of this step was to ensure
that "further inter-penetration is effectively curtailed, and ~to establish] group areas so that
a process of segregating ownership and occupation of the different groups may be set in
motion whereby the existing state of inter-penetration may in the course of time be
eliminated."! From this time the LTAB urged the co-operation of local authorities to "bring
about the desired state of affairs"," Municipalities were requested urqently to follow certain
steps in this regard: to identify areas to be declared defined areas and 'group areas. and to
compile a "group survey map". The LTAB wasted no time in placing much of the
responsibility for the implementation of the GAA with the local authorities. The circular
outlining these proposals was sent to all municipalities and set into motion a flurry .('activity
in numerous towns to meet the requests of the Board. It is within this context that the Springs
Council begun formulating plans for the division of the town ~;'\to'group areas'.
'.
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Council is convinced that only by the way of inter-racial co-operation and consultation,
Council feels that it must express it deep concern at the uncertainty, fear and hostility
to which the Act has given rise.
and not by the way of more separation or of solution imposed on one section of the
community by another, is peace to be found."
In spite of this protest, the Council proceeded to draw up plans for 'group areas' in Springs.
The first contentious issue it dealt with was the presence of Indian businessmen in the town.
Although the number of Indian businesses there was minimal and confined to one section,
there was nevertheless continual opposition from white businessmen to their presence. The
Council was split on the approach to be taken on this question. Some insisted that Indian
traders be removed immediately, while others favoured a softer approach. In terms of the
regulations pertaining to specified areas, which applied to the whole Transvaal, Indian people
could acquire no new property in white areas. The Council was concerned that they would
be able to extend their existing properties and therefore applied for those plots to be declared
defined areas to prevent occupation by Indians of any extension to properties in town,"
However, the decision regarding Indians was reviewed because of opposition from a number
of Councillors. At a meeting in October 1952 a motion in support of the above
recommendations could not secure majority support." At least one Councillor was concerned
that the removal of Indians from the town would occur without proper compensation. The
municipality therefore entered its first negotiations with the Board with no clear position
• regarding the future of Indians residing and carrying out business in predominantly white
areas.
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The municipality's first official recommendation about the creation of 'group areas' to the
Board indicates its uncertainty about how to deal with the allocation of 'group areas' for
coloureds and Indians. Predictably, it recommended that all"predominantly European Areas ...
be declared Group areas for occupation and ownership by the White Group only." With
regards to the black population it proposed:
That Payneville Native Location, Kwa'Ihema Native Location ..., the Nuffield Hostel
and all Native comnounds within thr municipal area be declared Group Areas for
occupation by the Native Group only; provided that where Cape Coloured persons at
present reside in the Payneville Native Location. ti~eybe permitted to remain there
until such time as the Council has acquired land lor occupation by Cape Coloured
persons only;
That the Asiatic Bazaar and the extensions thereto be declared a Group Area fO'.·
occupation by Asiatics only;10
•
A number of issues arise from these recommendations. Firstly, at t:1is stage the Council was
not yet considering the disestablishment of Payneville as an African location. From its point
of view the creation of Kwa'Ihema was designed to ameliorate the overcrowding in
Payneville, to accommodate the influx of new people into Springs and to provide proper
shelter for those who lived in the backyards of white owned houses. Secondly, the Council
continued to view the PayneviIlelBakerton complex as a location where Africans, coloureds
and Indians could live together, even if different sections of it were declared for specific
'groups', At this stage it did not envisage the complete removal. of all Africans from this area.
Thirdly, the Council was determined that Springs should have its own coloured and Indian
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locations. rather than subscribe to the notion of regional townships for these 'groups'. It
specifically rejected the proposal by the Commissioner of Coloured Affairs that coloured
residential areas should be planned regionally because the municipality would be in danger
of losing the people to areas with bigger populations." Towns such as Germistion and
Boksburg were regarded as better Gitesfor the construction of regional locations of this kind,
The Council was however aware that the acquisition of land and the building of houses
depended on money being made available by the National Housing and Planning
Commission.P This was a crucial trump card in the hands of the central government, which
Wa5 prepared to consider the plans presented by Springs, but insisted that the siting of a new
coloured location should be "acceptable from the point of view of the regional planning of
the areas."13
At its first meeting with the LTAB to discuss the proposals for 'group areas: the Council
found the board amenable to its proposals. However, it was informed not to concern itself
with representations regarding 'group areas' for Africans." Presumably, the Board was taking
its directions form the central government on this matter and was awaiting the findings of the
Mentz Committee. The Board urged the Council to identify land for a coloured 'group area'
and to apply for Bakerton to be declared a 'group area' for Indians only. The Board did not
commit itself to the Council's proposals but did not raise any objections to them. It also
suggested to the Council that Indian businesses in town be permitted lito remain in occupation
on temporary permit" and that the permit be valid for a period of three years." The future of
Payneville was not considered at the first meeting with the LTAB and only became an issue
after the Mentz Committee presented its recommendations. The findings of the Mentz
Committee and other bodies established by the government to investigate urban replanning
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on the Witwatersrand fundamentally affected the outlook of municipalities on the Reef. In
most cases the Councils tamely conceded to the government's schemes. It was within this
context that the Council's initial proposals changed in the years leading to Group Areas Board
siting in the town in 19S7. Various factors, including the government's proposals regarding
Payneville, plans for regional coloured and Indian townships and representations from peopl ~
in Payneville, all impacted on the plans for 'group areas'.
•
After the 1953 meeting with the LTAB little progress was made with the creation of 'group
areas' in Springs. This was due to at least two factors. Firstly, there was a lack of enthusiasm
among some Council members to implement the GAA. The Council agreed in principle with
the GAA but indicated to the Board that it would take "no action in regard to the
implementation of the Act ill the municipal area."!" This meant that unless the central
government took action little would be done by the COW"H to establish 'group areas'.
Secondly. the obstacles faced by the LTAB impeded the implementation of the GAA. Only
after the amendment to the GAA in 1955 was the Board in a position to proceed more
expeditiously with its zask of proclaiming 'group areas'. While the functioning of the Board
was delayed, the Mentz Committee completed ita report on regional planning for African
locations on the Witwatersrand. On 28 May 1954 the Secretary of Native Affairs informed
the Springs municipality that "I have the honour to inform you that it is the intention of the
Mentz Committee to recommend to the Minister that the residents of Payneville be removed
to KwaThema areas and that it eventually b,..abolished."!' Although this had not yet become
law, it was clear that the Native Affairs Department intended to implement the
recommendations of the Mentz Committee. The Department instructed the Council to apply
the same conditions which were approved by the minister in the case of Munsieville location
•
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in Krugersdorp. These were:
a) that the inhabitants of the location in due course be removed to the KwaThema
area;
b) that, as the first step in this direction, the renovation of and improvements to
dilapidated and unhygienic houses be not allowed; the inhabitants of such buildings
to be removed to the new area as soon as circumstances penn it;
c) that, in regard to the erection of new schools and churches, these should be
allowed, to ensure that the requirements of the Payneville community arc met, on
condition that the relative buildings are of a utilitarian and luxurious construction. IS
This represented an important turning point in the history of Springs and in particular for the
inhabitants of Payneville. The central government's position on the future of Payneville was
unambiguous; all the location's African residents had to be moved to KwaThema. This
directly contradicted the Council's proposal of retaining the location as a 'group area' for
Africans. As will be shown below this did not represent too much of a problem for the
Council in so far as the African population was concerned because of the establishment of
KwaThema. But the decision to remove all Africans from the old location changed the
• Council's view about what 'group area' Payneville should be proclaimed. This introduced an
important new element in the Council's schemes for the racial carving up of the town'. The
decision by the government to disestablish the old location made it possible for the Council'. to recommend its proclamation as 'group areas' for coloureds and Indians.
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By 1955 the Council was becoming "anxious" to resolve the future residency of coloureds and
Indians. Itwas concerned that the "Provision of housing for the coloured and Asiatic people
of Springs [was] becoming a matter of urgency" and urged the central government to decide
on the fate of Payneville as soon as possible." In February 1955 the Council received a
petition from Indian residents requesting that it create a 'Municipal Housing Scheme' for the
poorer resident" of Bakerton. The petitioners complained that they were the victims of
unscrupulous rich landlords who wanted to eject them from their places of residence because
they could not afford to pay the high rentals and goodwills," They indicated their
preparedness "to accept any kind of scheme that Council can provide, we do not ask for
luxury houses f'-om the Town Council [and] we would like to pay rentals to the Council."?
Overcrowding in Bakerton was often much worse than in Payneville with reports of up to
twenty people living in one house.P The Council was therefore under pressure also to resolve
the housing crisis of the Indian people. But no new development could occur before the
proclamation of 'group areas'. The T~TABwas however not overly concerned about the
'urgency' of these matters and wanted to ensure that Payneville's future be resolved in the
context of a regional plan. It therefore indicated to the Council in August 1955 that the future
of Payneville and Bakerton would not be decided in a hurry."
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In 1953 the Council had identified land to the west of Springs and bordering on the Brakpan
municipality as a possible site for a coloured township". The LTAB was in general agreement
with this idea and its proposal virtually coincided with that of the Council." In 1956 the
Council, and in particular the Non European Affairs Committee, reviewed its position in the
light of the government's decision to remove Africans from Payneville. It was noted that the
areas previously identified for coloured occupancy by the Council were being considered for
•
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white residential areas. The area identified by the Board was too close to an existing whi.e
area, which the Council found 'undesirable'. The Council also considered "that it was
undesirable to have a coloured township on the main road from Springs to Johannesburg.':"
After careful consideration the Council decided Payneville and Bakerton would be the best
areas for coloureds and Indians. It recognised that the removal of Africans would incur some
costs for the Council in payment of compensation but believed the resale of properties to
coloureds would recover some of these. Also, by not removing Indians from Bakerton the
Council would not have to pay compensation." This was a crucial decision which was to have
long term repercussions for Payneville. From this point the Council vigorously pursued the
idea of proclaiming Payneville/Bakerton a residential area for coloureds and Indians. But the
LTAB held a different view. It proposed that the area west of Springs (the New Era Syndicate
ground) up to Kwathema should be set aside for coloured occupation and that the
PaynevillelBakerton complex be reserved for the exclusive residency of Indians." The Board
acknowledged the Council's right to raise objections formally but insisted that until it took a
decision about the demarcation of 'group areas' no progress could be made about the future
of the coloured and Indian residents of Springs.
Within weeks of this stalemate being reached between the Council and the Board, the latter
• Group Areas Board"." In response to this meeting the Springs municipality reversed its
initiated a series of meetings between the different East Rand municipalities to discuss
4) regional planning for 'group areas' for coloureds and Indians. At a meeting held in Pretoria
on 17 February 1956 it was decided that Springs, Brakpan Benoni, Heide!berg and Nigel
would "combine their efforts and recommend regional areas for Coloureds and Asiatics to the
original decision to oppose regional planning and now favoured of a regional township for
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coloureds and felt that Springs, Brakpan and Benoni should co-operate on this matter." It also
recommended that the whole of Springs, excluding KwaThema, should be proclaimed a 'group
area' for whites only. It appears that at this stage the Council considered giving up on the idea
of developing Payneville for coloureds and Indians. It now subscribed to the principle of
regional planning for coloureds and Indians, and reversed it initial proposal of proclaiming
Payneville/Bakerton 'group areas' for blacks,
However, in March of the same year the municipality reverted to a previous proposal. It was
dissatisfied with the suggested regional townships for coloureds and Indians, and resolved to
recommend to the Board that Payneville and Bakerton be proclaimed for coloureds and
Indians." The area was regarded suitable because of the availability of approximately 5000
stands which according to their calculation would take 70 years to fill. Furthermore, they
believed there would not be dissatisfaction if coloureds and Indians lived adjacent to each
other, especially if a buffer strip was put in place." Although the Council preferred to develop
areas for Indian and coloured occupation it was also concerned that such a development
would lead to an influx into the town. Some members even suggested that some influx
measures be considered to keep out unwanted coloureds and Indians."
•
The GAB sitting in Springs
At its final preparation meeting before the sitting of the Board the municipality debated
whether coloureds and Indians should be given freehold rights, the issue of compensation and
the presence of Indian traders in town. It was noted that the Council could face compensation
claims of about £150000 . it was concerned that the government had not specified who would
be liable to pay compensation, especially because the GAA did not provide for the payment
•
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That the Indians and Coloured persons be given freehold rights in the area to be set
aside for them when group areas are declared in Springs;
of compensation." The issue causing most debate was whether to grant freehold rights to
coloureds and Indians with some Councillors raising the fear the ownership for Indians would
lead to uncontrolled influx into Springs." At the end of a lengthy debate in which resolutions
were passed and then amended, the Council resolved among other things:
That trading by Indians also be confined to their residential areas;
That Indian traders be allowed a period of two years within whicb to leave the town
after the proclamation of their grorp area;
That Coloured and Indian areas be referred to the Group Areas Development Board
in regard to the payment of compensation.l"
•
Itwas with these proposals that the Council entered the hearings of the Board in Springs on
11 November 1957. Over the previous five years the Council's position on the proclamation
of 'group areas' for Macks had undergone numerous changes. However, there are no records
of any consultation by the municipality with the people who were most affected by these
plans. For the people of Payneville the Board hearing in fact represented the first opportunity
for them formally to respond to the recommendations put forward by the Council and Board
about where they would be allowed to live in the future .
•
Unfortunately. the available records of the Board hearing do not indicate whether Payneville's
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African residents made any submissions. The Payneville Advisory Board reported that the
residents appointed Advocate Harold Wolpe to represent them at the hearings but there is
nothing to show whether this actually occurred. There are also no official records of
submissions by coloured residents. The main representations to the hearing, other than the
Council's proposals, came from Bakerton residents and the mining companies. Submissions
from companies such as the Anglo American Corporation mainly recommended the
proclamation of certaic ~!··~asas white 'group areas'. The most important representation came
from the Geduld Proprietary Mines, which owned parts of the land Payneville and Bakerton
were built on." In its written submission the mining company indicated its preference to have
Payneville proclaimed a white 'group areal. According to them the "area is very badly situated
for the purpose of housing the Indian and Coloured community of the town in view of the
fact that most of the industries in Springs are situated south and west of the town and
therefore a large number of the residents would have to travel to and fro to work through the
town daily.?" In a veiled threat to the Council, the company indicated it would want to he
compensated if the land was used for anyone other than whites." At the hearings the
companies also indicated their support for the proposal by the Mentz Committee that the
development of locations for Africans should be dealt with regionally and urged the Board
to take a similar approach in relation to coloureds and Indians." Part of their motivation was
that the existence of too many residential areas could adversely affect further mining in the
" region." Their primary concerns were therefore to protect the specific economic interests of
mining and to ensure the best available land was proclaimed for white residency.
• The main opposition to the proclamation of 'group areas' in Springs came from the Indian
,
~
community, primarily businessmen. From their written submissions it is apparent that there
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was some preplanning involved, possibly with the assistance of the Transvaal Indian Congress
and advocates Ishmail Mohamed (now Justice Mohamed)and A. Fischer (Braam Fischer).
Common to many written submissions from Indian businessmen was their rejection of the
proposals of the Board and Council, which they asserted "will have the result of depriving us
of OUf means of livelihood and will ruin us economically. u42 The impassioned appeal of the
owners of Standard Tailors in the centre of town was indicative of the desperation felt by
many Indian businessmen. Their handwritten submission in broken English speaka volumes
of the uncertainty bedeviling Indian businessmen at the time:
I am tailer and hereby wish to place on record my objections the above notice on
various grounds that the above ideas as proposed on map in town hall at Springs will
have the result of depriving me of my livelihood and will ruin me altogether. It will
drastically effect (sic) my wife and children and upset my brother and his wife and
children in health and belonging.
I am resident in Springs since 1934 and I am in tailor at stand 40 together with my
brother. Ihad no complaints whatsoever with members of the European or other races,
No enquiries from the police and other. It will be noticed that we have not caused
hardships or annoyance to anyone and that we have always lived I' :.:cably with OUr
neighbours. Beside tailoring I do not Know any other trade or profession. I see that
• there is no Afrikaaners tailor. I understand my Afrikaaners cutumers (sic) are very
pleased with US.43
'. The advocates representing the community called on the government to halt the proclamation
of 'group areas'." Braam Fischer appealed to the Council to "layoff the Group Areas t_~tn
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•and was boggled by the implication "that the Indian community of 1,100 seriously affected
a total population of 128,000 persons, or that the four stands they owned in Springs and the
one in Geduld made in any impression on one of thp Union's greatest commercial, industrial
and mining centres. ,,45 Ishmail Mohamed told the chairman of the Board that Indian residents
would not comply with its decisions if 'group areas' were imposed on the people." In spite
of these protestations by the Indian community and their legal representatives the Board
proceeded with its plans to demarcate various 'group areas' in Springs. The absence of other
opposition to the 'group areas' schemes made the task of their !Jropam:l~':Sconsiderably easier.
In fact, the one reported submission from coloureds supported the proclamation of 'group
areas' An unnamed woman who spoke on behalf of coloureds H"~:mPayneville argued that
if coloureds had their own location they would tum it into a better place than that which they
had to live under with Africans." This position was supported by :1memorandum sent to the
COMci1 prior to the meeting of the Board. The memorandum, signed by the principal of the
coloured school in Payneville, Mr J.D. Jacobs, urged the Council "to declare Payneville a
Coloured area as soon as possible" because life for coloureds "is terrible in the native
location"." Interestingly, on the second day of the sitting of the Board the town Council
rescinded its decision to support freehold rights for coloureds and Indians. It resolved "That
Indian and Coloured persons be given occupational rights in the area to be set aside for them
... and that the question of freehold rights be deferred sine die.'?" The precise reasons for this
turnabout is unclear. One may surmise, however, that opposition from the Board and business
would have convinced those Councillors initially in support of granting freehold rights to
coloureds and Indians, to change their minds .
•
By 1957 the Board had overcome most of the legal obstacles confronted by it in the early
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The decline of Payneville and the rlse of KwaThema
The future of Payneville was also integrally linked to the establishment of KwaThema, first
as an attempt to alleviate the overcrowding in Payneville and then from 1954 as the
alternative African location in Springs. From its c;JJablishment in 1952, KwaThema became
the main project for the housing of Africans in Springs. Its development formed part of the
general trend to concentrate on the building of massive townships all over the Reef. In the
19505 and was beginning to proceed speedily with the proclamation of 'group areas'. It
specifically had the powers to ignore opposition representations, as it did with the objections
from the Indian community of Springs. The Board's report and recommendations coincided
k:gely with the proposals of the town Council. It supported the removal of all Africans in
Springs to KwaThema and the proclamation of Payneville/Bakerton for occupation ofIndians
and coloureds." The Board also satisfied itself that its recommendations did not interfere with
mining activity and that the proposed development of residential areas for coloureds and
Indians was sufficiently separated from white development.Tt opposed the destruction of
Payneville and Bakerton because of the capital already invested there." Furthermore, the
removal of coloured and Indian people to other areas would mean additional expenditure
which the government and the Council wanted to avoid. With the exception of Kwa'Ihema,
Payneville and Bakerton, the rest of Springs was earmarked as a 'group area' for ownership
and occupation by whites only. Thus, eight years after 'the passage of the GAA it seemed the
most influential parties, viz., the government, municipality and white capital in Springs, all
agreed 01'\ the racial demarcation of the town and all that remained was for the plans to be
implemented. This agreement, together with the rapid growth of Kwa'Ihema, led the Council
to believe that the restructuring of its town would be effected rapidly.
•
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period from 1952 to 1959 the Council built an unprecedented number of houses for Africans.
This reform was central to its response to the crisis faced by the town in the late forties and
early fifties. But the establishment of Kwa'Iherna was also an attempt to assert greater control
I over the African population than was possible in the old location. As in other centres, thecreation of these big townships was accompanied by the systematic removal of people from
the integrated locations. The Mentz Committee proposed the removal of Payneville as part
of the government's general pian to eliminate all 'black spots' which had become notorious
underlying the government's schemes was to create a reliable and cheap source of black Ifor the lack control the government was able to assert over them. An important principle
labour, and simultaneously to place strict curbs on the influx of surplus labour from the rural
areas. The disestablishment of Payneville and the creation of KwaThema must be viewed
within the context of these dynamics, which influenced the attitude of the Council and the
response of Payneville residents to the various plans of the government and municipality.
The siting of KwaThema was consciously chosen to meet a number of requirements; it was
placed 3Yz miles south west of the town and the main white residential areas, indicating the
Council's intention to keep Africans away from the white areas. However, the township was
only two miles from the New Era industrial area to ensure easy access for Africans to their
workplaces. Building started in KwaThema in March 1952 and by the end of that year dose
• to 1100 houses had been built and about 5000 people mostly from Payneville, had been
settled there. 52 Between July 1952 and June 1953 an average of 95 families per month had
been allocated houses in KwaIherna." These figures indicate the rapidity with which the
• houses were being built in the new township and the demand for housing among African
people. Nature played its role in removing people from Payneville after a tornado struck
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Jabavu in December 1952. The storm easily ripped apart the cheaply constructed houses
resulting in eleven deaths and hundreds were left homeless." Over four hundred people were
moved to ~~~single quarters at the Nuffield and Payneville hostels. However. the majority of
those affected, 270 families, were moved to Kwa'Ihema and located in an area which is still
known as Tornado=
The construction of houses in KwaThema continued apace and by 1954 no less than 2226
municipal houses had been built and the Township's population had grown to 13 894.56 By
1958 there were over 6000 municipal houses and the population had swelled to 34 838351,
nearly trebling in four years. Between 1952 and 1957 the population in Payneville underwent
a precipitous decline from 33 000 to 9820,58 indicating a massive transfer of the old location's
people to Kwathema. Significantly, these transfers were primarily voluntary because people
were attracted by the provision of houses. It is now argued by some previous residents of
Payneville that the removal of people affected by the tornado was not voluntary." However,
this does not detract from the fact that the period from 1952 to 1958 witnessed a voluntary
mass migration by thousands of Africans out of Payneville. By 1957 the municipality had
borrowed £1 716214 from the National Housing and Planning Commission for the provision
of housing and other amenities in Kwa'Ihema/"
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• The development of KwaThema had a profound impact 011 the consciousness of the thousands
of residents who lived in unhealthy and overcrowded conditions in Payneville. For the lodgers
and squatters who were forced to cram into small rooms and corrugated iron constructions,
the idea of living in their owr ouse seemed like a miracle. Jimmy "5000" Jacobs was
possibly the last person to leave Payneville in the late seventies and therefore witnessed the
•
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Idecline of the location from the early fifties. For him the rush to get a house in KwaThema
was understandable because people "would rather be a landlord somewhere in the bundu than
be subservient to a landlord in the Iocation.v'" Not surprisingly, therefore. the official number
of lodgers in Payneville declined by nearly 80% in the five years between 1953 and 1958.62
In fact by the end of the fifties the Council succeeded in restoring the housing situation in the
old location to what it had been at the beginning of the forties. With a population of just
under 10 000 the location was still overcrowded but living conditions had improved since the
early fifties. Indeed many previous residents remember this period as the best in Payneville
and some of them do not recall there being a housing problem in the location."
Lodgers and squatters were not the only people ready to leave the old location. Banzi Bangani
remembers that as a newly married young man, he was absolutely thrilled at the prospect of
moving out of his father's overcrowded house in Payneville and acquiring his own house:
It was a relief when the Council said you are now going to get your own place. You'll
have your own toilet and you can put ill your own bathroom. People said this is nice.
Young and middle aged people owned no stand in Payneville, and perticularly those
who lived ill the Sackyards. All of them, they welcomed the idea coming to
KwaThema township. I also thought I could have my own house. It was something
beautiful to have a house. People welcomed the idea of having a three roomed house
with a toilet, it was a lovely thing."
•
Payneville represented a dead-end for many young people. The lack of development there
diminished the prospects of them ever having their own houses. Moreover, the amenities
provided in the new township were considerably better than in Payneville. Houses with toilets
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and running water, street lights, numerous public schools, a new hall and better shops -all
these represented major improvements in the lives of African people. The development of
KwaThema attracted many mote people to Springs. Newly urbanised people often moved to
Payneville as lodgers, knowing that they stood a good chance of being considered for housing
in Kwathema, For all of these people KwaThema was seen as a reform. A resident from
Payneville felt so strongly about the development in the new township, he took the unusual
step of writing to the local newspaper:
The community of Payneville cannot help but feel proud of its Town Council, which
is one or the best in solving Native housing problems ...
The economic scheme is viewed with great expectations and it is the pride of the
township.6S
The creation and development of Kwa'I'herna did not proceed without hiccups, even in the
first years of its existence. Numerous problems arose which impacted not only on Kwathema
but also on the old location. Rents in KwaThema were generally higher than in Payneville and
the government shifted away from providing sub-economic houses thereby placing a greater
burden on the majority of the people, who were poor. Furthermore, the state of the new
'houses was not always satisfactory and within the first years of construction many tenants
• complained about impending dilapidation .
The development of Kwathema also meant that the Council expended less money on
• development in the old location. In 1951 the Council promised Payneville residents that it
would construct 100 stands in Payneville extension for private ownership." In 1947 the
in high esteem by other municipaliti-
and township planning before embark. ~';,,
,.,Jucted thorough research on housing needs
·n of the new area. It also employed
Council also promised residents that it would sell houses to them, but the authorities reneged
011 both these promises once houses were constructed in KwaThema. 67 At the same time the
Council also refused the request from the Advisory Board that a swimming pool and old age
home be built. The virtual termination of development in Payneville was largely due to the
i-:ou II'S belief that more facilities were not needed in the location and the any expenses
incurred should be directed to development in Kwathema. This meant that even though
overcrowding was beirq resolved, all the other social and health problems in the old location
generally remained the same,
The Springs municipality presented KwaIhema as a model township and its plans were held
•
local African labour in the building of h, ,:;J. lS •.4\:;' : at it was the first local authority
which built an African location with street lights insta.~:};::J':ill over," But the Springs Council's
emphasis on finding a quick solution to the housing proslem impacted negatively on the
quality of houses constructed in Kwa'Ihema, In general of course authorities did not give too
much attention to quality in building houses for African people and 'he houses in KwaThema
were no exception. In 1952 the Payneville Advisory Board requested that the internal walls
of the new houses be plastered but this was rejected by the Council on the basis of the cost
being "prohibitive". Instead, they suggested that residents white wash their new homes." In
1955 the KwaThema Advisory Board complained that houses started cracking in less than
three months after their construction. Board member, Mr Ngakane, succinctly presented the
views of many people when he told the Council that "If perhaps these cracks came out after
say a period of a year no one would have reason to complain. But the fact that the houses
•
141
cracked as soon, almost, as the houses were completed, the Board felt that not much care was
exercised in the building of the houses."?" The Council's response to this criticism was to
1955 the government passed legislation stipulating that no African person whose annual
promise the appointment of an inspectorate to investigate the matter. The overwhelming bulk
of houses in the new township also did not have electricity. The official position was that
only when 60% of people in area wanted electricity would it be provided. In addition it was
estimated that the installation of electricity would probably cost about £50 per house, thus
placing it well out of the reach of most people." Although there was increasing concern about
the state of the houses in the new township this did not have a major impact on the desire of
many to move there. This was especially true of people who did not have houses in
Payneville and were probably more willing to make do with whatever quality house was being
More serious, however, was the difference in rent between the two locations. The socio-
economic survey commissioned by the Council in 1952 concluded that the overwhelming
number of residents earmarked for removal to Kwa'Ihema would barely be able to afford sub-
economic rents." Rather than build affordable houses for everyone the municipality built both
economic and sub-economic dwellings irrespective of whether people could afford the rents.
By 1956 the initial excitement over Kwathema was wearing thin and people started raising
objections about the living conditions there, and in particular over the high rents. In October
income exceeded £180 was entitled to sub-economic housing. Moreover, the Director of
Native Affairs in Springs reported to the KwaThema Advisory Board that after the
• construction of 1979 sub-economic houses in KwaThema the Council could not get any more
\'
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funding for such houses and that it would only be able to build economic houses."
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At that stage sub-economic rentals varied between £1.2.6 to £2.2.6, whereas economic rentals
ranged between £2.15.0 and £3.00.74 In Payneville the majority of occupants of municipal
houses paid less than £1.18.0 per month", For lodgers, who formed the majority of new
tenants in KwaThema the rent increase was more severe. These rent increases placed a heavy
burden on African people. Itwas estimated that the average income of a black male in 1955
was about £11,'6 meaning that the majority could not afford to live in economic houses. Even
those who earned in excess of £15 a month found it difficult to pay economic rentals. The
government's calculations did not take into account that many families only had one wage
earner and that £15 was far below the cost of subsistence for a family which was calculated
to be about £20.771n addition Kwathema residents had to bear the extra costs of transport to
town and their workplaces. By the beginning of 1957 the discontent in the community found
expression in a joint meeting of the Payneville and Kwa'Ihema Advisory Boards where a
motion was tabled by Absolom Khumalo and Dinah Maile arguing,
that the Council should discontinue building Economic Leering (sic) houses for the
simple and obvious reason that they impose an unnecessary financial burden on the
occupants of such dwellings. Occupiers of such houses are unable to pay high rentals.
The reason why some of the people hardly occupy the houses for at least six months
and why arrears in rent in Kwa-Thema reach a sum of £2,600 should be ObVIOUS to
the Council. It would be reasonable enough if the wages of the people could b-
o
brought to what the government at present as an Economic level (i.e. £15), or else the
line of demarcation for a person to quality under the Economic group be at least £25
... the high rents imposed on HI-paid people cause an unsettlement in the location."'.
Although the "unsettlement" among residents did not spill over into open and organised
opposition, many people simply boycotted paying the high rents which led to an escalation
in arrears. The authorities responded by expelling people from the township but found it very
difficult to replace them with people who could afford the rent. In 1958/59 a total of 224
people were forced to vacate their houses. Of these 59 people were expelled from the location
and III were transferred to cheaper houses. In addition 104 people were transferred from
economic houses to sub-economic houses because of rent defaults." The increasing problems
faced by the residents of Kwathema influenced the attitude of the remaining people in
Payneville, who became more reluctant to leave the old location. Interestingly, the population
of Payneville increased for the first time between 1957 and 1958 since the development of
Kwal'hema." This was partly because less houses were built in KwaThema but also indicated
the return by some people to Payneville, especially those expelled from Kwa'Ihema, In 1959
the Council attempted to deter such behaviour of people by proposing an increase in rents by
as much as 100% in Payneville. It hoped in this way to make Payneville less attractive
economically and thus undermine the growing resistance to the removal of the location.
•
In spite of these problems which arose in relation to KwaThema in the late fifties, the Council
became more determined to disestablish Payneville as a 'native location', remove all the
Africans to the new township and proclaim the old location residential area for coloureds.
From 19:56 the Council seriously begun making arrangements for the disestablishment of
Payneville. In April of that year it was reported that there were no unauthorised structures left
in Payneville and the Council felt it was in a position to implement the directive of the Native
Affairs Department to remove all Africans from Payneville." After considering the financial
implication of removing African people from the old location the municipality concluded that
it would be in its best financial interests to proceed with the immediate demolition of the
•
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temporary housing scheme (Jabavu) and the "gradual transfer of (the) population from
Payneville to Kwa-Thema". 82
The Native Affairs Department set out clear guidelines for the abolition of an African
location. Among its stated objectives was to soften the blow that removal might bring:
The cardinal idea is to give the Native satisfaction as far as it is reasonable possible
to do so. It must be remembered that the sentimental value of their' homes is really
more important than the intrinsic value and while the authorities know that the
demolition of such houses is for the benefit of all, it is not always a simple mutter to
persuade the Natives who have built or bought their homes to realise this.s3
Furthermore, the departmental procedures indicated that the abolition of a location would only
be considered after all Africans had been removed and the issue of compensation had been
finalised." These aitruistic noises made little material difference to the fate of African people
living in integrated locations such as Payneville as the government was determined to have
them removed as soon as it was possible. The response of the Payneville Advisory Board
reflected the petty bourgeois interests of its members. They were ambiguous about the
removal of Payneville and were primarily concerned with how they would be able to finance
the building of their new homes. Speaking on behalf of those people who made a living from•
sub-letting and professionals such traders, taxi-owners, teachers and ministers of religion, the
Advisory Board wanted assurances that they would be able to carry on with their
livelihoods." They also requested that freehold rights be granted to those who moved to• KwaThema. In November 1955 the Payneville Advisory Board "humbly request[ed] the Town
-------------------_j
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Council with all possible respect to withdraw the :emoval of Payneville from its present site
for the following reasons»
(a) This Township was removed some time ego from New State Areas.
(b) Shop buildings and houses are expensive in Kwa-thema,
(c) We travel to and from Town by bus at 6d. and by taxi at 1/-.
(d) We are near Town
(e) It will be unreal to be silent without reference to the removal of PaynevilJe.,,86
Most of these requests were not acceded to and the Council proceeded with its plans to
disestablish Payneville. The one obstacle that did arise was the discovery of further coal
deposits on land earmarked for expansion of KwaThema. A!>a result the Council could not
proceed immediately with its plans to demolish Jabavu. However, the Council also conceded
that other reasons for the delay included "factors such as the inability of the sub-economic
tenant living below the poverty datum line to pay the rentals applicable in K-Na-Thema, the
shortage of sub-economic housing and the additional transport costs to and from the Kwa-
thema"." It took until 1958 for these plans to be implemented and for the people to be moved
to KwaThema.
• Opposition to influx eontrol
It was previously explained that the establishment of big townships by the authorities was
integral to the plan to assert greater control over African labour. Although the government
recognised the necessity of black labour in industry, it did not want to see an influx of
'unnecessary' or surplus African labour into the cities. The Springs municipality took a similar'.
continuously attempted to extend pass laws to women.
approach and throughout the fifties it not only conducted more raids on Africans but
In 1953 the Council published its plans for industrial expansion. Verwoerd was reportedly
"perturbed at this news" because one of its implication would be the need for more African
labour. Verwoerd let the Council know that he was "not in favour of a larger Native location
for Springs than the whole of the existing Kwa-Thema areas."SIfThe minster was particularly
concerned that industrial development should not lead to an uncontrolled influx of Africans
who might not be placed in a controlled township such as KwaThema. The Town Clerk wrote
a lengthy report to convince the Native Affairs Department that the intended industrial
expansion and the concomitant demand for african labour would not require additional land
for African residential occupation. The Council also complained about the "large numbers
of unemployed Natives [that] take up accommodation in the locations ... The Council feels that
it would assist greatly to conserve accommodation in the locations if such Natives could be
permanently removed.?" Thus the Council and the central government concurred on the need
to control influx and to ensure as far as possible that occupation in townships be reserved for
Africans employed in the urban areas.
In February 1954 the Council resolved to enforce section 10 of the Urban Areas Act and
• restrict the influx of African women into the urban areas." In 1955 the Payneville Advisory
Board noted that inspectors were chasing African people from the town and even fined
women £1 if they did not have permits. Board members reported that there was an outcry
• from ordinary people about the refusal by officials to grant women permits." Throughout this
\
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period the Advisory Boards concentrated much attention to opposing influx control measures
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and repeatedly complained u~the Council about arrests of 'bona fide' residents who did not
have permits."
These incidents were only the tip of the iceberg as the authorities harassed thousands of
people for passes and permits. The seriousness of this issue was reflected in the attention
given to it by the Advisory Boards which called for the abolition of the pass system. They
particularly objected to the extension of passes to women. However, their opposition was
derided by Council official who argued that "The native male has always treated the female
of the species as a chattel who must till his soil, cook his food and provide him with a
multitude of children."? A reflection of the seriousness with which the Advisory Boards
viewed the extension of passes to women is the fierce debate which occurred between the
KwaThema Advisory Board and members of the Council in May 1954. In that discussion a
board member expressed himself thus:
•
Europeans are perturbed about the many Africans coming into towns ... The
Government does not believe in Africans being permanent residents in urban areas. It
behoves us to go a little deeper into the economic roots of the cause of the influx.
These women (Skokiaan Queens) must necessarily sell liquor to help the family
budget. The disease must be diagnosed. These people come here because they are
starved in the rural areas ." and not because they are intent on producing illegitimate
children. Immorality will not be stopped by passes."
•
In January 1958 more than two thousand African women were issued with passes in Springs .
A delegation of women informed the Council they objected strongly to the carrying of passes
149
but the local authorities insisted they had no choice but to carry out the law passed by central
government." In May of that year the police arrested all the mourners from a KwaThema
funeral who had come to the cemetery in Payneville." The Payneville Advisory Board
objected to the extension of passes to women because it tiL aot acceptable to the Africans as
a Nation. The Board maintains that the National Pride of African womanhood has been
degraued and the Board beg[s] for redress."? In 1958 ANC women members campaigned
openly against the pass system and attempted to organise a public meeting in Payneville in
November. The Council prevented the organiser of the campaign, Mrs J. Radebe ("a known
leftist"), from holding this meeting." The authorities were well aware of the sensitivity of the
issue and of the campaigns in other areas against the pass system. The opposition by the
Advisory Boards to the pass system represented its most important political campaign of the
fifties. This was partly because the imposition of passes affected residents on a daily basis and
was one of the main national political issues. However, the continued presence of former
communist leader, Dinah Maile, and other radicals such as Legodi was critical in keeping the
Boards in touch with the needs of the people. The Boards also increasingly focused their
attention on the specific needs of the small petty bourgeoisie class in the townships. Thus
much of its contact with the Council was taken up by requests for trading rights. Absolom
Khumalo was a good example of someone who used his position on the Board to influence
the Council to award trading sites and licences to him.
•
•
In a certain sense the continued presence of people like Maile and Legodi on the Boards was
becoming anomalous, at a time when the Congress movement had shifted away from using
the Boards as vehicles for struggle. These Boards, especially the one in Payneville, remained
vehicles of semi-opposition to the authorities. But in the fifties they also became much less
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inclined to be involved in mass action, than was the case in the forties. Although the ANC
was the main politi .al organisation in the townships, especrlly in Payneville, there is little
evidence of it being active during this period. This was partly a reflection of the general
decline in mass struggles after the Defiance Campaign, which was only reversed from the mid
fifties. Besides influx control, the main issues facing blacks in Springs were the removal of
Payneville and the proclamation of 'group areas'. Yet, there was no organised opposition from
the ANC or any other party to these developments, bar the intervention of the Transvaal
Indian Congress at the hearing of the Group Areas Board. It has been argued here that the
main factor undermining struggles against these schemes was that they were in fact regarded
as reforms by the people most affected by them. The provision of housing for tens of
thousands of Africans and the promise of exclusive residential areas for coloureds and Indians
were welcomed by these communities. In the mid fifties these developmerns were not
regarded as a danger to the future of Payneville. People's hatred of racial segregation did not
prevent them from taking advantage of the housing provided by the government
•
From the late fifties numerous problems linked to KwaThema begun to emerge. The high cost
of living, bad housing and the stricter control in the new township caused many people to
consider returning to Payneville. Opposition to these problems began to emerge from different
quarters. This coincided with the general revival in the black oppositior movement nationally.
But in a certain sense the opposition to forced removals and the GAA came too late .. the dye
was cast. The transformation and restructuring of Springs was well underway. From 1952 the
biggest social engineering project undertaken by the municipality, viz., the development of
Kwathema, gathered pace. By 1958 the new township was well established with a much
bigger population than Payneville. The central government's decision that all Africans should'.
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be removed from Payneville virtually determined the future of that location. Its role as the
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centre (If integration and racial unity was brought to an abrupt end. From that point the
Council wanted to convert the old location into a 'group area' exclusively for coloureds. At
I
the end of the fifties it appeared as if the main tasks in the disestablishment of Payneville
were completed. It also seemed therefore that the remove of the rest of the African
population from the location and its proclamation as a coloured 'group area' would occur
quickly, However, this was not to be the case. It took until the early 1970s before the last
African families were smoved and even then the Council did not succeed in having the
location proclaimed a coloured area. The reasons behind these developments are the subjects
of the last chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
Removals and resettlements in the sixties and seventies
The 19605 stand out as the decade of the consolidation of apartheid and the silencing of the
black opposition movement. The banning of the ANC and PAC, and the arrest of thousands
of political activists represented the high point of control by the government over the black
population. In the first decade of its rule the Nationalist government did not have everything
its OWl1 way but by the end of the decade it had set in place marr: of its plans to effect
control over the black urban population. In particular, the establishment of massive new
townships epitomised the apartheid ideal of herding Africans into isolated areas, safely away
from white areas but close enough for them to reach their places of work. The initial success
of this exercise in social engineering had much to do with the fact that it provided a better
standard of living for many urban Africans, in spite of the overriding aim of entrenching
racial segregation.
•
However, these reforms were not long lasting. The townships soon became overcrowded and
the residents were subjected to a much higher cost of living than the)' were accustomed to.
In addition, the state attempted to enforce much greater control over the lives of the people
through influx control and other coercive measures. Under the premiership ofH.F. Verwoerd
the government sought further to entrench and extend racial segregation. The experiment of
urban racial restructuring was now extended to encompass the whole country. The bantustan
system was designed to curb the influx of Africans to the urban areas. The policy of "separate
development" was advocated to give the impression that the government was actually
interested in the development of the African people. From the mid sixties the government
•
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expended more resources on the development of its bantustan policies, partly at the expense
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of the development of black townships in the urban areas. As a result the rapid development
of the African townships in the fifties was not sustained in the sixties. This was also due to
the government's belief that it had brought the "native problem" under control and was thus
less anxious to attend to Africans in urban areas. Furthermore, the verkramptes in the
Afrikaner alliance were campaigning for the removal of Africans from the urban areas. They,
therefore, resisted any further development of townships because it encouraged the permanent
settlement of Africans in urban areas.
On the East Rand the slowdown in the development of African townships hampered the
development of regional townships for coloureds and Indians. The decline in housing
provision for Africans meant that those who resided in the integrated locations could not be
removed and the proclamation of those locations as 'group areas' could therefore not be
proceeded with, As a result various East Rand towns were confronted with a situation where
the racial restructuring started with such vigour in the fifties was slowing down, much to the
chagrin of the local authorities. An important and debilitating consequence of this
development was the uncertainty it created in the lives of thousands of black people all over
the East Rand. Especially affected were the residents of integrated locations. The uncertainty
about the future of the old location also meant that the various municipalities were unwilling
• to spend money to improve them, which led to a further decline in the living standards in
those locations. However, such was the nature of the political defeat of the black population
by this time that they were generally ineffective in opposing the policies and plans of the'. government. The Advisory Boards, some of which had become radicalised in the late fortiesand early fifties, for the most part retreated from oppositional politics and focused their
attention on self aggrandisement and serving the interests of the small African middle class.
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In Springs the Council's attitude towards !~e town's black residents underwent important
shifts. In the period leading up to the sitting of the Group Areas Board in Springs, the
Council was strongly in favour of retaining the Indian and coloured populations of the town
and opposed the regional plans of the government. However, in the next decad- it reversed
its position. In 1952 the Council wanted Payneville to retain its coloured and African
population but by 1957 it supported the of the old location as a 'group area' for coloureds and
Indians. By the late sixties it position had further shifted to support for the declaration of the
area as a white 'group area'. These changes in the Council's position reflected the shifts in
its relationship with the government, from being semi-independent to embracing all the main
tenets of apartheid policy. A further and more detailed study than is provided here is required
to show the changing relationship between the Council, its constituency and the state. It seems
that from the early sixties. especially after the creation of the Management Committees
(1961), the Council became more susceptible to pressures from the central government and
less so from their constituency, The Springs Council certainly became more conservative in
its relationship with the towns' black population which is revealed in the harsher treatment
meted out to residents removed from Payneville from the mid sixties. This change was in
some measure reflected in the Councils' shift from using English as the only official language
• to a predominant use of Afrikaans by the early seventies .
Group Areas in the sixties and seventies: uncertainty and declining living standards
• At the beginning of 1958 it seemed that the proclamation of 'group areas' in Springs would
be completed within a short period of time. The Group Areas Board, the Town Council and
•the major business interests agreed at the end of 1957 on the essentials of the racial
demarcation and restructuring of the town. It was agreed that the removal of African people
from Payneville to KwaThema should occur expeditiously. The latter township would also
become the only area for African occupancy in Springs. Payneville would be proclaimed a
residential area for coloureds and Bakerton for Indians. The rest of the town would be
declared a 'group area' for whites. In November 1959 the municipality sought ministerial
approval for the final disestablishment of Payneville and was confident that a stage had been
reached whcr. .-is could be effected.' However, the proclamation of 'group areas' in Springs
only occurred in 1964 and then only for white areas. Throughout the sixties and up to the mid
seventies the future of Payneville and its residents remained in the balance. The uncertainty
embracing the black residents of Springs was only partly due to problems within the town.
The final proclamation of 'group areas' for coloureds and Indians also depended on the
progress made in the development of regional townships. From the late fifties most African
people knew they would have to move to KwaThema. The main uncertainty confronting them
was not knowing when their removal would occur. Coloureds and Indians, on the other hand,
were made to believe that they would get their own townships in Springs. By the mid sixties
this position changed. These people were to be relocated to regional townships. However,
problems in the development of regional townships for coloureds and Indians further delayed
their removal from Payneville. Hundreds of black families thus lived in continuous uncertainty
as the central government and local authorities vacillated over the final racial demarcation of
the Bast Rand.
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• One of the major stumbling blocks to the disestablishment of Payneville as an African
location was the 'strenuous opposition' of the Grootvlei and Geduld mining companies to the
use of the land for residential areas coloureds and Indian people.' In a letter to the
Council the Grootvlei Proprietary Mines informed them that,
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the I"ttitudeof [the] Company is that it is opposed to your Council's proposal to use the
land fox Asiatic and Coloured occupation. Furthermore, it is felt that, as the original
purpose for which your Council was granted the right to occupy the land, viz. a Native
Township, is being abandoned, it is only right that [the] Company should now regain
the use of its own property for which it never received any compensation from your
Council .
... there is a distinct possibility that the ground to the east of the present Payneville
Township will be required for mining purposes and purposes incidental thereto.'
•
There is little to indicate that the mining company was seriously intent em using the land for
mining and it seems likely that its real motivation for opposing the Council's proposal was
that it preferred the land to be used for white occupation only. At this stage the Council
remained adamant in its support for the proclamation of this area for the occupation by
coloureds and Indians, but it was forced to recommend that the deproc1amation of Payneville
as an African location be withheld pending a decision about the future use of the land owned
by Grootvlei Mining Company. 4 This was because in the event of the location being
deproclaimed, ownership of the land would revert to the mining companies, wh.ch would give
them sole authority over the future use of the land .
• In spite of these problems, the Council still planned that coloured families should occupy
houses vacated by Africans. It aimed to reserve about 300 and 100 houses for coloureds and
Indians respectively in Payneville.' The Council's determination to house coloureds and
Indians on this hind was confirmed by its repeated petitioning of' the central government to
act ill its favour against the mining companies. Some councillors even suggested that the t nd
in Payneville not owed by the mining companies be proclaimed 'group areas'. The Council
feared that Grootvlei mining company might want to sell the land directly to coloureds and
Indians, which would mean the COlIDCil would not be compensated for the investments it had
made in the location since 1923.6 The objections of the mining houses did not prevent the
Council from pursuing its policy of removing Africans from the location. This was not the
point of contention with the mines. On the contrary, they concurred that African should be
moved to the new township. The Council merely wanted to ensure that the deproclamation
of Payneville as an African location should not occur until it was guaranteed of being able
to proclaim it a 'group area' for coloureds and Indians.
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After considerable discussion and pressure applied by the Council on the GAB and
government departments, the Department of Mines indicated it would not oppose the Council's
proposed demarcation of the area.7 However, both the Geduld and Grootvlei mining
companies were U11mOVIJ ':.>y this and reiterated their opposition to the Council's plans for
Payneville. They also claimed that the Department of Mines had not discussed the matter with
them and they were not bound to decisions made by that ministry.! In 1961 the GAB
suggested that the proclamation of a 'group areal in Payneville might invalidate the objections
of the mining companies. Furthermore, the Depart' ent of Mines supported the GAB's
proposal to amend the Surface Right Permit to include coloureds and Indians," But nothing
came of' these plans and the objections of the mines remained a constant problem which t:.e
Council was forced to consider when formulating plans for the location. Nevertheless, with
•
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the support of central government the Council realised the problem WIAS not insurmountable
and continued pressurising the GAB to proclaim the area. It took the best part of two years
for the Council to deal with the objections of the mining companies, albeit with only partial
success. It was therefore unable to make definite plans about the provision of housing for
Indians and coloureds. The situation was further complicated by the government's insistence
that no African location could be deproc imed as long as Africans were resident there.
Initially this was intended as a justification to acce' 'ate the removal of African people from
integrated locations. However, following the slowdown in housing provision for Africans in
the new townships, this policy became an obstacle in the deproc1amation of the old locations.
While faced with these problems the Council came under increasing pressure from the
coloured and Indian communities to improve and develop their areas. As noted in the previous
chapter, members of the coloured community, especially professionals and other middle class
elements became increasingly vocal in objecting to the limits placed on their development
because they resided in an African location. In 1960 the Coloured Welfare Committee
opposed the proposed rent increases and the imposition of a levy fund for the erection of a
school in the location. According to them, the coloured community did not benefit from any
improvements made in the location and they declared that they would only pay the increased
rents under protest." At this time the Welfare Committee was the main organisation
• representing coloureds in the location. It is unclear what the actual strength of the Committee
was in the community, but its recognition by the Council made it the official voice of
coloureds from Payneville. Moreover, its most prominent members, J.D. Jacobs and D.S.
• Isaacs, were well supported and regarded as the leaders of their community.'!
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The Welfare Committee claimed to represent all the coloured people, but it mainly wanted
to further the interests of the aspirant coloured middle class. Thus they primarily objected to
the restrictions faced by coloureds who wanted to open businesses in the location. In a letter
I
to the secretary of the Department of Community Development they complained that
... because Payneville is a Native location. Coloureds are not allowed to trade or own
taxis. These rights are enjoyed exclusively by Natives ... The Natives are able to trade
in Payneville and in KwaThema, their new location, and we are forced te buy from
them and use their taxis.
We respectfully ask you to do everything in your power ... to proclaim Payneville a
Coloured area, as soon as possible.12
For these leaders a crucial benefit deriving from the creation of 'group areas' would be the
elimination of competition from African V rd Indian businessmen. In a 'group area" coloured
businessmen would have almost exclusive access to the purchasing power of the coloured
community. On the one hand, apartheid limited the development cf the coloured middle class
by its preferential treatment of whites. On the other hand, i~gave them some protection from
the cc mpetition of other black businesses. This played an important role in the support given
to segregation policies by elements from the African. coloured and Indian middle classes .
• T~lese people generally tended to collaborate with the government to further their specific
class interests. They also became more prominent in their communities after the defeat of the
liberation movement and the silencing of the more progressive elements of the black middle
• class.
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The Indian residents of Bakerton were similarly becoming impatient with the lack of
development in their area. As in Payneville, living conditions were deteriorating quickly.
Overcrowding reached unbearable proportions because of the absence of any construction of
houses. The last house building ill Bakerton had taken place was in 1939. Since then the
population had increased from about 700 in 1940 to 860 in 1950 and 1233 in 1969.13 The
removal of Payneville also meant that the availability of entertainment facilities declined
dramatically. In 196t M.R. Khan and A.B. Gani applied to the Council for a stand to open
a cinema "for the sole purpose of entertaining Asiatics and Coloureds", H The Council refused
this request because its policy towards Indians in Springs was again under review. In an
interview with the GAB, the chairman of the Non-European Affairs Committee argued that
the Springs Council did not necessarily want Indians to stay in the municipality and favoured
their relocation to a regional township." The implication of the shift in the attitude of the
Council was that it would no longer even consider improving the living standards of the
Indian community. They would have t· continue living in overcrowded conditions until such
time as the government finally decided to move them to the regional township for Indians.
As far as coloureds were concerned the Mayor was of the opinion at the time,
that it might be to the advantage of Springs if all the Coloureds were to establish
themselves in Springs. Coloureds had attained a higher level of development and were
more reliable than nativea, Coloureds usually earned higher wages and would
accordingly have a greater purchasing power. ItS
•
• However, by 1963 the Council shifted from its original opposition to a regional location for
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coloured people. Now it firmly supported regional townships for Indians and coloureds. In
an interview with government officials, including the secretary of Community Development.
the mayor of Springs, Mr. Dyssel, argued that the Council initially thought that coloureds
should be retained in Springs as replacement labour for Africans. However. it was now of the
expensive and preferred that a totally new place should be found for coloureds. Bearing these
opinion that coloureds would never be beneficial in the industrial development of the town. 17
Furthermore, he noted that the upgrading of facilities in the old location would be very
considerations in mind. he supported the removal of coloureds to the regional location
planned in Boksburg, The only problem the Council would then face would be whether it
would be required to make a financial contribution to the Boksburg Council." With regards
to the residents of Bakerton, the Council raised its concern that conditions were deteriorating
rapidly there. It proposed that some upgrading of the area take place considering the removal
of Indians was anticipated to take a few more years. In fact the Council did not think that the
removal of Indians would occur 'holus bolus'. but envisaged that it would take between 10
and IS years."
1. The biggest section of the proposed coloured and indian area fonus part of
The changes in the attitude of the Council, or of individual members among its ranks, were
indicative of the uncertainty that prevailed in the local authority and government about what
to do with Payneville and its coloured and Indian residents. The Council's indecision reflected
• the problems faced by the GAB in finalising its plans for regional townships for coloureds
and Indians. In 1963 the secretary of Community Development enumerated some of tho
reasons for the delay in the proclamation of 'group areas' in Springs:
•
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proclaimed mining land;
2. It would be uneconomical to purchase mining land for the purposes of a coloured
'group area', which would in any event have to re-planned;
3. 'Group areas' cannot be proclaimed in Springs until the Indian regional area in
Benoni had reached a reasonable point of development,
4. The replanning and development of the Indian regional township in Benoni cannot
be proclaimed until the coloureds living there were removed.
5. The removal of coloureds from Benoni to Boksburg was dependent on the removal
of Africans from Stirtonville and Galeview.
6. The proposed area for coloured and Indian occupation in Springs cannot be effected
until Africans were removed from there.2()
Clearly, it was taking some time for the regional plans of the government to come to fruition.
The Springs Council found it difficult to make any long term plans until the other parts of
the regional jigsaw puzzle fell into place. In 1962 the government informed the Council that
• according to the Native (Urban Areas)Consolidation Act, coloureds living in African locations
had to be resettled by the end of that year. However, it conceded that in the absence of
alternative accommodation they should be allowed to remain in Payneville until such time that
• finality was reached about where they would be settled.21 At this stage the Council officially
supported the idea of regional Iocarions for coloureds and Indians, and wanted Payneville to
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be considered as the regional area for coloured occupation. The prevarication of the COWlcH,
and the contradictory positions of its various members, aggravated the uncertainty experienced
by the people from Payneville and Bakerton. This was particularly disconcerting for the
residents because at no stage were they consulted about the caanges in the Council's position.
They were most anxious to see improvements in their lives, whether this occurred in the old
location or in the new regional townships.f More importar, y. they wanted these changes to
occur as quickly as possible. But they were to be disappointed es the governrne , :F,' ':' "I;:
Council continued to vacillate over the future of Payneville.
On the 21 February 1964 the government officially proclaimed Springs as a white 'group
area'." At the same time the Payneville/Bakerton complex was provisionally proclaimed as
a 'controlled area'. Indians businessmen operating in tOM\ were allowed to continue trading
there but had to find residential sites elsewhere." These proclamations did little to ease
people's anxieties. They hoped the proclamation would lead to a speedy resolution of their
problems and continually pressurised the Council to improve their living conditions, but to
no avail." The municipalities responsible for the development of regional townships for
Indians and coloureds, namely, Benoni and Boksburg respectively, indicated that progress was
slow in this regard, The Springs Council thus prepared itself for a policy of 'patient
waiting'," while at the same. time taking steps to ensure that the future use of the land under
question be resolved before the black population was finally removed. In its opinion the best
way to proceed with this was to recommend that Payneville and Bakerton be declared 'group
areas' for whites." This would deal with the objections of the mining houses and
simultaneously ensure the removal of the black population from the area. In making this
recommendation the Springs Council reached another important turning point in it its policy
•
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regarding Payneville and its residents. It no longer entertained the idea of having Indians and
coloureds in its municipality and wanted the old location to be us-edfor the exclusive benefit
of the white community. According to this plan KwaThema would be the only area in Springs
for black occupation. This would take care of the town's labour needs and the people not
essential to industry, that is to say, the coloured and Indians could be disposed of and moved
to another town.
In May 1968 Bakerton was advertised for proclamation as a coloured 'group areas' by the
GAB.2SI have not been able to locate the records of the GAB for this period and therefore
do not know what motivated the Board to suggest this. The Council records do not reveal
whether they were even consulted on this matter. Nevertheless, the Council was strenuously
opposed to the idea because they wanted the whole Payneville/Bakerton complex to be
proclaimed a white 'group area'." The main reason cited for this change was that coloureds
and Indians were to be accommodated in other towns on the East Rand and therefore the
Springs municipality was not required to have its own townships for these people. But what
was probably more significant was the concern of the Council and government that Payneville
was located too close to developing white areas and a main road connecting two white
residential areas." By 1971 the central go' ernment had not taken any action with regards to
the above proposal and the Springs Council became anxious that a proclamation be passed
• speedily. This was partly because residents of Payneville and Bakerton were demanding
improvements and development in their respective areas. For example, the Orient Social Club
from Bakerton requested permission to establish a recreational centre next to the existing
'. township but could get no answer from the Council because of the uncertainty of the futurelocation of Indians from this area."
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Meanwhile in 1965 the Council, under pressure from the Coloured Welfare Committee, agreed
that those coloured families living as lodgers in the location and in white residential areas
would be accommodated in municipal houses left by African families." By 1967 the lodgers
in Payneville were still living under the same conditions. The main reason for not moving
coloured lodgers to better accommodation was because the Council had not built any new
houses in KwaThema. This meant that municipal houses in Payneville were not being vacated
by Africans." Coloureds from the location further complained that they were constantly raided
by the police, were refused permits by the SUI' ntendent and wanted to be treated as a
separate group from the African people. However, the delegation from the Welfare Committee
conceded that if the Council acted partially towards coloureds living illegally in the location,
it would create "racial friction"." The Council responded by agreeing to allow coloureds to
occupy owner-built houses bought by the Council from African residents. These interim
measures became more urgent because the regio-u.l township located in Boksburg, viz.
Reigerpark, could not yet accommodate the coloured population from Springs." By this time,
not surprisingly, the coloured community in Payneville was becoming restive with the lack
of progress in finding them alternative accommodation. In a memorandum sent to the Council
in March 1967, the Welfare Committee urged that action be taken urgently:
on behalf of the community, the committee humbly requests to proclaim Payneville or any
• other area in Springs as a coloured 'group area' to give the people an opportunity todevelop as an independent nation with its OW11 identity. The inexplicable delay in the
proclamation of an area for our people has now become unbearable. We have reached a
point where we can no longer exercise any patience. We feel. and you cannot blame us
• for this, that you have neglected your role as guardians over \IS ... For over 40 years we
have been legally exploited by the Natives ... W,; therefore re.:]ui; urgent assistance and
170
I
I
j
protection."
However, these appeals were ignored by the authorities. By 1967 it had become apparent that
Reigerpark would not be able to accommodate the coloured people from Payneville and the
authorities begun considering alternative sites for a coloured township." Nevertheless, the
government concluded that there was no urgent need to find alternative accommodation for
coloureds because they could reside in Payneville for another five years. Thus the
identification of a new 'group area' for coloureds from Springs and Nigel was indefinitely
postponed."
•
By 1971 the proposal to proclaim Payneville a white 'group area' had the support of the
Springs Council and the Departments of Indian and Coloured Affairs, as well as from Mining
and Development." In a detailed memorandum outlining the motivation behind the proposed
proclamation, the Department of Development argued that the proclamation of Payneville as
a white 'group area' would accelerate the resettlement of the location's residents to ~l}eir
rightful townships on the East Rand. that is to say, Indians in Actonville and coloureds in the
new township in Nige1.40 In February 1973 a top level discussion was held between the
Springs Council and the ministers of Planning, Community Development and Indian Affairs
to consider the future of the location." The meeting confirmed that the cabinet supported one
residential area for Indians on the East Rand, namely, Actonville. However, due to the lack
of facilities there it appeared likely inat the residents of Bakerton would have to reside in the
old location until the late seventies/" Similarly, the new location for coloureds in Brakpan,
Withok, was not nearing completion and it was anticipated that they would have to remain
in Payneville there for at least another three years,"
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In October 1973 some of these proposals were rescinded. At a meeting between the Group
Areas Boards and the Departments of Planning, Mining and Community Development it was
decided that the Indian communities from Springs and Nigel should not be moved because
there was not sufficient space for them at Actonville." Extensions to the latter township were
opposed by the Brakpan Council and the Department of Mining." This marked a shift from
the state's previous insistence that all the Indian people from the East Rand should reside in
one location. The relentless pressure from the affected communities for improvements in their
lives also affected the outlook of the government By the early 1973 it acknowledged that any
further procrastination could potentially lead to a souring of relations between it and the
Indian community." Under these circumstances the National Party felt that it could deviate
from its policies developed in the early fifties and agree to the creation of more Indian
townships on the East Rand. It was also agreed not to oppose the possible creation of a
coloured township in Alberton. These decisions were endorsed by the cabinet in September
1973.47
•
The question of what should happen to the coloured people from Payneville still remained
unresolved, however. In February 1973 the Council undertook a social survey of the location
and in particular of the living conditions of coloureds ( at that point there were only a handful
of African people left in the location). They found that "there is a considerable amount of
dirt and filth scattered around" and the toilets in the hostel were "dilapidated ... to an extent
that it would be impossible to clean ...properly.?" According to the Council the required
improvements to make the location habitable would be too expensive and suggested that
temporary dwellings be constructed for coloureds in KwaThema until such time that they
could be moved to Withok.49 This proposal was supported by the Minster of Coloured Affairs
•
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and the Deputy Minster of Bantu Administration, Punt Janson." However, the coloured
community rejected the proposal." Although no reasons are cited for the Welfare
Committee's opposition, it would be safe to assume that they remained opposed to living so
close to African people. The Council accepted their objections and agreed to invest in
minimum upgrading, such as the installation of pans and the of improvement of street
Iighting.F These improvements did not make much difference, and when ...H:.ltm Suzman
visited the location in the late seventies she described it as "the worst slum in the
Transvaal"." At this stage the terrible conditions in Payneville was threatening to become a
political embarrassment to the government and it hastened the process of relocating the
coloured people. However, the idea of moving them to a township in Nigel had been
abandoned and they were then moved to the new coloured township in Brakpan, namely,
Geluksdal.
Payneville in the sixties: resistance and forced removals
In the first six years of its existence KwaThema rapidly grew into one of the biggest African
Townships on the Reef. By 1960 close to 6000 houses were built and the population of the
township rocketed to about 37 000. The Council could boast that it Was the first township to
be built entirely by African labour and the £140 000 spent on street lighting made it one the
best lit residential areas in the whole country." Occupants of municipal houses and
homeowners were reluctant to leave Payneville. The latter group had the most to lose. Many
of them had invested a considerable amount money and time on their homes over many
decades and were not impressed with the alternative accommodation in Kwa'Ihema.f
•
• In the late fifties and early sixties the Council proceeded cautiously in its dealings with
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Payneville residents, partly because of the increased political activity in the location. The
refusal by the authorities to grant women permission to hold an anti-pass meeting was
indicative of the fear that "agitators" would challenge their control in the location. In March
1960 the anti-pass campaigners called on the community to boycott union festivities. A
pamphlet urged people not to celebrate their oppression and to reject passes and Bantu
Education. S6 Under these circumstances the opponents of the removal of Payneville became
more vocal. In the sixties the homeowners represented primarily by the Payneville Advisory
Board became the main opponents to the removal sckemes, The Board raised all sorts of
objections to the plans of the Council to delay the final removal of the location and the
relationship between it and the Council remained tense throughout this period. Already in
1958 the Board had indicated its shock that the Council had advertised Payneville to be
proclaimed a 'group area' for coloureds and Indians." When a similar advertisement was
placed in the Advertiser in 1959 the Board was confronted by residents who accused them
of being "sell outs"S8because it was assumed that they were aware and consented to the
Council's plans. This showed that the authorities rarely consulted with black people about
plans affecting them, which was confirmed by complaint from the Advisory Boards as well
as the coloured and Indian communities.
•
The main area of contention between the residents of Payneville and the Council was over,
the compensation to be paid to homeowners on their removal to Kwa'Ihema, The Department
of Native Affairs set out the guidelines for the payment of compensation in a memorandum,
which recommended the appointment of assessors to determine the value of properties." The
basis of compensation approved by the Minister of Native Affairs was that owners would be
paid the standing value of the house less the v.Jue of any material retained by them. In•
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addition people would be compensated for costs incurred for demolition of the building and
transport to the new township, unless these were carried out by the local authority."
Furthermore, the municipality could pay homewoners a "consolation" fee "for the loss of the
home which is demolished and in consideration of the inconvenience and expense incidental
to removal"." This was mainly to be paid to people deriving income from subletting.
However, government policy stated that the amount to be paid could not exceed 25% of the
value of the house and recommended that only be 15% because of the "inflated value of
properties"."
From the start the Payneville Advisory Board indicated its intention to secure ~!!~best deal
for Payneville residents and to use the process of valuations to cause further delays. When
asked by the Council to appoint an assessor to represent the people of the location, the Board
resolved to postpone this by a month to allow it "adequate time to consider the matter fully."!)]
In January 1960 the Board presented the Council with a detailed memorandum outlining its
major concerns about the removal of Payneville's African residents. Some of the most
important questions raised for the consideration of the Council were the following:
a) As we belong to the poorest paid section of the Community, we would like to know
how are we then expected to finance the building of our new homes at Kwa-Thema.
This point troubles us very much and we consider other factors ill this regard to be of
• secondary importance.
We, therefore, suggest that a loan system should be introduced by Council, payable
under reasonable terms and conditions.••
b) ... the Board is of the opinion that people resident in Municipal dwellings, who have
/i
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effected improvements in the form of additional rooms, be compensated for
improvements made.
c) ... we are of the opinion that Kwa-Thema is so planned that when fully developed
will be a big modern Township. and we do not visualise its removal being
contemplated within the foresee ..\bl\~ future... In the circumstances, we, therefore,
request very respectfully the Town council of Springs to consider the request of
allowing uu the right of freehold tenure, or alternatively a 99 yeer leasc;.6<i
The Council was amenable to the proposal of making loans available to those who wanted
to build their own homes and indicated that loans of up to 95% were permissible if the value
of the house did not exceed £250. However, it rejected the other proposals arguing that
residents of municipal dwellings already had the benefit of their improvements and could not
expect to be paid for those improvements when they left. Also, the government's policy was
against the granting of freehold to Africans and the maximum period of a lease was 30
years." The Board also questioned the underlying reasons for the removal of the location.
arguing that they could not see how this action accorded with the government and Council's
claim to "give the Native satisfaction", The Council argued that they did not push for the
removal but that it was an instruction from the government which they were merely carrying
out66 The Board also proposed a formula for the valuation of properties which would increase
• the amounts received by owners" and declared the Town Engineer's valuation of properties
carried out in 1956 to be null and void." This was also rejected by the Council which
accepted the valuation method outlined by the government. The response of the Council to
the memorandum did not satisfy the Board and for the next few years it continued
campaigning tor its demands.
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Aftei the completion of valuations, the Council decided that homeowners should be offered
a price not exceeding two-thirds of the valuation of their properties. Furthermore, it kept the
location's residents in ignorance of the original valuations so that homeowners did not know
what offers to accept from the Council for their properties. The Board strenuously objected
to this behaviour and ,,,,,";'.sed the Council of not following the guidelines as set out by the
government. 69 The unhappiness expressed by the Board was reflected in the mood of residents.
By mid 1962 only seven people had approached the Council with offers to sell their
properties. 70 By the end of that year the number of people offering to sea their properties had
increased to 59 and the Council anticipated to spend R34 923 on these properties, However.
this was still less than 5% of the R900 000 the Council expected to pay to residents." The
Payneville Board pursued its objections and in 1961 appointed attorneys to assist it in dealing
with the local authorities. The Council agreed to meet a deputation consisting of the Advisory
Board and its lawyers "for the sake of good relutions''." fit the end of 1962 the same
attorneys demanded that the Council make available the valuations to the Board and
homeowners. Failing this, the Board threatened to take the matter to the Supreme Court." The
Council dismissed the demands of the Board and argued that the problem rested with the
Minster of Bantu Affairs. At a meeting of the Advisory Board the acting Director of Non-
European Affairs stated that valuation would only be disclosed "when a forceful
disestablishment was underway"." For the Board this attitude could only be interpreted as an
• attempt by the Council to minimise the amount paid to homeowners. Board member, W .
Sokhupe, berated the Council for their selfishness:
• Today we are told of a new thing, that people were moving voluntarily. Why were
valuators employed? Why is Council refusing with the valuations? Why does the
177
I
I
..
Council want to buy our houses? The Springs council is a surprising body, it would
not do anything that could benefit its Non-European Community. It is monopolistic in
that it wants to own all the business interests in the townships. We want our valuations
as we may lose them with the march of time.7S
In January 1964 the Board requested the Department of Bantu Administration to withdraw the
authority it had granted to the Council to deal with the above matters." However, the
objections from the Board were ignored and the Council continued with its plans. By the
beginning of 1964 only 8~ homeowners were paid out by the Council, representing an
increase of only 23 over the 1962 figure." The slow progress in removing people from
Payneville hardened the attitude of the Council and in June 1964 it concluded that forceful
measures would be necessary to move occupants of municipal houses to KwaThema. The
authorities were prepared to undertake these measures even though they acknowledged that
the main reason for people's unwillingness to leave the old location was because they could
not afford the higher cost of living in Kwa'Ihema."
The rate of the removals was also affected by the slowdown in the construction of new
houses in KwaThema. Moreover, the natural increase of the new tov..nship's population also
placed demands on the new houses. For example, it was agreed that the 832 houses built in
the early sixties would probably mostly be taken up by residents of KwaThema rather than
• Paynevitle." It was only in the late sixties with the construction of a further 800 houses that
the removal from Payneville gained momentum. Between October 1961 and mid 1968 only
287 privately owned houses and 199 municipal houses out of a total of 879 and 565
• respectively, were demol.ched." Between 1968 and 1969 a further 102 private homes and 139
178
1
j
I
)';
municipal houses were demolished, indicating the greater availability of new houses in
Kwathema." However, residents also remember that the Council acted more sternly against
them. For many of them this period witnessed the worst period of forced removals from the
old location at the time. As in other locations the Council would pin notices to the doors of
people to be removed, often giving them only a few day's notice. Municipal trucks would
come into the location and collect people's belongings, whether they were ready or willing
to move or not. 12 By this time the Council was anxious to proclaim the location a white
'group area' and wanted the black residents out 'Of there as soon as possible. In the end the
Advisory Board could not offer effective resistance to the authorities and people were forced
to accept the compensation paid by the Council, Today, this issue has come back to haunt the
Springs authorities as people claim that they were robbed by the Council and are demanding
proper compensation for their lost properties. Kenny Madalane's mother was paid only R560
for her house in 1969. According to him the house which had five rooms, a pantry and
outside rooms was worth much more than that.S3
The tension between Payneville's African residents and the Council did not just centre around
the question of compensation. The introduction of higher economic rentals in Payneville in
1958 caused further opposition from residents and the Advisory Board. The Council
complained that it was incurring heavy losses in Payneville and was thus compelled to
increase rents, although not for those living ~r sub-economic dwellings." However, the
increases for occupants of economic houses were considerable: the rent for type A.l houses
was increased from £1.5.0 to £3.0.0., for type B.I houses from £1.0.0. to £2.8.6. and for type
C.l houses from £-.l8.0. to £2.5.0.85 The Advisory Board strongly objected to these
increments. P.P. Legodi, a radical member of the Board, argued that the community opposed
•
•
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the increases because:
a) Payneville had redeemed all its loans and rents should therefore decrease rather than
increase.
b) Sanitation in the location was outmoded, resulting in the spread of diseases such as
tuberculosis.
c) In view of the impending removal o..'the location and the decision of the authorities
not to make any further improvements to the location the rental were unac\~eptable.86
Rather, the Council was urged to increase the wages of its workers so that they could afford
to pay for the increasing cost of living. Legodi also argued that residents were not necessarily
against the increased rents but were only prepared to pay these in the new township where
• there were better facilities." In this sense of course he did not represent the views of the
majority of residents who wanted better facilities but could not afford the higher rents in
KwaThema. Nevertheless, the oppositional stance of the Payneville Advisory Board was one
of the main ~eatures of the area in the sixties and was in sharp contrast to the conservatism
of the KwaThema Advisory Board. The latter pursued the narrow interests of its members and
the petty bourgeoisie of the township. Hence it was concerned mainly with matters such as
trading licences and the acquisition of more shops. The Payneville Board was also alert to
these issues and particularly wanted guarantees that traders in the old location would be
• assured of businesses in Kwathema." However, the removal of residents and the declining
living conditions in the old location, often forced the Board into confrontations with the
Council.
•
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Two examples 'c~l!ld suffice to indicate the different approaches of the two Boards. The
KwaThema Advisory Board raised no objections to the passage of the Urban Bantu Council's
Act of 1961 but the Payneville Board would have nothing to do with it at the time. Members
of the latter Board argued that the ~ct offered no improvements in the lives of Africans.
Moreover, they regarded it as a step in the wrong direction because.
The Board was looking forward ~.' the time when Native Councillors would sit
side by side with their White Counterparts and not a Council elected on a tribal
basis to implement tribalism ... the Urban Native has reached a stage where he
had got used to the Western Culture way of living; for him there is no going
back to the Kraal., Natives already resident in Urban Areas, were
detribalised ...89
By 1965 the Board had changed its viewpoint and agreed to the establishment of a joint
Urban Bantu Council with the KwaThema Board." This was at least in part due to tho
dramatic political changes which occurred in the intervening four years. The smashing of the
black opposition and the strengthening of the state made it extremely difficult for a body such
as the Advisory Board to stand out against the laws implemented by central government.
Therefore the opposition of the Payneville Board, however ineffective, remained significant
• under the circumstances and especially when compared to the attitude of its counterpart in
KwaThema. The conservatism of the KwaThema Board was perhaps best expressed in its
message of condolence to the government on the death of Verwoerd:
•
The Hon, Dr. H.I'. Verwoerd was a man of great experiments in the world, whose aim
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was to make this country a happy place for all of us, European and Bantu. The cruel
blind evil deprived him to witness these experiments.
We amy add that the Hon. Dr. Verwoerd as Minister of Bantu Affairs and
Development signed the proclamation which proclaimed KwaThema a Bantu
Township.
The residents of KwaThema further wish to congratulate his Hon. Mr. B.J. Vorster for
being elected our Prime Minister/"
•
No similar message came from Payneville and it was left to the Township Manager to pay
tribute to Verwoerd on behalf of the residents of Payneville and Bakerton." However, the
Payneville Board was by no means radical, as its call for Kwathema to be declared a "Bantu
Homeland" shows." In a certain sense the Advisory Board acted in much the same way as
the coloured's Welfare Committee, which worked exclusively in the interests of coloured
people, even if it was to the detriment of other people. In 1963 the Payneville Board ~ ed
to the fact coloured people were given preference to occupy houses vacated by .'"'l.ulCan
people." It argued that the local authorities favoured coloured residents who even came from
other areas to occupy hOUSf.lS in the location. This meant that African people who qualified
in terms of the Influx Control Regulations could not find houses in Payneville, ir, spite of the
fact that the location was specifically designed for Africans. The Board proposed that
coloureds people should not be allocated houses in the location unless all Africans were
housed."
•
This was indicative of the deteriorating relations between the people in Payneville. The
apartheid policies of the government and the declining living conditions brought about by
182
\
those policies, tended to polarise the community along racial lines over the struggle for
dwindling resources. In the absence of an organisation to direct the discontent of the people
against the state, the people turned against each other. The heightened racial consciousness
was exacerbated by the middle class leaders who saw in segregation and separate development
an opportunity for their own upward social mobility. The sense of community and integration
(and at times even working class unity) which had existed from the mid twenties was torn
asunder by the success of apartheid in the sixties. Under the circumstances existing in the
sixties it seemed as if people would only advance as racially defined groups. In any event the
government would not tolerate anything else.
Opposition to the Group Areas Act and forced removals was virtually abser-t in the sixties,
precisely at the time when thousands of people suffered as a consequence of their
implementation. The crushing of the liberation movements had a devastating effect on the
consciousness of the population. Moses Magudulela remembers that "everyone in the location
was afraid. Very few people tried to do something but they failed."96 The fear of detention
and even death forced people into acquiescence. The Council also threatened people with
deportation to the bantustans and a handful of residents accepted this rather than be moved
against their will to Kwa'Ihema." Businessmen in Bakerton were hard hit by the removals
..~ as their clientele base was virtually 'wiped out in the sixties. But they also felt powerless to
oppose the authorities. Instead some of them fetched people from KwaThema and the mines•
to their shops as a desperate measure to prevent bankruptcy."
In the absence of opposition to the schemes of the authorities, they could proceed with the
• racial restructuring of Springs and the whole Bast Rand, irrespective of the consequences to
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the black population, with virtual. impunity. r;he lack of development in the
Payneville/Bakerton area resulted in a terrible deterioration of living conditions which the
authorities seemed mainly unperturbed by. In 1972173 the last African families were forcibly
I
removed from the location and for the next few years Payneville was exclusively occupied
by just under two thousand coloured people. They were finally removed in 1978179, leaving
only Bakerton with its original residents.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation has attempted to highlight some of the key processes in the making of
apartheid in Springs. The racial social engineering of the fifties and the sixties had devastating
consequences on the black population of that town. Today, Payneville lies in ruins with heaps
of rubble indicating where houses once stood. The or..iybuilding still remaining is the old
clinic which has been used as a police station for many years - a potent symbol of apartheid
oppression of the residents of this former integrated location. It is likely that some residents
will get some compensation for losses suffered juring the removals, but the majority of
previous Payneville residents will in aU likelihood remain in their present townships.
KwaThema and Geluksdal.
It has been argued in this dissertation that when the National Party came to power it did not
do so with a clearly worked out plan to enforce racial segregation. The essence of the
meaning of apartheid was contested within the Afrikaner alliance throughout the fifties and
sixties. It has also been shown that the "practical" faction. representing the interests mainly
of capital. tended to hold sway over government policy. But their ideological dominance was
continually contested by the "purist". who became increasingly influential Hi the sixties.
In 1948 there was no guarantee that the apartheid government would succeed in its aims. It
was not able simply to impose preconceived plans on the growing black urban population.
Indeed the fifties stand out as a period of intense conflict between the state and the oppressed
majority. The struggle against class and racial control permeated virtually every facet of urban
society. Workers. youth, women and squatters in factories, locations and squatter camps
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•resisted the apartheid onslaught and struggled for a better life. These struggles profoundly
influenced the making of apartheid and contributed to delays in the implementation of
apartheid. The defeat of the liberation movement in the early sixties represented a crucial
turning point in the development of apartheid. From that point the National Party was able
to pursue it policies almost without hindrance.
The absence of a 'blueprint' is also revealed by the Group Areas Act which was hailed as the
main legislation to achieve racial segregation. However, weaknesses in the Act and opposition
from different quarters made the functioning of this cornerstone of apartheid virtually
impossible in the first half of the fifties. By the end of the fifties the government had sorted
out most of the legal problems related to the Act and was able to proceed speedily with the
proclamation of 'group areas'. It has been argued, therefore, that by the early sixties the
government had set in place the legal and administrative mechanisms to effect compulsory
o
racial segregation.
The creation of 'group areas' formed an important component of the racial reshaping of the
urban areas. Together with influx control, forced removals and the Native (Urban Areas) Acts,
the GAA was designed to bring the rapidly expanding urban black population under control.
The fifties thus witnessed attempts by the government to implement its racial plans in the
main towns and cities. The Witwatersrand was especially targeted and in the early fifties the
government expended much time in formulating plans for the reorganisation of this region.
This dissertation has also argued that regional planning was essential in the National Party's
racial social engineering. The destruction of the old integrated locations and the relocation of
its inhabitants to regional townships was a vital aspect of the reshaping of urban areas. The
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apartheid city emerged out of these schemes. The plans developed for regional and urban
planning by the Mentz Committee. among others, showed the determination of the National
Party to ensure the success of' apartheid. From the early fifties the central government
intervened more directly in the reshaping of the cities. Itwas determined to assert maximum
control over the black population without having to operate via local authorities. I
J
The formulation of regional plans in the early fifties also represented a turning point in the
disestablished as an African location, set in motion a chain of events which culminated in tile
history of Springs. The Mentz Committee's recommendation that Payneville should be
complete abandonment of the old location. The developments in Springs epitomised the
making of urban apartheid. In the forties the town experienced massive urbanisation and
militant struggles by the Payneville population. In response to this crisis the Council initiated
'group areas' demarcation of Springs and the removal of Africans to Kwa'Ihema, These
the creation of KwaThema. From the early fifties a key preoccupation of the Council was the
developments impacted seriously on the relationship between the residents of Payneville and
Bakerton. From the late fifties, different middle class leaders, organised specifically to further
the interests of particular 'racial groups'. This seriously impeded the: emergence of a united
black opposition to apartheid. It has also been argued that the creation of new townships
represented a reform, albeit very limited. for those people crammed in overcrowded locations.
• This impacted negatively on the ability of the liberation movement to mobilise these people
•
against the GAA and forced removals. By the time the ephemeral character of the reforms had
been exposed in the early sixties, the state had smashed the black opposition movement which
made any resistance extremely difficult. In the sixties the people of Payneville experienced
a decline in their living standards as the authorities prevaricated over their future.
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The nature ;j! this study has 11l1fortunatelybeen limited and there are a number of issues
which require further research. For example, the changing relationship between the central
government and local authorities, and the impact of racial social engineering on the
consciousness of the black population are issues which are dealt with only very cursorily here.
The organisers of the 'Return to Paynevile campaign' argue that they want reclaim the spirit
of the old location. They remember a location without racial tension and hardships. In a
certain sense they want to tum back the clock to the pre-apartheid days. This romantic view
of the old integrated locations is not uncommon. Previous residents of Sophiatown and
District Six also remember the 'good old times'. It is unlikely that the old Payneville will ever
be resurrected. But the support the campaign has received from African and coloureds bears
testimony to the devastation inflicted on their lives by apartheid.
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